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ABSTRACT 
“OUR SPIRITUAL CENTER”: LANGUAGE IDEOLOGY AND PERSONHOOD AT A COMMUNITY 
CHINESE HERITAGE LANGUAGE SCHOOL 
SEPTEMBER 2003 
PETER SILVER, B.A., SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY 
M.A., SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY 
ED.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Jerri Willett 
This dissertation is an ethnographic study concerning language maintenance efforts at a Chinese 
heritage language school in a North American community. This research employs the construct of 
language ideology-members’ common sense notions about language and language learning—to explore 
important aspects of what it means to speak, act, think, and feel like a member of the community. It is 
argued that the heritage language school is the center of a moral project helping to mediate cross-cultural 
experience so that children maintain positive social identities. 
Methodology involves discourse analysis and ethnographic observation. Interviews and texts are 
transcribed and analyzed to suggest structure and pattern. The analysis finds evidence to support the 
conclusion that notions of language and language learning reflect traditional patterns of Chinese thought 
and culture but that these are reconfigured to suit American circumstances. It is suggested that the subject 
position of Overseas Chinese helps members maintain stable notions of self as Chinese. 
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CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW AND CONTEXT 
But now she wants to be Chinese, it is so fashionable. And I know it is too late...I wanted my 
children to have the best combination: American circumstances and Chinese character. How 
could / know these two things do not mix?—From The Jov Luck Club by Amy Tan (1989) 
To what shall I compare myself, so blown by the winds? 
To a lone sand-gull between the Earth and Heaven— 
Du Fu (eighth century A.D.) 
1.1 Introduction 
Amy Tan’s character, Lindo Jong, is hardly the first immigrant to reproach herself for somehow 
failing to pass on cherished ways of being, or to wonder at America’s power to commodify, absorb, and 
assimilate. From their earliest experiences in America, immigrants have used language as a defense 
against loss of communal ways. As Joshua Fishman (1980) observes: “de-ethnization and 
Americanization on the one hand and cultural-linguistic self maintenance, on the other, are equally 
ubiquitous throughout all of American history.” Some nations, Canada and Australia among them, have 
made linguistic and cultural maintenance a matter of public policy. Stephen Krashen (1998) sets forth a 
number of “practical arguments” for doing so-including “national well being,” “individual well being,” 
and encouraging harmonious relations between generations. Other scholars (Brecht & Ingold, 1998; 
Fishman, 1980) have similarly noted how our nation has placed little value on developing heritage 
language as a national resource. 
Despite compelling reasons to regard heritage language as a public trust, responsibility for the 
protection of the mother tongue, along with its myths, traditions, and customs, falls most often upon 
ethnic communities themselves. Yet, while ethnic communities may be unable or unwilling to take on this 
responsibility, an even greater risk, some argue, lies in placing the treasure of heritage language in the 
care of public schools. The intimate connection between language and social identity has caused Pool 
(Woolard, 1998) to describe language planning as “identity planning”—a responsibility that groups 
should entrust to public officials with only greatest caution. Moreover, as Denhauer and Denhauer point 
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out, “language reversal cannot be done to one or for one by others” (King, 2000, p. 168). Fishman 
amplifies the need for individual communities to take responsibility for keeping the home language alive: 
The final disturbing matter is the touching belief of many marked linguistic minorities 
that bilingual education will save their language...Those who want bilingual education 
badly for language maintenance purposes or co-purposes must come to realize that unless 
in their own homes, in their own communities, in their own cultures, in their own social 
institutions and in their own local economies, bilingual education will not only do 
nothing for them, it will do less than nothing (Guthrie 1985, p. 225) 
Indeed, it is the family, Alba (1990) reminds us, that provides ethnicity with its most potent rationale— 
that of descent, and it is within the family that members first encounter linguistic and cultural traditions 
and the sense that these are worth holding on to. 
Given public indifference toward the preservation of minority language and culture in the United 
States, many immigrant groups have rallied community resources and expertise to organize heritage 
language instruction. Whether classes take place for a couple of hours on weekends or, as in some 
instances, replace public schooling altogether, the level of community involvement in heritage schools 
creates, in Fishman’s (1980) words “a world particularly rich in the faith, in feeling, in emotion and in 
dedication,” and all these, in turn, contribute to both school and community continuity. Paulston (1994) 
underscores Fishman’s comment, pointing to the “need to teach the moral values of good and evil, right 
and wrong, in the language in which those values were originally transmitted.” It is this connection 
between values and language that causes Fishman (1980) to observe that maintaining the ancestral 
language must be “viewed as a moral necessity rather than merely as a vital one.” The heritage language 
school is thus the heart of community tradition and so moral coherence. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Despite a great level of dedication, the success of many communities in preserving ancestral 
language remains limited. With respect to Chinese schools, Gallagher (1996) observes that students’ 
language abilities decline even as they attend classes, such that “high school students at Chinese language 
schools generally speak neither as fluently nor as accurately as they did when they first entered school” 
(p. 69). Gallagher attributes this decline to a number of factors, including “greater self-consciousness 
among teenagers, increased resentment of parental pressure to learn Chinese as children grow older, and 
declining motivation.” She further identifies teenagers’ widening circle of interests, which leaves little 
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time for formal language study; failure of colleges and public schools to grant academic recognition for 
study at the community heritage language school; and, importantly, outdated and uninformed language 
teaching methodology. On this last count, Gallagher argues that Chinese schools must catch up with 
current trends in language teaching to encourage communicative competence. Thus, “[T]eachers and 
parents together need to recognize the importance of providing maximum opportunities for listening and 
speaking Chinese.” Campbell (2001) cites Chiang’s ethnographic study of seventh graders in a Chinese 
school in Texas. Chiang similarly notes the failure of teachers and children to speak Chinese: 
Despite the fact that the school administrators, the parents and the teachers invested a 
tremendous amount of effort to construct an environment to facilitate the teaching of the 
Chinese language, their choices in language use for both for formal and informal 
occasions unwittingly defeated the language maintenance efforts by allowing English to 
encroach upon the domain designated for Chinese...in day-to-day instruction, the 
Chinese teacher struggled with the dilemma of establishing rapport with the students by 
using the language with which they felt most comfortable (English), while at the same 
time reinforcing their Chinese language and cultural knowledge. (Campbell, 2001, p. 
289) 
As the principal of a Chinese heritage language school, I have also frequently observed teachers 
and students using a great deal of English during their classes. Without minimizing the importance of 
Gallagher’s suggestion that a communicative teaching approach would increase the amount of Chinese 
used in class, it might be productive to first inquire why such admonitions seem necessary in the first 
place. That is, it might be productive to inquire more deeply into the “dilemma,” as Chiang calls it, 
occurring in the gap between attitudes toward learning Chinese and corresponding behaviors that appears 
to work against learning Chinese. 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
While a substantial literature has developed around language maintenance programs in public 
school, community efforts to transmit cultural traditions remain much as Fishman (1980) characterized 
them more than twenty years ago, “Shrouded by towering mountains of ignorance and vast oceans of 
apathy.” Given their importance to the communities they serve, this scholarly indifference toward 
heritage language schools is hardly deserved. While some might argue that the work of community 
heritage language schools is of mainly parochial interest, these institutions, Fishman (1980) insists 
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must be included in our educational, social and intellectual bookkeeping, more for the 
sake of our national well-being than for their sake, since even the United States cannot 
afford to overlook some 6000 schools attended by as many as 600,000 children, (p. 236) 
A significant number of children represented in Fishman’s statistics attend Chinese language 
schools. A recent study by the National Council of Chinese Language Schools (Chao, 1996) places the 
enrollment of the 634 Chinese language schools across the country at approximately 82,675 students. 
With a history extending back as far as one hundred and fifty years in the United States, Chinese 
community heritage language schools have served a vital role in helping generations of children come to 
terms with racial prejudice, assimilation, and questions of ethnic identity. 
Research into heritage language schools may serve national well-being in several ways. Brecht 
and Ingold (1998) perceive a “groundswell of interest” in heritage language education because of its 
potential as a “national resource” to address social, economic, and geopolitical exigencies. With respect 
to Chinese heritage language schools in particular, Wang (1996), too, insists upon the importance of 
research “to serve the needs of our future generations and help fulfill the language capacity of our nation” 
(p. 68). Thus, one practical goal of inquiry into community linguistic self-maintenance is to “encourage 
and support dialogue leading to collaboration, resource sharing and articulation between formal education 
systems and the nations heritage community language schools and programs” (Brecht & Ingold, 1998, p. 
4). Second, research contributing to an understanding of Chinese heritage language learners has 
implications for improved understanding of Chinese children in mainstream classrooms. For example, 
Wong (1992) reports cases in which UK school officials interpreted Chinese students’ reluctance to 
become involved in school activities as a sign of emotional difficulty: 
Without understanding the needs of Chinese children, teachers are quite negative about 
the 'withdrawn' attitude of some Chinese children. In fact, children... were quite 
conscious of their cultural identity. Because of the pervasive influence of English at 
school and at home through the mass media, they found it difficult to maintain their 
cultural identity by speaking the Chinese language as their parents expect. They had no 
intention of separating themselves from children of other races, (p. 53) 
Finally, while Fishman endorses the practical goals of heritage education, he believes “These 
[heritage language] schools must be recognized as filling an important identity-forming and identity¬ 
providing function for millions of Americans” (Baker, 1996, p. 185). Far from being a divisive force, as it 
is often portrayed, Fishman believes ethnicity is crucial to the moral strength of the nation, acting as a 
wall against increasing commodification and homogenization of our society. Although many in the field 
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of multicultural education share a similar concern, Hoffman (1996) argues that both public school 
teachers and universities that train them offer curricula that frequently treat ethnicity in a way that does 
little more than “reproduce ethnic and racial stereotypes as they promote ideologies founded upon 
traditional categories of race and culture” (p. 565). I agree with Milbum (1998) that a perspective 
focusing on the ways that groups construct culture and personhood through communicative practice may 
provide a corrective to the kinds of stereotyping that Lynch (1989) claims makes multicultural curricula 
“narrow and ethnocentric.” 
1.4 Context for the Study 
People on their way to violin, swimming, or contra dancing practice often pass through the 
Chinese school, possibly without knowing they have done so. Many faces at the Chinese School are 
decidedly not Chinese and English is heard more often than Mandarin. Because it shares the middle 
school venue with various community groups, once or twice a year classes may have to be cancelled or 
rearranged. From time to time, space-sharing leads to minor conflicts, such as when the middle school 
cooking teacher claimed the cabinet space the Chinese School used for its books and supplies. Such 
instances are, however, rare and harmonious relations between the Chinese School and the middle school 
are carefully cultivated. For example, the Chinese School each year gives the secretary in charge of room 
assignments a Christmas present and the school superintendent was last year an honored guest at the 
Chinese New Year celebration. 
The school operates rent-free on school property. Teacher contracts are drawn up by the town 
and although salaries are paid entirely through contributions, Chinese schoolteachers receive their 
stipends on town checks. Materials needing to be copied for next week’s lesson may be left in the school 
office and picked up the following Sunday. Chinese school letterhead bears the middle school address 
and Chinese school materials are stored in middle school classrooms. Further, children studying at the 
Chinese school are able to receive credit counting as a language elective in the public school, though this 
option is rarely exercised. Thus, the Chinese school is, in quite a real sense, woven into the fabric of the 
public school. This openness may be contrasted with the Evergreen School, the site of Belden’s (1997) 
research: 
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leased from the Jesuit school where the academic props and religious messages in situ 
during the week remain on the weekend, the Chinese students operate within an 
environment created for them by people who are (with only a very few exceptions) from 
a different ethnic (and largely otherwise religious and philosophical) group...ironically 
the door to the classroom locks automatically so as to admit no one from the outside once 
students are in; it is the benevolence of whoever sees the outsider trying to enter that he 
or she is approached from inside the classroom, the doorknob turned, and the person 
allowed in! (p. 54) 
Williamston Chinese School was founded by faculty and graduate students from Taiwan in 
1975. Students were children of professors and graduate students, while teachers were wives of these 
professors, as well as female graduate students. While some of these children spoke Chinese as their first 
language, a number of American-born (and so English-dominant) children of local business owners also 
attended the school. Demographic changes have altered the original composition of the school. A few 
graduate students stayed on in America, married locally, and had children of their own. A considerable 
number of non-Chinese children attend the school (after the data for this research were collected, many 
children adopted from China by non-Chinese parents also joined the school). My position as principal and 
the election of non-Chinese parents to the Executive Committee will further suggest the depth of this 
change. 
Because attendance is likely to vary from term to term and even within each term, the following 
description of the student population represents a generalization. Class size can vary between as few as 
four students and as many as ten. Of the fifty or so students, ages range from adult to from four or five 
years of age. While about half the children have parents from Taiwan, a considerable number are of 
“mixed” parentage, for the most part American men of European ancestry married to women from 
Taiwan, though there are a few families where the reverse is true. In addition, two or three families from 
Mainland China send their children to the Chinese school. This small number of Mainlanders reflects the 
fact that Mainland Chinese tend to make separate educational arrangements. The number of children 
adopted from China by non-Chinese parents has grown during my tenure as principal from two families 
to enough to constitute an entire class. A separate class was also opened to serve the parents of these 
children, as well as other adults who are new to Chinese. Five or six families with no Chinese 
connections send their children to the Chinese school for purposes of enrichment. 
All seven teachers are women and most of these have (or used to have) children attending the 
school. The level of formal education and amount of teaching experience are important considerations in 
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the hiring of teachers. The honorary and unpaid position of Principal originally rotated every two years 
among teachers’ husbands, though demographic changes have disrupted this practice (to judge from the 
representation at the annual principals’ meeting, men remain the heads of many Chinese schools in the 
region). 
The gender of principals is an artifact of a rule stating that teachers should not be required to 
take on dual responsibilities. This rule was devised at a time when teachers tended to be the non-working 
wives of university faculty. Rules having to do with positions, tenures, and other administrative matters 
have accrued over the years and are stored, along with other documents issued by the school, in binders. 
When unusual situations arise, these binders are consulted for precedents. Rules may also be amended or 
revised, as when, to cite a recent example, it was decided that Teacher’s Day bonuses should be scaled 
according to length of service. 
Public responsibility toward the Chinese school is part of the district’s broad commitment to 
engaging matters of ethic and cultural diversity. This commitment is a practical necessity in a district with 
a large international population. To call Williamston a “college town” does not adequately describe the 
degree of connection between the town and college community. Williamston is the home of State 
University, and the location of other well-known colleges. These institutions draw a substantial 
international population, including faculty and graduate students with school-age children. While schools 
in neighboring towns might ignore or marginalize their international population, Williamston must 
engage it. 
Multicultural displays and festivals are a regular occurrence in the high school and middle 
school, as well as in the town’s elementary schools. One wall of the middle school cafeteria (used also by 
the Chinese school for classes and snack time) is devoted to a show of middle school art attempting to 
answer questions written large on a banner at the top: “Who am I? What is family? Where do I belong?” 
Here, solutions in poster paint involve some combination of flags, maps, and self-portraiture. The 
sameness of this work suggests either universal agreement with respect to the existential questions posed 
on the banner (making these questions not worth asking in the first place) or the presence of ideologies 
suggesting that matters of personhood, family, and place are up for interpretation-hardly a proposition 
that all members of the Chinese school would readily accept. In addition to working toward maintaining a 
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general climate of respect, the district provides an after-school Chinese heritage program open to all 
children, regardless of first language ability. This program, however, focuses on teaching Chinese culture, 
‘ rather than language, and, like other sorts of after-school programs, its first concern is the needs of 
working parents. 
Williamston Chinese School follows a tradition dating to the Gold Rush period and, as I will 
later suggest, considerably earlier. Even the nature of the relationship between the Chinese school and the 
public school, while perhaps unusual, can be seen as part of a tradition that sought engagement with, 
though not assimilation into, the American mainstream. Unlike a number of other mother-tongue schools, 
Chinese schools in the United States have chosen to be supplements to, rather than replacements for, 
American mainstream schooling (Leung, 1975). Despite ample resources to create separate educational 
institutions parallel to public schools, Chinese parents have rejected the idea of full-time day schools and, 
instead, opted for what Leung (1975) terms “partial assimilation.” The view that the smaller group must 
stand in relation to the society as a whole can be traced back to Confucian social theories. These derive 
from cultural notions of personhood that may not fully accord with the ideology projected by the faces, 
maps, and flags on the cafeteria wall. 
Families with Taiwan connections maintain close contact with home and continually travel back 
and forth, bringing candy, nuts, cosmetics and patent medicines and returning with food, magazines and 
sometimes vacationing relatives. Connections are also maintained by the school’s relationship with the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, an office of Chinese government in Taiwan located worldwide 
and in several large cities in the United States. OCAC, which was established in 1926, and has been 
directly involved in language education among Overseas Chinese for more than fifty years (OCAC, 
2001). OCAC supplies free textbooks and other materials produced in Taiwan, written especially for 
Overseas Chinese. In addition, OCAC hosts an annual Teacher Day banquet, teacher-training sessions 
and an annual principals’ banquet. Until recently, OCAC issued modest stipends to associated Chinese 
schools. These free banquets, training sessions, and materials bind members in a web of mutual 
obligation to Taiwan (it is common knowledge that the practice of stipends ceased because schools 
consisting mostly of Mainlanders were also taking advantage of them). The principals’ banquet connects 
individual schools through chain of hierarchy back to the Chinese government in Taiwan. Thus, the 
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Williamston Chinese School operates within a matrix of dual dependence and obligation, requiring 
support from both the town government of Williamston and the national government of Taiwan. 
Classes are held on Sunday for three hours. Midway through classes, children get together in the 
cafeteria for snacks. Parents alternate the responsibility of providing soft drinks, cookies, and chips. 
Children often leave their seats to play and so parents have to keep a sharp eye to make sure nobody 
wanders away or gets hurt. Except for the fifteen minutes of snack time, Sunday afternoon is a time for 
mothers to talk about things that are happening in Taiwan, the price of airline tickets, how well the 
children are doing in school, and other matters of concern. Opportunity for talk is an unofficial but 
> nevertheless widely understood function of the Chinese School. 
Children’s classes (there is also a class for adults) are divided into four levels, and each level is 
assigned a corresponding book. Books, printed in separate “lower” and “upper” volumes, are intended to 
be completed in a year. As will be described later, these basal readers constitute an important educational 
focus, reflecting, as they do, Chinese parents’ own educational and cultural experience. All teachers are 
addressed, just as they are in Taiwan, by their family name followed by the word laoshi, which means, 
literally, Old (and so venerable) Master. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: LANGUAGE IDEOLOGY AND ETHNOGRAPHY OF 
COMMUNICATION 
2.1 Overview 
The proposed research adopts the perspective of ethnography of communication and considers the 
notion of language ideology to better understand patterns of language use at a Chinese heritage language 
school. In this section I will describe premises central to both constructs and show how they are 
interrelated and relevant to the concerns presented above. 
2.2 Language Ideology 
King (2000) observes, “In many language loss and revitalization contexts, it is common for 
community members to articulate pro-revitalization rhetoric, yet concomitantly, not use the endangered 
language in daily life” (p. 168). This situation, in King’s view, reflects “fundamental differences between 
individuals expressed attitudes toward an object and their actual behaviour surrounding that 
object...individuals often express attitudes about language which seem incompatible with language 
behaviour.” For this reason, “an important step in facilitating greater use of the threatened language... may 
be to acquire a deeper understanding of why this shift seems to be so difficult and in fact, only rarely 
made.” Such an understanding, King continues “is of particular importance for advocates of language 
revitalization and planners of heritage language education programs.” 
As “an area of scholarly inquiry that is just beginning to coalesce” (Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994, 
p. 55) language ideology is defined in various ways. Yet, despite inability to fix on a single meaning, many 
studies refer to Silverstein’s (1957) seminal paper in which he described language ideology as “sets of 
beliefs about language articulated by users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language 
structure and use.” Rumsey (Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994), in contrast, limits language ideology to 
“shared bodies of commonsense notions about the nature of language and the world” (p. 57). Heath’s 
definition of language ideology as “self evident ideas and objectives a group holds concerning roles of 
language in the social experiences of members as they contribute to the expression of the group” (Woolard 
& Schieffelin, 1994, p. 57) suggests two poles of language ideology. One of these poles stresses the degree 
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to which the group, through “self evident ideas,” controls the social experiences of its individual members 
while the other pole is concerned with how individual members contribute to the interpretations of the 
group. These two poles of language ideology reflect two poles of sociological thought, generally. One of 
these is concerned with macro-theories of society and so such issues as race, class, and gender, while the 
other is interested in micro-theories and so questions of identity. Thus, while macro perspectives, like 
Marxism and various functionalist views tend to describe social behavior as internalization of culture, 
micro-views, including symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology, focus on pattern and structure as 
this is produced through moment-to-moment social interaction. In other words, macro theories assume that 
people are placeholders for prior social structure and that the task of research is to reveal the structures that 
make people behave as they do. Micro theories, in contrast, argue that social life is produced “from within 
by members of society and it is the task of research is to identify the methods of such production” (Hester 
& Francis, 2000, p. 1). While acknowledging the influence of culture and institutions on shaping the 
natural facts of educational life, this study follows Gee (1999) in maintaining a focus on its locally 
accomplished and situated nature. I agree with Gee that people are “sense makers par excellence" (p. 79), 
rather than being, to use Garfinkle’s phrase “cultural dopes.” Social actors at once making sense of their 
environments from within while producing actions that make sense to others: “activities are produced so as 
to be accountable—recognizable and reportable—for what they are” (Hester & Francis, 2000, p. 3). 
While many folk understandings of language are, like many other aspects of social life, “seen but 
unnoticed” (Hester & Francis, 200, p. 3), terms like Chinglish, Spanglish or Tex-Mex suggest attitudes on 
the part of members having to do with the relationship between language variety and social use. The study 
of language ideology, then, is concerned with users’ implicit and explicit ideas, theories and attitudes 
toward language and its use. Urciuoli (1995) observes that actors’ statements about certain aspects of 
language (e.g., “words,” “accents,” “mixing,” and “language” itself), however apparently inconsistent, 
“emerge among people to whom language identities matter, in relations shaped by the politics of ethnicity, 
race, and class within the nation and by the politics of ethnic nationalism” (p. 525). The intersection 
between language and social identity is expressed by the idea of Discourse. Gee (1999) refers to 
Discourses (spelled with a capital ‘D’ to distinguish it from the more general linguistic term), as 
ways of being in the world, or forms of life which integrate words, acts, values, beliefs, 
attitudes, and social identities, as well as gestures, glances, bodily positions, and clothes. A 
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Discourse is a sort of identity kit which comes complete with the appropriate costume and 
instructions on how to act, talk, and often write, so as to take on a particular social role 
that others will recognize, (p. 127) 
Because ideologies of language help explain who people are and how they exist in re relation to others, 
they are aspects of cultures’ Discourse systems. 
2.2.1 Language Rationalizations 
The construct of language ideology is most often applied to multilingual contexts, particularly 
when minority language survival appears to be threatened. In such situations, Woolard and Schieffelin 
r 
(1994) observe, “The failure to transmit vernaculars intergenerationally may be rationalized in various 
ways, depending on how speakers conceptualize the links of language, cognition, and social life” (p. 62) 
and the interpretation of such “failure” further reflects the way in which researchers conceptualize these 
links. Like the construct of language ideology itself, the meaning of‘rationalization’ is not a clearly 
defined concept and so changes with various theoretical frameworks that employ it. Broadly speaking, 
rationalizations are an attempt to explain dissonance between the world as it is perceived and the world as 
it is believed. 
From a macro perspective, rationalizations are distortions of reality legitimizing dominant 
interests. Thus, minorities may rationalize in various ways their choice not to use the endangered language 
but their choice is shaped by the dominant group’s ability to control valued symbolic resources. Jones and 
Heller (1996) discuss a number of examples in which minority language maintenance serves as counter¬ 
discourse to cultural hegemony, the assumption being that 
Educational practices and ideologies will be shaped by the interests of certain groups who, 
because of the control they exert over a particular set of highly valued and symbolic 
resources, are in a position to assign value to other forms of cultural and linguistic capital 
to influence the operation of educational institutions that produce and distribute the most 
highly valued resources. This control...may be tightly or loosely extended and may flow 
from the relative consensus or conflict among dominant groups, leaving more or less room 
for contestation and change, (p. 129) 
In this view, heritage language maintenance is resistance to cultural hegemony occurring in the 
unrationalized or demystified spaces left open by dominant groups. This assumes that language ideologies 
are objects that can be put on display for objective critique. By pointing out the means by which 
rationalizations paper over the gap between the real and the ideal, it is supposed that insight leading to 
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greater use of the threatened language will be gained. People are able to operate rationally upon language 
propositions to produce desired consequences. Yet, while language ideologies consist of explicit 
statements about language and the people who use language, they are woven into the Discourse and so are 
parts of an all-encompassing system of meaning potential. 
In contrast, a micro view of language ideology (which is the position taken here) would regard a 
rationalization as a communicative frame through which actors make sense of their own and others’ 
actions. Rationalizations, like all linguistic accounts, “are not simply representations of the world 
[distortive or otherwise]; they are part of the world they describe” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, p. 
r 
107). In this view, a rationalization is what Gee calls a “situated meaning,” an “an image or pattern that we 
assemble ‘on the spot’ as we communicate in a given context, based on our construal of that context and 
on our past experiences” (Gee, 1999, p. 47). Situated meanings are established intersubiectively, as actors 
coordinate to achieve mutual understanding around a common activity (Duranti, p. 255). However, there is 
no referring beyond intersubjectivity, since human life cannot take place apart from its communicative 
context. Quoting Mead, Prus (1996) suggests that patterns and images could not exist in pre-defmed terms 
since “people bring [objects] into existence by the ways in which they attend to, distinguish, define, and 
act toward these” (pp. 11-12, author’s emphasis). These objects include ‘own’ and ‘others’, and an 
ongoing appraisal of the relation amongst them. For the social actor, as well as for the researcher who tries 
to understand the reality of that actor, there is, as Garfinkle says, 
‘no time out’ from the here-and-now character of all sense making, every usage of a 
category or a collection. It has to be decided in each and every case what the category 
means and this will involve a figuring out of what collection the category belongs to, for 
this occasion. Similarly, in the absence of contextual detail, it is difficult, if not 
impossible to say what a particular device, say ‘family’, means and hence what its 
constituent membership categories are. (Hester & Elgin, 1997, p. 18) 
Regarded as communicative accomplishments, rationalizations are organizations of meaning that 
speakers create to achieve “intersubjectivity,” the “mutuality of understanding” that occurs “amidst the 
ambiguities entailed in the human struggle for existence” (Prus, 1996, p. xvii). Indeed, the idea of 
“language” is itself a social construct, and the decision to lose or maintain it among these ambiguities. 
Woolard (1998) points out: 
The belief that distinctly identifiable languages can and should be isolated, named and 
counted enters not only into minority and majority nationalisms but into various strategies 
of social domination. For example, ideas about what is or is not a “real language” have 
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contributed to profound decisions about the civility and even humanity the humanity of 
others... (p. 17) 
Thus, the choice to preserve language may simultaneously entail subverting emergent forms reflecting 
realities and aspirations of own and other groups. Indeed, framing issues of language and identity in terms 
of loss and maintenance may encourage intolerance since it privileges notions of “pure” forms of language, 
departures from which signal cultural corruption and assimilation. 
Duranti (1997) critiques what he calls Chomskian view, which encourages the idea of language as 
existing in the world in an untarnished state and of the “native speaker” as a person whose ideal language, 
i.e., “competence,” contains little “mixing” or “impurity” from other languages. The trouble with this 
approach, says Duranti, is that after impure communities of speakers are set aside, virtually nothing is left: 
In forty years of intense research by a group of innovative and highly productive scholars, 
very little if anything has been said about how to relate abstract knowledge of the idealized 
members of ‘pure’ communities to the linguistic performance of people who live in real 
communities, (p. 74) 
Instead of supposing the presence of pure communities, Duranti goes on to ask, “why don’t we 
embrace instead the idea that variety is part of human cultures and human nature? Why don’t we accept 
that there are always contrasting forces in any human aggregate and even within the same individual” (p. 
75). Agreement that “variability is the norm,” would lead to the realization that all forms are hybrid forms, 
thus canceling the distinction between various formulations of pure and hybrid. Similarly, Carbaugh 
(1996, p. 202) quotes Hymes that communities are not monolithic but “an organization of diversity.” 
Carbaugh comments that “A monolithic vision, as a result of theory or other practices will not do...the 
spirit here is to embrace the diversity of communicative resources available in the various scenes of actual 
communities...” (p. 200). 
It is from a micro perspective on language ideology that research “recognizes struggles among 
multiple conceptualizations of talk within a community and even contradictions within individuals” 
(Woolard, p. 15). Mertz (1989), for example, argues that while solutions to questions of language 
maintenance may (from a macro point of view), give the appearance of capitulating to dominant 
discourses, they nevertheless affirm membership in a way that responds to social change. Mertz’ 
interpretation of language ideology is in keeping with the ethnomethodological principle that people are 
continuously engaged “artful practices” to organize meaning (Silverman, 1993) and that rationalizations 
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are skillful symbolic productions that establish understanding. Rationalizations, says Mertz, are not some 
form of distortion, but the expression of agents coming to terms with social experience. This is the drift of 
her suggestion that folk theories of language (i.e., language ideologies) are an “interpretive filter that 
speakers [use to] give local meaning to global economic and social changes, meaning which forms the 
critical background for language shift” (p. 114). Rationalizations and justifications are here viewed not as 
false representations of the world to be got over, demystified, seen through, or tom aside but solutions to 
r - 
the problem of making meaning in a shifting, unstable cosmos. That is, speakers form coherent patterns to 
at once create and control experience when the old, familiar meaning systems become unreliable. Far from 
* 
being the result of false consciousness, distortion, or the like, justifications are instances of praxis, and so 
what Bourdieu calls the “active aspect of knowledge”: 
all knowledge, and in particular all knowledge of the social world, is an act of construction 
implementing schemes of thought and expression, and that between conditions of 
existence and practices or representations there intervenes the structuring activity of the 
agents, who, far from reacting mechanically to mechanical stimulations, respond to the 
invitations or threats of a world whose meaning they have helped to produce. (Mertz, 
' 1989, p. 115) 
2.2.2 Language Attitudes 
Attitudes are the focus of much research in second language learning, and heritage language 
research is no exception. At a conference of the Center for Applied Linguistics, Valdes (2000) suggested 
that among the questions that need to be included in a heritage language research agenda is: “What is the 
general attitude of the heritage language community towards the study or maintenance of a heritage 
language?” 
King (2000) defines language attitudes as a “particular response to certain aspects of a particular 
language” (p. 168). The failure of speakers to use their heritage language in daily life reflects “fundamental 
differences between individuals expressed attitudes toward an object and their actual behaviour 
surrounding that object...individuals often express attitudes about language which seem incompatible with 
language behaviour.” The way speakers justify the gap between attitudes and behavior, says King, may 
ultimately provide practical insight into a means of encouraging greater use of a heritage language. King 
thus follows a long line of second language researchers, who have sought to correlate various dimensions 
of attitude with learner success (Lambert, 1974; Schuman, 1978). However, as Ellis points out, no one-to- 
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one relationship has been found, owing to the difficulty of attributing to others (as well as to ourselves) 
simple attitudes toward complex behaviors. 
Charon (1985) argues that attitudes, rather than being a predictable response to a stimuli from ‘out 
there’ having a reciprocal effect on behavior are, instead, generated through social interaction, allowing 
any given object can be defined in various ways. Taking up Shibutani’s suggestion, Charon (1985) 
recommends that ‘perspective’, instead of‘attitude’ provides a more nuanced way to consider action. 
Comparing perspective with attitude, Charon says that the latter implies 
a call to response, a determinant of behavior, encouraging consistent action by the 
organism in a multitude of situations. Perspectives, on the other hand, are conceptualized 
as dynamic and changing, guides to interpretation and then to action, undergoing change 
during the interaction, and not necessarily consistent in the same person, (p. 24) 
Although perspectives change moment to moment as people take up positions in face-to-face interaction, 
they allow us to see a dynamic changing world as “relatively stable, orderly and predictable and so can use 
them” as “an outline scheme defining and guiding experience.” Like Gee’s (1999) “situated meanings,” 
attitudes are not static but “flexibly transformable patterns that come out of experience and, in turn, 
construct experience as meaningful in certain ways and not others” (p. 49). Through communication, 
people define, not simply react to, the social world they are part of. Perspective, unlike attitude: “is 
attached to interaction and to various groups with which the individual identifies. Individuals interact with 
many others; individuals take on many perspectives; therefore, any given object can be defined in a 
number of ways, not one” (Charon, 1985, p. 23). 
Pan, Chaffee, Chu, and Ju (1994) link attitudes to culture through the intermediary notion of 
values. Values are “learned and internalized by members of society for their orientations and adaptations in 
a social world.” The authors approve Kahle and Timmers’ suggestion that values may be thought of as “a 
type of social cognition.” Thus, “It is values that provide cultural rituals, customs, and artifacts their 
meaning. Values also give each culture its distinct character” (p. 18). Attitudes and values are closely 
related but, as in King’s formulation, attitudes are directed toward a specific object: “A value resembles an 
attitude in that it involves an affective component, but values are more abstract and general than attitudes, 
and a value is not confined to any specific attitudinal object or behavior” (p. 18). Similar to situated 
meanings, attitudes are what Gee (1999) calls “mid-level generalizations” (p. 49) in the pattern-seeking 
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and building activity of the mind, able to assemble and work on social reality. Values, on the other hand, 
occur at a higher level of cultural abstraction of “cultural models.” 
Harre and Secord (1979) agree that attitudes cannot be understood apart from the system of 
values and concepts in which they occur. Rather than being stand-alone items in the consciousness of 
individuals, Harre and Secord argue that attitudes are intertwined with culture. They point to Gimu and 
Giri as a cultural resource that Japanese people use to create and make sense of a central fact of existence, 
death. Noting how attitudes toward death differ from culture to culture, they say that 
[E] valuations of death in Japan depend upon context and upon the particular on relation, 
that is, obligation relation, in which they stand with respect to someone, and which defines 
the situation in which an evaluation is made. ‘Death’ may evoke a favorable attitude when 
it is considered in the context of the resolution between Gimu and Giri, between 
obligations to the state and family, and obligations to one’s personal honor, but may evoke 
quite unfavorable attitude in other contexts, (p. 308) 
Thus, Gimu and Giri offer pattern and significance to experience with death “so that we may not only feel 
but know what we feel and act accordingly” (Geertz, 1973, p. 80). Gimu and Giri are part of what Geertz 
calls “cultural resources of an adequate system of public symbols” (p. 81). The are “public” in the sense 
that they provide for the 
development, maintenance, and dissolution of‘moods’, ‘attitudes’, ‘sentiments’ and so 
on—which are ‘feelings’ in the sense of states or conditions, not sensations or motives— 
constitute no more basically private activity in human beings than does the directive 
‘thinking.’ (p. 81) 
Attitudes may produce rationales as part of the struggle to make experience coherent. We can see 
this process at work in Gee’s (1999) example of how negative, resistant behaviors in children are 
rationalized by middle-class parents as natural signposts on the way to culturally valued independence. 
Gee explains that “[P]arents label behaviors part of a stage only when these behaviors represent new 
behaviors of a sort that could be seen as negative or difficult and that require new sorts of responses from 
the parents” (p. 65). Other behaviors, which produce no such dissonance, are not labeled as stages. The 
term “stages,” then, is a rationalization to resolve the dissonance between negative attitudes toward 
disruptive behavior and the belief that the child is normal. “Independence,” as will be discussed shortly, is 
a key element in the middle-class American cultural model; however, not all cultures share this model. Not 
all cultures pattern attitudes the same way, however. 
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2.2.3 Cultural Models & Cultural Codes of Speaking 
Discussing Philipsen’s research on some working-class American cultures, Gee (1999) points out 
how groups differently respond to disruptive behavior of children: 
For example, some working-class families operate in term of in which children are seen 
as inherently willful, independent, and selfish, and in need of socialization that leads not 
to more independence, but to collaboration with and caring about the needs of family and 
others, (p. 66) 
To attribute actions to a “stage of development” has become reified as part of what it means to be 
a person in the cultural models of many American communities. Cultural models, says Gee, provide 
“theories that ‘explain’, relative to the standards of the group, why words [along with other symbolic 
actions] have the various situated meanings they do.” Geertz’ (1973) description of “cultural patterns” 
expresses a similar notion: 
[BJecoming human is becoming individual, and we become individual under guidance of 
cultural patterns, historically created systems of meaning in terms of which we give form, 
order, point, and direction to our lives. And the cultural patterns involved are not just 
general but specific—not just “marriage” but a particular set of notions about what men 
and women are like, how spouses should treat one another, or who should properly marry 
whom. (p. 52) 
Cultural models, says Gee (1999), take the form of “images or storylines or descriptions of 
simplified worlds in which prototypical events unfold.” Thus, children do not simply ‘grow up’ but keep to 
a storyline in which they follow ‘stages of development’, imminent processes, located somehow ‘inside’ 
the individual child, making her behavior, like the loss of baby teeth, more or less independent of her 
social context. Gee further distinguishes among “different sorts of cultural models,” in terms of “how they 
are put to use and the effects they have on us” (p. 68). With the first of these, “espoused models,” members 
consciously identify themselves as social actors within a cultural model; “evaluative models” provide the 
basis to consciously and unconsciously grade self and others with respect to notions of appropiacy and; 
“models-in-(inter)action” “guide our actions and interactions in the world” (p. 68). Applied “to ways of 
talking, listening, reading, writing and communicating” (p. 68), cultural models suggest an alternative 
description of language ideology. 
Similar to Gee’s “cultural models,” is Philipsen’s (1992) “cultural code of speaking.” A cultural 
code of speaking refers to cultural storylines having to do with language and its users, thus providing an 
alternative definition of language ideology. A cultural code of speaking is a 
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socially constructed and historically transmitted system of symbols and meanings 
pertaining to communication—for instance, the symbols of “Lithuanian” [understood as a 
folk-term indicating a certain kind of person] or “communication” [understood by many 
groups of Americans as the ground of sympathetic understanding] and their attendant 
definitions; beliefs about spoken actions (that a man who uses speech to discipline boys is 
not a real man); and rules for using speech (that a father should not interrupt his daughter 
at the dinner table), (p. 8) 
Thus, 
In terms of answering questions of ultimate meaning, in terms of providing individuals and 
societies with ways to answering questions about why they exist and where they fit in a 
scheme of sense and meaning a code of speaking provides the resources for creating a 
sense of coherence and form. p. 16). 
Philipsen identifies two basic resources from which to talk about ways of speaking, a code of 
honor and a code of dignity. Codes of dignity and honor may constitute what Gee (1999) calls “master 
models,” sets of “associated cultural models, or single models, that help shape and organize large and 
important aspects of experience for particular groups of people...” (p. 69). 
A code of honor 
...refers to the worth attached to individuals by virtue of their attained social 
identity... Discourse spoken in a code of honor prejudices talk-and the hearing of talk-in 
favor of treating individuals as social categories and in favor of treating society and social 
groups as organized hierarchies of social identities, (p. 103) 
A code of honor also takes great stock in tradition, ensuring continuity of practice across time and space. 
Gimu and giri are spoken from a code of honor since they assume that personhood is acquired through 
participation in the social order, an order that allocates to individuals certain positions in the scheme of 
things. 
A code of dignity, on the other hand, “refers to the worth attached to individuals by virtue of their 
being a person” (p. 113). Quoting Berger, Berger, and Kellner, Philipsen (1992) says a code of dignity 
emphasizes a person’s “intrinsic humanity divested of all socially imposed roles or norms. It pertains to the 
self as such, to the individual regardless of his position in society” (p. 89). A code of dignity is shaped by 
the “Western conception of the person” as 
Bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic 
center of awareness, emotion, judgment and action organized into a distinctive whole and 
set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural 
background...however incorrigible it may seem to us [it is] a rather peculiar idea within 
the context of the world’s cultures. (Geertz,1976, p. 225) 
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Philipsen goes on to note that a concern for dignity “does not merely de-emphasize a person’s 
social roles but positively emphasizes the uniqueness and legitimacy of each person’s cognitive and 
affective world” (p. 114). Thus, a code of dignity establishes the person as, first, 
a unique self rather than a bundle of social roles. The person is who he is by virtue of inner 
qualities. For this reason, it is a violation of nature, as well as morality, to suppress the 
development and expression of those unique inner qualities because it is these qualities, 
and their expression, that in large part constitute the individual person, (p. 117) 
Philipsen gives the example of how, in some American cultural scenes, it is wrong for a woman 
to call herself by her husband’s name since to do so “imposes on her unique self an externally defined role. 
This is an evil thing, in this code, because it impedes the development and expression of the woman’s 
essential identity, the identity built up from her unique personal potentialities and goals” (p. 117). It also 
assumes (among other things) the individual is existentially and morally prior to society, with society 
being seen as being made up of an accumulation of private, individual acts. 
Codes of dignity and honor resemble the dichotomy discussed in much research on intercultural 
communication (Gudykunst & Ting Toomey, 1988; Hofstede, 1980; Marcus & Kitayama, 1991; Samovar 
& Porter, 1995; Scollon & Scollon, 1996). This construct offers a theoretical framework for understanding 
difference in terms of cultural conceptions of personhood. While individualism/collectivism shares 
features with codes of honor and dignity, it is often expressed as a dichotomy between Western and non- 
Westem cultures. However, as we have seen from the examples of two American communities, this is a 
fairly crude overgeneralization. 
To the extent that any grouping can be thought to share a single cultural premise, Chinese are 
generally described as holding a prototypically “collectivist” world view while U.S. Americans are 
prototypically individualist (Hsu, 1981; Marcus & Kitayama, 1991; Scollon & Scollon, 1996). The 
individual/connected dichotomy is echoed in Wong’s (1992) suggestion that the Confucian person can be 
thought of as “connected to a network of interlocking relationships” while the Western person is “free and 
independent.” 
While the collectivist/individualist construct was formulated to account for cultural differences 
among communication styles, Nadamitsu, Chen, and Friedrich (2000) point to a number of studies 
challenging its positivist assumptions about culture. Beginning with the general view that “culture is social 
and relational, not objective or empirically independent” (p. 160), their study of Chinese and Japanese 
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communicative styles leads them to conclude that the meanings of ‘collectivity’ and ‘individuality’ will 
vary with the groups that use these terms and so are relative concepts, not a fixed scale of behaviors. The 
authors also cite studies demonstrating how essentialist notions of culture ignore or misrepresent important 
within-group differences. They point to the work of Martin and Nakayama, who propose a “dialectical 
approach to the study of intercultural interaction...to transcend the dichotomy and its inherent mutual 
exclusivity. This approach entertains the notion that two contradictory ideas can coexist simultaneously 
and that multiple realities do exist” (pp. 159-160). 
2.3 Ethnography of Communication and Language Ideology 
Dell Hymes (1972), generally credited as the founder of ethnography of communication, 
proposed that persons who share similar rules for speaking and interpreting speech of at least one variety 
constitute a ‘speech community’ (p. 54). A speech community is a network of relations held together not 
by speech alone but by communication in its broadest sense, including gestures, signs, and symbols 
through which people interact. Silverstein (1957) recognized the fit between language ideology and 
ethnography of communication: 
...from the work of Dell Hymes and his students that has carved out a field called 
‘ethnography of speaking’...it has become clearer that people not only speak about, or 
refer to, the world...outside of language...they also presuppose...and create...a good deal of 
social reality by the very activity of using language” (p. 194) 
Similarly, a cultural code of speaking reflects and creates deeply held patterns of social organization, 
constituting “a distinctive social reality.” 
Ethnography of communication shares with language ideology a concern with statements about 
language when heard in the context of culture and society. That is, it directs inquiry to participants’ 
meaning systems and so brings researchers to ask: “What is it that these people, in this scene, think they 
are doing by communicating in these ways” (Carbaugh, 1996, p. 26). Through ethnography of 
communication 
One tries to interpret the participants’ meanings of their communicative practices, how 
they cohere through their communicative actions and their ideas about who they are and 
what they are doing. One seeks to know how present concerns are significant and 
important to them, keeping the symbolic landscape of the community in mind. This is to 
hear cultural life in communication. Knowing what coheres conversational scenes from the 
view of participants, in a way that resonates with heir terms and meanings, this is to hear 
in community scenes, cultural communicative action. (Carbaugh, 1996, p. 26-27) 
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Combining insights from sociolinguistics and anthropology, ethnography of communication 
proposes that social life can be made known through studying the terms that group members use to talk 
about aspects of social life, particularly terms having to do with communication itself. Hall and Valade 
(1995), for example, explore “brown-nosing” as a folk term symbolizing a domain of American social 
interaction and so a term in the language ideology of a cultural scene. Similarly, Katriel and Philipsen 
(1981) inquire into the term “communication” itself as a salient folk symbol of middle-class American 
cultural values. Using Brown and Levinson’s (1978) theoretical framework of “Politeness,” Chen has 
studied talk at the Chinese dinner table as an instance of ritual communication. Each of these examples 
suggest that communication is a social “accomplishment,” rather than the acting out of designated social 
roles. 
Communication scholars, say Carbaugh, Gibson and Milbum (1997) adhere to three basic 
“guiding assumptions” about communication and culture: 
When communication occurs, it exhibits, or instantiates, not randomness, but some kind of 
systematic patterns; Systematic patterns of communication implicate social organization 
(e.g., the structuring of interaction, social relations, institutions) and cultural meaning 
systems (e.g., beliefs and values about persons, social action, nature; Communication is 
thus partly constitutive of sociocultural life. (p. 3) 
Ethnographers and, in particular, ethnographers of communication hear in teachers’ statements about 
language, language teaching, and interrelated comments about schools, students, and so on, not simply 
facts about members’ worlds but also ways in which these facts constitute the world. Speaking and 
listening, in other words, reflexively create the community in which these are achieved, since conversation 
constitutes a social agreement in which certain kinds of expression, ideas, actions, relationships, are 
possible. In a heritage language school, especially, a group’s ideas about language, language use, and 
language teaching are intertwined with central cultural ideas of personhood in a particularly intimate way 
such that “ways of speaking are inextricably tied to ways of being” (Carbaugh, 1993, p. 161). Such 
questions as those posed on the banner in the middle school cafeteria, seem particularly apropos for 
ethnographers of communication, since “Who am I? What is family? Where do I belong?” are answered by 
considering the “shape of particular communication practices in particular scenes, and by exploring how 
those practices activate, for the people in those scenes, meanings of social identification and meanings of 
cultural lives” (Carbaugh, 1996, p. 27). 
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This discussion of speech community relates to Philipsen’s idea of “cultural code” because it 
stresses the inherently discursive dimension of community and role of language in contributing to 
members’ “knowledge and attitudes toward life” (Philipsen, 1992). It is in knowing (implicitly and 
explicitly) and being able to communicate a code that persons establish membership in a particular 
community: “To know, and use appropriately, the meanings, rules, and speech habits of a local group 
signals and affirms that one is a member of it” (Philipsen, p. 14). 
However, the idea of “speech community” need not assume a group of people maintaining the 
same linguistic repertoire. By this criterion, the Chinese School would not count as a speech community 
because it consists of learners at various levels of Chinese ability and parents who speak no Chinese or 
Chinese of different dialects. Indeed, if Hymes’ ‘code sharing’ criterion is interpreted too narrowly, it 
would be difficult to locate any speech community. As Duranti (1997) points out, few communities of 
speakers can be entirely homogeneous and so be said to share a single linguistic variety (p. 71). Even more 
to the point, a restrictive definition of a speech community will exclude persons who consider themselves 
to be part of the community, even though their speech patterns differ from those of dominant members. 
Dorian (1982), for example, describes fisher folk in eastern Sutherland who are “semi-speakers” of Gaelic, 
whose linguistic repertoire differs from that of fluent-speaker norms. Despite this lack of fluency, the 
group maintained strong competence in the social rules of the community and considered themselves full- 
fledged members. Dorian thus rejects definitions of speech community that establish a normative base line 
of linguistic competence. She urges, instead, Corder’s proposal that a speech community “is made up of 
people who regard themselves as speaking the same language; it need have no other defining attributes” 
(Duranti, 1997, p. 81). 
While Corder’s formulation would widen the number of persons who could claim to be members 
of the Williamston Chinese School community, it would still exclude many others, since a number of the 
people who are stakeholders in the community (including, of course, children) are not able to regard 
themselves as speaking the same language. As a solution to such problems, Duranti proposes that a speech 
community should be considered “the product of the communicative activities engaged in by a given group 
of people” (p. 82, author’s italics). Rather than supplying a pre-defined language category and excluding 
on the basis of that category persons who do not fit, Duranti’s suggestion “recognizes the constitutive 
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nature of speaking as a human activity that not only assumes but builds ‘community’” (p. 82). From this 
perspective, the researcher’s task consists of looking at “a group of people’s daily dealings with one 
another from the point of view of the communication they exchange and the communicative resources they 
employ” (p. 82). 
2.4 Research Questions 
As will be further discussed in a subsequent section, analysis of communication at the 
Chinese school uses ethnographic methods and the complementary method of discourse analysis. 
Analysis proceeds from the assumption that speakers are rational agents who are able to make 
sense of what they do and that this sense-making uses as a resource deeper cultural coding. Thus, 
as Gee (1999) advises students of discourse analysis: 
We always assume that everyone has good “good reasons” and makes “deep sense in 
terms of their own socioculturally specific was of talking, listening (writing, reading) 
acting, interacting, valuing, believing, and feeling...The assumption of‘good reasons’ 
and “deep sense” is foundational to discourse analysis...humans are, as creatures, sense 
makers par excellence. Within their cultures and Discourses, they move to sense, the 
way plants move to light, (p. 79) 
The need for individuals to make sense of their social situations, as Willett (1995) points out, has 
often been ignored by second language researchers, who view culture as an object of study, rather than as a 
process informing classroom practices. Thus, when second language research concerns itself with culture, 
it is most often driven by questions having to do with “rules” as part of “communicative competence,” the 
latter being understood as sets of social routines and formulae. What has been largely ignored is the way in 
which social aspects of language are part of a broader cultural patterning of the classroom itself. What is 
learned in classrooms, then, are not merely elements of the target language but the culture of the classroom 
itself. Thus, in ESL classrooms “learners acquire more than linguistic rules. They also appropriate 
identities, social relations and ideologies” (p. 477). Kramsch (1994) makes much the same point when she 
describes foreign language classrooms as spaces in which 
The dominance of any established 'culture' is alternately adopted and contested, adapted 
and ironicized by the emergence of new meanings. In the creation of spoken and written 
texts, individuals manipulate and shape imposed contexts to fit their own individual 
needs and bring to the fore their own meanings, (p. 67) 
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However, “individual needs” and “own meanings” are not members’ private possessions but notes from 
other cultural discourses entered, sometimes harmoniously and sometimes with discord, into the music of 
the classroom. 
Willett’s (1995) proposal for a revised agenda for English as a second language research seems 
particularly relevant to heritage language studies: 
the question we must ask is not which interactional routines and strategies are correlated 
with successful language acquisition. Rather, we must ask what meaning routines and 
strategies have in the local culture and how they enable learners to construct positive 
identities and relations and manage competing agendas, (p. 499) 
I read Willett’s proposal as containing a formulation for language ideology research. “Competing 
agendas,” identified by King as inhibiting greater use of the threatened language, are here presented (as in 
Mertz’ research) as being in dynamic balance. Routines and strategies are not context-free and so 
universally applicable to all situations. Instead of being neutral teaching apparatus, routines and strategies 
are a system of signifiers within a locally occasioned semiotic system. Likewise, “agendas” cannot be fully 
conscious, deliberate, and systematically organized to-do lists. Rather, they must be loosely prioritized and 
partly pre-reflective thoughts based upon cultural notions of what people are and should be like; how they 
act and should act; feel and should feel and, to use Carbaugh’s (1999) evocative phrase; “can (and should) 
dwell in nature” (p. 28). Agendas are managed as these are constructed intersubjectively through discourse 
establishing the premises of personhood in any particular group. In other words, identities are present in 
scenes as sets of discursive positions, which, as Kramsch, above, suggests, may be disputed but are 
ultimately an ongoing aspect of the new culture embracing all members of the group. 
The assumption that members have “good reasons” for what they do and that these reasons make 
“deep sense,” as Gee goes on to say, “is foundational to discourse analysis.” It is also, as we have seen, 
foundational to ethnography of communication and to the present consideration of language ideology. This 
assumption leads me to ask the following overarching question with respect to language ideology and 
identity at the Chinese School: What ‘good reasons’ do some people at the Chinese school give for 
talking, reading, writing, acting, interacting, valuing, believing, and feeling about language practices and 
what is the pattern and structure, or ‘deep sense’ uniting these good reasons? How are good reasons and 
deep sense negotiated to discursively produce and transform identities in positive wavs among the 
competing cultural agendas? 
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To develop an interpretation of “deep sense” (the pattern that underlies good reasons for doing 
things). Gee urges analysts to use situated meanings and cultural models not only as a means of describing 
social reality but also as “tools of inquiry” (Gee, 1999, p. 53). According to Gee, situated meanings and 
cultural models are at once “things that exist in the mind and in the world,” the implication being that the 
mind is also part of the world and so “thinking devices” guiding the analyst should be counted not as 
objective tools of analysis but also as part of the interpretation. 
I organize Gee’s “tools of inquiry” under what Carbaugh (1990) describes as three basic 
“functions” (pp. 2-4) of social identity. Although Gee’s “different sorts of cultural models,” espoused. 
evaluative, and models-in-(interaction, discussed in the previous section, offer a somewhat parallel 
scheme, Carbaugh’s formulation more specifically underscores identity as communicative action. The 
importance of thinking about identity in terms of what it communicates (rather than what it is) may be 
illustrated with reference to Moerman’s (1975) research. Moerman found that attempts to elicit emic 
descriptions of Lue tribal identity were flawed because members grew adept at providing inventories of 
“ethnic identification devices” to distinguish themselves from other groups. However, Moerman came to 
realize that these devices, rather than being employed in everyday life, were used primarily to satisfy an 
outsider’s questions. Moerman thus turned his attention to the way members invoked identity in face-to- 
face interaction. The implication for the current research is that concern for the answer to “Who am I?” 
cannot be learned by asking the corresponding question “Who are you?” Instead, the ethnographer must 
listen for occasions in which members invoke identities and note the social functions such invocations 
serve. In other words, the researcher (like the social actor herself) must listen for how identity is achieved 
in certain scenes, rather than attempt to determine the essence of who achieves it. Gee’s (1996) analogy of 
Discourses with ‘identity kits’ (p. 127) directs the researcher’s attention not toward the ‘real’ person 
behind the social mask but to the effects of the mask itself as it is deployed in social scenes. The researcher 
is concerned, in other words, with how identities work, not with who is behind them. 
Carbaugh (1990) suggests that basic functions of social identity can be categorized as definitive, 
instructive, and evaluative. The definitive function discursively constructs who can belong or not belong to 
the group; the instructive function tells members how to act in a group; and the evaluative function offers 
the means to determine whether actions meet the expected standards of membership. This last function, in 
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particular, addresses the moral dimension of identity and so allows members to interpret identity as 
positive or otherwise. These three functions are clearly interrelated and will be described in more detail 
later in this dissertation. 
The definitive, instructive, and evaluative functions of identity generate, respectively, three broad 
questions implied by the above guiding research question. I suggest tentative sub-questions from Gee’s 
(1999) tools of inquiry for research into cultural models: 
1. How do members of the Chinese school define identities “Chinese,” “American,” and/or Chinese- 
American”? 
- What Discourses are invoked to explain various characteristics of these identities? 
What “master models” do speakers draw upon to invoke identities at the Chinese school 
and how do these help define Chinese people? 
- What sorts of texts, media, experiences, and interactions influence these models? 
- “How are identities signaled by members and/or constructed in the interactions among 
members” (Gee & Green, 1998, p. 141) 
2. How do these identities, so defined, work to guide various behaviors and actions? 
- What are the terms people use to discuss language and language learning and how does 
this organize particular actions? 
- Whose interests are the cultural models representing? 
- How do group members’ expressed attitudes toward language differ from discursively 
organized language practices (i.e., what is the “gap” between language expressed 
attitudes and behaviors)? 
- “What norms and expectations, roles and relationships, and rights and obligations are 
constructed by, and/or signaled by members relevant members to guide participation and 
activity among participants in the event” (Gee & Green, 1998, p. 140) 
- “How are identities transformed in and through the actions, responses, and collective 
activity in the situation?” (Gee & Green, p. 141). 
- How is talk about who belongs and who does not belong shaped by political concerns? 
3. What social actions at the Chinese school are valued and worthy of esteem and what social 
actions are ignoble and so worthy of censure? 
- What models of person are regarded as estimable (i.e., how do estimable people 
behave?) and how does the Chinese school encourage model behaviors? 
- What sorts of cultural models, if any, are being used here to make value judgments about 
selves or others? Are there competing or conflicting models of valued social actions? 
- What sorts of actions deserve some form of redress? 
Although Gee’s “tools of inquiry” are intended to be addressed through Discourse analysis, they can 




Pleasure and anger against and sadness and joy not yet having issued is called being ‘on 
centre’; all when they issue coinciding with measure is called ‘harmony’. That ‘centre’ is the 
ultimate root of the world, that ‘harmony ’ is the universal Way of the world. Make perfect the on 
centre and the harmonious, the heaven and earth will be seated in them and the myriad things 
nurtured by them—Mencius (fourth century B.C.). 
3.1 Overview 
This .section will review three fields of literature relevant to Chinese heritage language teaching. 
The research context first requires a discussion of the relevance of the conceptual framework to language 
maintenance efforts. I then provide a definition of heritage language schooling as a formal means of 
preserving language, followed by a review of research on language shift in the Chinese community and 
formal efforts, past and present, to arrest this shift. Next, I will consider several strands of research having 
to do with the matter of ethnic identity in general and Chinese identity in particular. Finally, I will 
consider the literature on ethnicity and second language learning with a view to discussing the 
implications for language maintenance in a pluralistic society. 
3.2 Language Ideology and Language Maintenance 
Overall, the body of research on language attitudes, culture, and language behavior suggest that 
among second language learners, positive attitudes towards the L2, its speakers, and its culture tend to 
promote learning while negative attitudes discourage it (Ellis, 1994). A positive view of the heritage 
culture should thus lead to higher levels of language proficiency while a negative view of the heritage 
culture will have the opposite effect. This understanding underlies Wong’s suggestion that “mainstream 
society’s denigration of Chinese,” is responsible for the inability of Chinese schools to prevent language 
loss. Yet the situation may be more complex when it comes to heritage language learning, since the 
distinction between “own” and “other” culture is ambiguous. 
Ellis cites Irish people’s attitudes toward learning Gaelic. A five-year study by the Committee on 
Irish Language Attitudes Research found that people generally agreed that Gaelic was “necessary for 
ethnic and cultural integrity, but at the same time there was only low or lukewarm commitment to its 
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actual use.” Edwards’ (1995) quip that “the Irish like their Irish, but that they like it dead!” glosses over 
what must be members’ own rationalizations of the gap between attitudes and behavior, rationalizations 
that could reveal complex explanations for the failure of the Irish to bring Gaelic back to life. 
Discussing Denauer and Denauer’s study of efforts to maintain indigenous languages of southern 
Alaska, King (2000) points to the ambivalence of group members toward their mother tongue: 
On the one hand, it is being taught and people say it is good to learn it; but on the other 
hand, the student is aware of the overwhelming anxiety and negative associations 
surrounding the language, whether spoken or unspoken, (p. 180) 
Extrapolating to his own study of Quichua speakers of the Ecuadorian highlands, King 
comments that “in light of the competing ideologies surrounding Quichua, it is understandable how 
individuals might articulate pro-Quichua ideology, yet use the language infrequently at home, among 
their family, and in particular with their children (p. 180). 
As another example of lack of correlation between attitudes and behavior, Ellis cites Lanoue’s 
study of a remote Indian tribe in British Columbia, Canada. This group rejected their mother tongue in 
favor of English, even though they had positive attitudes toward their own language and negative 
attitudes toward Anglo-Canadian culture. Rejection did not occur because English offered economic 
advantage but because, as Ellis explains, English had become a symbol of pan-Indianism and so was the 
only way of ensuring the tribes’ future identity. While this would seem a straightforward pragmatic 
decision, it is grounded in deeply rooted cultural assumptions having to do with the nature of language 
and its relation to personhood, ethnic identity, and social domination that Ellis does not detail. 
An ethnographic approach to language attitudes and language behavior deals more directly with 
possible causes and effects of language shift. Along with previously cited studies of King and Mertz, 
Scollon and Scollon’s (1983) work with Athabaskan Indians of Alaska suggests that, even though 
Athabaskans have “clearly stated goals of succeeding within the American economic and political 
system,” their behavior is one of resistance to education and literacy within the American school system. 
The Scollons conclude that the reason for resistance “is that for Athabaskan Indians to engage in the new 
discourse systems of American schooling and literacy amounts to a change in identity, and it is this 
change in identity which is resisted” (p. 246). While the Scollons do not attempt to tie this insight to 
Athabaskan language maintenance efforts, they do demonstrate how other aspects of Athabaskan 
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language ideology affect language maintenance. They explain how folk understandings that Chipewyan, 
(the language of the Athabaskan group they were studying) is more difficult to speak than Cree or English 
“is an indirect way of saying it is preferable for some reason for children not to learn Athabaskan, perhaps 
because of social pressures against its use” (p. 135). This justification, along with other expectations 
about language and language learning, has had the consequence that “in the bilingual situation leads to 
lesser and lesser learning of Chipewyan” (p. 135). 
Mertz (1989) explores ways that language ideologies were linked to decline in the use of Gaelic 
on Cape Breton. Folk beliefs that speaking Gaelic was an obstacle to speaking English correctly, and so 
an impediment to social mobility, resulted in parents’ refusal to pass the language on to their children. 
However, Mertz interprets the shift from bilingualism to English monolingualism not as simply a reflex 
to external ideological pressure “but rather reflected Cape Bretoners’ active interpretation of, and struggle 
with, changing circumstances” (p. 113). Gaelic is still used in hybridized forms to powerfully express 
contemporary realities. If, following Mertz, we think of justification as warrants for coming to terms with 
changing circumstances, language ideologies at the Chinese school may reflect emergent understandings 
of what it means to be Chinese-American. 
Related to the above concerns is the linguistic phenomenon of “code-switching.” Code 
switching, which typically occurs in bilingual communities, is defined by Ellis (1994) as “one kind of 
intra-speaker variation...[which] occurs when a speaker changes from one variety or language to another 
variety or language with situational or purely personal factors” (p. 696). Code-switching also refers to the 
phenomenon of interlocutors switching between languages in conversation. Thus, Gumperz (1982a) 
defines code-switched discourse as “the juxtaposition within the same speech exchange of passages of 
speech belonging to two different grammatical systems or sub-systems” (p. 59). Although variation may 
seem redundant and unnecessary, Woolard (1996) notes that “studies in code switching long ago 
convinced us, the social meaning of communicative forms can never be taken as natural and transparent 
but must always be examined as cultural construction” (p. 15). As Hymes (1974) points out, “What seems 
variation and deviation from the standpoint of a linguist’s analysis may emerge as structure and pattern 
from the standpoint of the communicative economy of the group” (p. 4). 
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Linguistic anthropologists regard instances of language variation as ‘heteroglossia’ (Duranti, 
1997, p. 76), a term derived from the literary scholarship of Bakhtin. Originally devised to conceptualize 
a writer’s use of “voice,” heteroglossia captures the notion of the inherent variability of language (Gee, 
1996). Bakhtin suggested that the speech of each person consists of various voices, linguistically 
constructed personae that are recognized by other members of the group. Within this speech is the mix of 
voices that within each person represent 
the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, 
between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the 
present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth.” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 291) 
Gee (1996) stresses the “intertextual” quality of heteroglossia when he explains that it is comprised of the 
co-existence of various “social languages,” which can be 
« 
sedimented...by social, political, and cultural happenings unfolding in history. In fact, 
even what looks like a uniform social language... is often a compendium of different 
social, cultural, and political sources and looks to us now to be uniform only because the 
workings of multiple social languages have been forgotten and effaced, (p. 70) 
Duranti (1997) observes that, within communities of bilingual and second language learners, 
heteroglossia serves as a resource for persons to express resistance to the official, standard, majority 
language: “the choice of a particular language over another may index one’s ethnicity or a particular 
political stance toward the relations between language and ethnicity” (p. 18). Yet, since heteroglossia may 
occur several times within a single utterance, it is clear that code switching and one’s “particular political 
stance” have no simple one-to-one correspondence. Moreover, the presence of heteroglossia, as Gee, 
above, suggests, calls into question even the idea of “a particular language” from which to choose. Thus, 
heteroglossia can be more productively regarded as a resource for ad hoc expression of meaning, 
indexing shifting identities and relations of power. 
Rampton (1987) suggests that interlanguage itself can serve as a resource for pragmatic use of 
code-switching. Rampton documents examples of heteroglossic utterances devised by second language 
learners that might be counted by applied linguists as interlanguage but which, says Rampton (1987), 
represent an attempt to negotiate a position of power. Jo (2001) similarly focuses on the creative quality 
of heteroglossia when describing the high degree of code switching among Korean-American heritage 
language students at a university program. Jo regards such code switching as revealing “the process of 
deconstructing rules, crossing language boundaries, and mixing different codes...which signifies Korean- 
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American lived experiences and identities, not dissolved into the Korean native nor assimilated into the 
American identity” (p. 27). As Jo’s work among these students suggests, in formal language learning 
situations, and especially heritage language situations, there can be no simple, formula for whose 
language indexes whose ethnicity or political stance. Thus, as Gumperz (1982a) points out, 
[RJather than claiming that speakers use language in response to fixed, predetermined 
set of prescriptions [e.g., political or ethnic], it seems more reasonable to assume that 
they build on their own and their audience’s abstract understanding of situational 
norms, to communicate information about how they intend their words to be 
understood, (p. 61) 
Code switching occurs by virtue of the “indexical” or pointing function of communication. 
Communication, Duranti explains, can either symbolize objects—as in the word “fire,” which is an 
arbitrary symbol for the phenomenon, or it can “index” the actual occurrence of a phenomenon, in much 
the same way as smoke indexes the physical presence of fire. By extension, some words “index” actual 
things by ‘pointing’ directly to them. Demonstrative pronouns, for example, bear a concrete relation to 
objects or symbols they refer to. Likewise, personal pronouns and certain terms of address help to 
construct the scene in which they are used. They thus position speaker and listener into certain 
relationships. The term “doctor,” for example, recognizes and constrains interlocutors to behave in certain 
patterned ways. Duranti (1997) goes on to note that to use words indexically related to some 
object or aspect of the world out there means to recognize that words carry with them a 
power that goes beyond description and identification of people, objects, properties and 
events. It means to work at identifying how language becomes a tool through which our 
social and cultural world is constantly described, evaluated and reproduced, (p. 19) 
The entire project of heritage language education and even, as Kramsch (1994) seems to suggest, foreign 
language instruction in general, can be said to depend upon the indexical power of language to establish, 
maintain, and transform identities. A “social practice account” of language calls attention to its role in 
shaping the meaning it appears to passively transmit. This account maintains that language, rather than 
being a repository of essential meanings corresponding, in some fashion, to reality ‘out there,’ is 
constitutive of that reality. This will be further discussed in a later section when I contrast Confucian 
accounts of language with contemporary social practice accounts. 
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3.M Heritage Language Schools 
Heritage language schools are a widespread and numerically significant, albeit little noticed, 
educational resource in the United States. Baker (1996) notes that more than 5000 ethnic community 
mother tongue schools (a figure somewhat lower than Fishman’s 6000) are located in every state of the 
US and serve such varied ethnic communities as: Arab, African, Asian, French, German, Greek, Haitian, 
Jewish, Russian, Polish, Japanese, Latin American, Armenian, Dutch, Bulgarian, Irish, Rumanian, 
Serbian, and Turkish. 
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Draper and Hicks (2000) observe that the term “heritage language” is relatively new to the 
vocabulary of language learning and so, at present, there is little agreement on just who a heritage 
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language learner is. Wiley (2001) agrees, noting, “as with any attempt to apply a single label to a complex 
situation, defining heritage language is problematic” (p. 29). Moreover, because much of the discussion 
of heritage language learning is conducted around public school response to the presence of bilingual 
children, matters of direct, and often privately funded, ethnic community involvement are often 
overlooked. Baker, for instance, might well be describing maintenance bilingual education when he 
defines heritage language education as a situation in which language minority children “use their native, 
ethnic, home or heritage language in the school as a medium of instruction and the goal is full 
bilingualism” (p. 184). Note that Baker’s definition leaves out persons who study an ethnic language in 
community schools on weekends or enroll in high school foreign language classes reflecting their ethnic 
backgrounds. 
In contrast, Draper and Hicks say a heritage language learner is most likely a person with 
exposure to the non-dominant language at home but could also be “anyone who has had in-depth 
exposure to another language” (p. 19), most likely in an informal context. This more inclusive definition, 
while avoiding Baker’s normative ‘native-speaker’ criterion, overlooks members’ stake in ethnicity as a 
factor in heritage language programs. Valdes (2000) hints at ethnicity as a component of heritage 
language when she alludes to its being the (non-English) language of home. However, she does not count 
learners who have no competence in the heritage language: 
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The term “heritage” speaker is used to refer to a student who is raised in a home where a 
non-English language is spoken, who speaks or merely understands the heritage 
language, and who is to some degree bilingual in English and the heritage language. 
(P- 5) 
Valdes’ definition would leave out, among others, many American Jewish learners of Hebrew (who 
constitute the largest group of children in ethnic schools), Irish learners of Gaelic, English learners of 
Cornish, and, to mention a group that constitutes a significant number of learners at the Williamston 
Chinese School, children adopted from China as infants by parents who are not of Chinese descent and 
who do not speak or read Chinese. It further excludes these adoptive parents. Such considerations remind 
us of the political dimension of heritage language. As Wiley (2001) asks: 
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who can be considered a legitimate heritage language learner? Should “outsiders” to the 
heritage language be encouraged to learn it? Which is more important in determining 
“outsider” or “insider” status: language proficiency or ethnicity? (p. 30) 
In Canada, the term heritage language education refers to two kinds of programs: heritage 
language bilingual education and heritage language lessons (Baker, 1996). The former uses the heritage 
language as a medium of instruction for about fifty percent of the school day while heritage language 
lessons are taught in a far wider range of languages but are taught for only about two and one half-hours 
per week, during dinner-hours, after school, and on weekends. In the United States, the terms 
“maintenance bilingual education” or “developmental maintenance bilingual education” correspond to 
Canadian “heritage language bilingual education,” but public schools here do not generally offer a 
counterpart to heritage language lessons. This function is most often assumed by ethnic communities 
themselves. 
It is this last sort of school I have in mind when I refer to heritage language schools. Fishman 
suggests use of the term “ethnic community mother tongue schools” to distinguish them from public 
schools, and notes that they are usually fee-paying private schools with expertise drawn, often 
voluntarily, from the local community. Baker (1996) cautions against the term ‘heritage’ as it “points to 
the past and not to the future, to traditions rather than the contemporary” (p. 185). Baker echoes 
Cummins’ (1995) concern that the term ‘heritage’ implies mastery of a tradition or culture and so 
conceals present day attempts to come to terms with issues of difference. Sensitive to such criticism, 
British schools often prefer the terms “community language” or “where English is an additional 
language.” Be that as it may, “heritage language,” and related terms “heritage school,” “heritage learner,” 
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and so on, continues to be the way this cluster of notions around a particular aspect of second language 
learning is most commonly referenced and so remains the term I plan to use throughout this study. 
3.4 Language Loss Among Chinese in America 
Commenting on Maxine Hong Kingston’s Woman Warrior, a critic for the New York Review of 
Books, observed, “The Chinese-Americans are a notably unassimilated culture. It is not unusual in San 
Francisco to find fourth- or fifth-generation American-born Chinese who speak no English,” (Wong & 
Lopez, 2000, p. 263). If this were true, there would hardly be a need for Chinese heritage language 
schooling in the first place. Indeed, evidence suggests that, even among recent arrivals, language shift 
occurs at a rapid pace. Wong and Lopez observe that the long history of Chinese settlement in the United 
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States, along with pressure to assimilate, has led to a situation in which “English is in fact the only 
language-not the second language of the majority of the native-born.” Nor is language shift among 
Chinese an entirely recent phenomenon. As far back as the turn of the last century, Mary Roberts 
Coolidge (1909) noted: 
a comparison of the Chinese with other aliens, particularly with the Italians, Mexicans, 
and Greeks in San Francisco, discloses the fact that they are being Americanized quite as 
rapidly, and, in some respects, make better citizens because of their superior intellectual 
capacity, (p. 441) 
Kuo’s (1974) study of Mandarin-speaking immigrant families in the Midwest describes a pattern 
which, as Wong and Lopez observe, will sound familiar to many Chinese-Americans and, indeed, 
immigrant families in general. Although parents used Mandarin at home with overseas-bom preschool- 
age children, these children soon began to use English most or all of the time when talking to siblings and 
other Chinese children, as well as when talking with themselves. Moreover, because children bom 
overseas preferred to use English, siblings bom in the United States were even more inclined to develop 
English as their dominant language. As one parent commented, “He didn’t like to speak Chinese as soon 
as he picked up some English... unless he cannot express himself in English. We still speak to him in 
Chinese; he’ll answer in English.” Kuo suggests that because these upper middle class parents had a good 
command of English, they might have been responsible for accelerating language shift. Wong and Lopez 
comment that, because parents in this study were English-speaking, it is reasonable to suggest that they 
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“were themselves partly responsible for accelerating language shift.” This would be consistent with 
Lieberson’s (1981) observations that mother-tongue shift requires two crucial steps: 
First, non-English-speaking immigrants or their descendents must learn English as a 
second language. Second, bilingual parents must pass on English as the mother tongue of 
the next generation. If only the first step occurs, but the bilingual parents maintain their 
mother tongue in socializing their offspring, then a stable multilingual situation will exist 
in which bilingualism does not generate mother-tongue shift, (p. 159) 
* 
While Kuo’s data seem to suggest a relationship between socioeconomic status and language shift, Wong 
and Lopez point to data indicating the situation is considerably more complex. They cite Li’s (1982) 
analysis of 1970 census data showing that families of lower, rather than higher, socio-economic status 
had the greater propensity for language shift. Thus, 
among persons with less than a high-school education, the proportions are about 15 
percent in the second generation and 51 percent in the third generation; but among those 
with more than a high-school education, the proportions are 9 percent in the second 
generation and 47 percent in the third generation, (p. 285) 
Without offering explanation for the phenomenon, Wong and Lopez comment that these data suggest that 
middle class Chinese Americans are more likely to retain Chinese language than lower-class Chinese 
Americans. 
Despite some retention of Chinese language into the third generation, it is clear that an extensive 
language shift has taken place. Li notes that “among second-generation Chinese Americans...the use of 
Chinese as a mother tongue was virtually universal 60 years ago, but not today” (Wong & Lopez, 2000, 
p. 285). While 88 percent of Chinese Americans claim Chinese as their mother tongue, Wei (1994) 
observes “it is doubtful that even half...can communicate intelligibly in Chinese, since mother tongue has 
only a slight bearing on language proficiency” (p. 285). 
Census data for 1990 shows a significant relationship between country of birth and length or 
residency in the United States with respect to language use. Among Chinese bom in the US, only 52.7% 
reported use of both English and Chinese at home. For Chinese bom overseas, the figure jumps to 95.2%. 
The difference between these figures suggests a significant decline in the use of Chinese across 
generations. It is further suggestive that, among households that reported using both English and Chinese, 
85% of those bom in this country said they used English very well while only 36.9% of the foreign bom 
claimed the same for proficiency in English. Summarizing these statistics, Wong and Lopez observe that 
the 1990 census data “suggest that a shift in language use has occurred from Chinese to English with the 
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Chinese community as length of residency increases and particularly among the native bom sector of the 
community.” 
3.5 The Chinese Community Heritage Language School 
Chinese schools are among the oldest and largest institutions attempting to ensure cross- 
generational use of the ethnic mother tongue. As noted earlier in this work, a recent study by the National 
Council of Chinese Language Schools places the enrollment of the 634 Chinese language schools across 
the country at approximately 82,675 students (Chao, 1996). Chinese Schools in America date back to the 
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gold rush period, when considerable numbers of Chinese workers sailed to California from impoverished 
regions of southern China in search of employment opportunities. This pattern of immigration followed 
customary migration patterns within China itself. Workers from various localities cultivated specific 
occupational skills, like clerking or winemaking, to export to some more usually urbanized, central 
location (DeGlopper, 1995, pp. 46-47). Sojourners went as single men intending to return home once they 
made good. When an individual reached his destination, he would seek out a huiguan, a mutual assistance 
association of men from the same place. These “same place name associations” constituted solidarity 
groups, providing financial and social assistance to migrants, whose customs, language and, perhaps, 
physical appearance was different from that of the host community. Huiguan (alternatively, tongxiang 
hui) “permitted the growth of those networks of mutual confidence and communication that were 
necessary for long-distance inter-urban commerce” (p. 47). 
Further huiguan were among a number of community-based organizations that filled a gap in a 
Confucian society that DeGlopper says was relatively unconcerned with social relationships at the 
community level. As a sign of this indifference to life at the community level, DeGlopper points to the 
Qing Dynasty text, the “Sacred Edict.” The text begins by asking rhetorically “What are those things we 
call local communities (hsiangtang)V The answer is that communities are villages, the people who live 
in these villages, streets and neighborhoods: 
Their fields adjoin; their houses touch; they meet as they go out and come in; they hear 
each other’s cocks and dogs; they marry each other; they help each other in case of fire, 
flood or theft, (pp. 15-16) 
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Thus, instead of concern with many kinds of people that constitute a community and the multifaceted and 
complex ways they connect with one another, Confucianism, says DeGlopper, assumes villages are 
homogeneous and harmonious units with no tensions among members. For this reason, he concludes that 
Confucianism could serve as only a “rough guide” for communal life. While Confucianism formally 
articulated certain role expectations, “it was opposed to those elements of the culture that were heterodox, 
deviant, and expressive of the interests of the lower depths rather than the commanding heights.” 
Confucianism thoroughly describes the proper relationship between older and younger brother and 
between kings and ordinary folk but, says DeGlopper, is silent on matters having to do with relationships 
between wine merchant and coffin maker, the sorts of relationships that constitute the heart of community 
life. What ordinary people needed, whether migrants to other parts of China or those who never left their 
communities, was “a set of term of terms and concepts [i.e., a code] that members of that society used to 
conceptualize it and describe themselves to themselves” (p. 19). 
De Bary theorizes that such a set of terms was indeed made available through “community 
compacts” (xiangyue) as far back as the Song Dynasty. According to de Bary, the “Sacred Edict” quoted 
above, was a late iteration of the community compact. These compacts, reflecting commitment to the 
idea of hierarchically structured and harmoniously ordered communities gently united through ritual 
ceremonies, are evidence of a communitarian tradition within Confucianism—a tradition beginning not 
with king but the village (pp. 62-63). These documents placed an 
emphasis on mutuality, reciprocity and cooperation among community members...the 
main provisions of the compact called for mutual encouragement in the performance of 
worthy deeds, mutual admonition in the correction of errors and failings, reciprocal 
engagement in rites and customs, and mutual aid in times of stress and misfortune, (p. 60) 
“Here, then,” de Bary continues, “was a model for popular education in direct relation to the daily life of 
the community, a practical way of implementing basic Neo-Confucian principles in a context wider than 
kinship of personal relations” (p. 60). 
Written some five hundred years after the earliest community compacts, the sacred edict is 
evidence of consensual efforts in local politics having devolved into a set of empty formulas and lectures 
delivered by local gentry serving an Imperial Confucian elite: “By this time the original meaning of the 
term xiangyue had become obscured because the practice itself had become largely lost.” 
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Mencius’ advocacy of the “well-field” system is a further instance of the communitarian 
tradition within Confucianism. This model of institutional organization urged that land be distributed on 
equal plots among private (sz) families with a central ninth plot identified as public (gong) land. Families 
would cooperate to maintain the well-plot, thereby helping to build cooperative communities: 
When those in a village who hold land in the same well-field befriend one another in their going 
out and their coming in [i.e. at home and abroad], assist one another through illness and distress, 
the hundred surnames [the people as a whole] will live together in harmony and affection, (de 
Barry, 2000, p. 33) 
De Bary notes the way in which the well-field system conceptualizes public and private as “a single 
interdependent continuum” marked by harmony, cooperation, and egalitarianism. 
Finally, de Bary points to local schools as institutional structures functioning at the community 
level within the Confucian context. The idea that schools should serve as crucial social institutions 
derives from the Confucian belief that “good government depended on education, not laws and 
punishments” (p. 42). Good government was the result of aligning politics with “Heaven’s Command” 
(Tianming). Confucius characterized his own education as “meeting the demands of Heaven—Heaven 
representing the higher moral authority in the universe and Heaven’s way as defining his own mission in 
life” (de Bary 1998, p. 24). Thus, secular education became associated with spiritual development, by 
turning, as Yao (2000) suggests, 
a seemingly external [Heavenly] ‘Mandate’ into a moral sense of mission and 
transformed the interaction between the spiritual Ultimate and an individual into a 
process of personal experience and growth. This transmission is the key for secular 
learning to be imbued with sacred meaning and for self-cultivation to be closely 
associated with spiritual purity and sincerity, (p. 209) 
What in the West is the secular business of education was, in China (where there was no clear distinction 
between secular and sacred), associated with the loftiest of spiritual enterprises. The community school 
became emblematic of the Confucian ideal and the goal of political reformism in later 
ages, since it expressed in institutional form the values of economic equality and 
education for all as the basis for meritocratic advancement into the public service for 
some, if not a more civilized life for society as a whole, (de Bary, 1998, pp. 42-43) 
De Bary says the significance of the term “community school” is suggested by the characters 
that make up the term. The term 'she' indicates “a corporate body with religious roots in the local soil” 
and xue is the word for learning “the process by which one could become literate and articulate enough to 
participate in a higher culture, thereby acquiring the potential for engaging in the upper levels of society 
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and government long dominated by literati” (p. 45). In practice, however, community schools rarely 
achieved their lofty goal of moving the “properly centered self to higher and wider concentric circles of 
social service” (p. 45), but increasingly focused on preparing a smaller elite for civil service exams. Yet, 
“a significant side-current” continued to advocate for community schools and the ideal of cultivating 
scholar-officials: 
There was a tradition continuing from Zhu Xi [the great Song Dynasty scholar] of Neo- 
Confiician concern with general education on the level of the local community, 
recognizing the need for education of the population as a whole, and not just of the elite 
in schools supported by lineages, local gentry. Moreover, these schools were conceived 
as part of a local community infrastructure including community granaries and 
community compact organizations that would serve public needs beyond the level of the 
. family and the clan, (de Bary, 1998, p. 53) 
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In the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, the huiguan system was adapted to 
emigration to Southeast Asia and North America (DeGlopper, p. 47). Although migrants were initially 
single men, changes in American immigration law eventually permitted the creation of family life. 
Chinese children were forbidden by the California School Law of 1860 from attending public school with 
white children, though Asian children could attend school with whites if no other provision were possible. 
Even here, however, white parent groups might exert local pressure to exclude Asians. 
In this climate of discrimination, hueiguan filled an educational gap, merging functions of the 
self-help organization with those of school (shexue). That members thought of these institutions primarily 
in terms of the former is suggested by the fact that they were referred to as of the guan (Morimoto, 1997). 
Institutes enrolled twenty or thirty pupils ranging in age from seven to eighteen and were conducted on 
weekday evenings from five till eight. Subjects taught included Confucian classics, Chinese language, 
philosophy, calligraphy, and poetry. The first formal Chinese ‘school’, known as the Qing School, was 
established by the Chinese Imperial Government in 1886 in San Francisco (Morimoto, p. 11). Two 
teachers sent from China taught about sixty children the Four Books, the classics of Confucian thought, 
knowledge of which was essential for passing Chinese civil service examinations. Children studied from 
three in the afternoon until nine in the evening on weekdays and for twelve hours on Saturdays with just 
this goal in mind. In 1908, an official of the Manchu government visited the United States and Canada to 
advise community leaders in San Francisco, Sacramento, New York, Chicago, Portland, Seattle, 
Vancouver, and Victoria on matters of curriculum and instruction. The thrust of his recommendations 
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concerned the strengthening of patriotic ties with the motherland, since it was expected that American- 
educated Chinese would enhance the technological development of China and that Chinese education 
would ease the transition for returnees. 
Involvement of the Chinese government at the end of the nineteenth century was part of a highly 
significant shift in official attitude toward sojourners, who, just prior to this time, were dismissed as being 
barely Chinese. Because of what Wang (2000) refers to as the “earthbound mindset” of China, travel 
beyond China’s borders had, for many centuries, been officially discouraged. Migrants were regarded as 
adventurers and vagabonds, subject to arrest upon return to China. Most who did leave China departed 
from the southern ports, far from the central authority. The contempt with which emigrants were regarded 
is suggested by Pan’s (1990) anecdote of a Dutch official who apologized to the Manchu Emperor for a 
massacre of Chinese in 1740. The Emperor was reported to have replied that he was “little solicitous for 
the fate of unworthy subjects who, in the pursuit of lucre, had quitted their country and abandoned the 
tombs of their ancestors” (pp. 21-22). Not at all within the category of‘migrants’ were scholar-officials 
who had to leave the country on government business. Although these officials might leave China for 
many years, they were honored with the term huaqiao, with ‘hua’ meaning “splendid; majestic; gorgeous; 
colorful; brilliant; bright; fine; beautiful; luxurious” as well as “prosperous; thriving” and ‘qiao’ referring 
to “sojourner.” 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Qing court realized that emigration offered economic 
and political advantage to a country now anxious to take its place among the community of nations 
(Wang, 2000). The term that had been reserved for Confucian literati and officials forced to endure posts 
far from their homes as a duty to the state, would now be applied to ordinary persons moving abroad to 
improve their circumstances. Reinterpreted for ordinary folk, huaqiao, “captured the sense of doing what 
had to be done, fulfilling a duty, and emphasized the noble and dignified actions that benefited others as 
well as oneself’ (Wang, 2000, p.48). Huaqiao, says Wang, provided a 
uniform sense of identity among people who had been distinguished from one another by 
their province or county of origin or as merchants (huashang), workers and artisans 
(huagang) and coolies (kuli). Such a title should also convey approval, and capture the 
spirit of what Chinese culture expected from good Chinese, (p. 45) 
With the founding of the Republic in 1911, the ruling Kuomintang party aided the establishment 
of additional Chinese schools in Oakland, Stockton, Fresno, Boston, and Phoenix. Even after its retreat to 
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Taiwan, following defeat by the Communists, the Kuomintang retained and built upon its involvement 
with Chinese schools. As noted above, such involvement continues at the Williamston Chinese school, as 
well as at many other heritage schools around the country 
Leung observes that because of racial discrimination, “Many parents looked to China as the sole 
channel of mobility for their children and prepared to return them to the homeland. Here the language 
schools prepared and fitted them for the purpose” (p. 3). Alternatively, education would aid children 
within the Chinese community itself. This required versatility in Chinese language and culture because of 
ongoing dependence of the Chinese community with China. As late as 1941, Tom was able to write: 
The function of the Chinese school as a means of vocational preparation is of vital 
importance at the present time... Any one who does not know Chinese is looked down 
upon. For the second generation, those who can master the Chinese language are looked 
upon with favor and admiration, but those who are ignorant of the native tongue are 
called “brainless”...Many college-graduate American bom Chinese have no chance to get 
a satisfactory job in the Chinese community, (p. 80) 
Leung makes the point that the development of Chinese language schools “reflected a need 
rather than a choice. It was discrimination against the Chinese that turned the Chinese toward their own 
group for support and emotional needs” (p. 5). Yet, despite a level racial prejudice, Chinese school, even 
from its earliest days, was regarded as augmenting, rather than replacing, public schooling. This is 
evidenced by the fact that Chinese schools held classes during periods of the day that allowed children to 
attend public school so far as they were able (Low, 1982). Citing a popular proverb which says “do as the 
villagers do when you are in the village; sail with the current when you are at sea,” Leung suggests that 
that what he calls “partial assimilation” had long been a goal of many Chinese. Yet because of virulent 
discrimination, the Chinese school had, by the mid twentieth century, evolved “into a community 
resource, functioning to enhance family and social life and to alleviate the effects of discrimination 
against the Chinese” (Wong & Lopez, p. 288). 
The 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Amendments lifted discriminatory policies against 
Chinese immigration that had been in place since the previous century. The result was a greatly increased 
number of migrants and so Chinese schools to serve them. Wong and Lopez suggest that the 1949 
Communist victory on the Mainland made it considerably less likely that migrant children would be able 
to pursue careers in China. Further, civil rights legislation led to a decline in discrimination against 
Chinese and enhanced employment opportunities. Thus, while there were greater numbers of Chinese 
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newcomers after 1965, Americans of Chinese extraction were more integrated into mainstream American 
society, making superfluous the kind of language knowledge that Tom, above, regarded as a necessity for 
employment. 
Although Leung twenty-five years ago predicted the end of Chinese heritage schools, they have 
begun to flourish after a decline in the seventies. Wong and Lopez attribute this revival to the ability of 
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heritage schools to transform to meet the needs of changing environment: 
Chinese language maintenance seems to have acquired more positive connotations for the 
dominant society, for Chinese immigrant parents, and for Chinese American children and 
youth. Changing material circumstances and changing cultural attitudes have intervened 
to create more favorable conditions for Chinese language schools, (p. 288) 
Chinese schools serve as venues for the construction of communities and identities as huiguan 
and community jschools did in ancient times. In the same way that Confucian models of culture 
encouraged people to think of these institutions as part of a broader society, so present-day Chinese 
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schools, rather than forming a wall against American circumstances, exist in dynamic relation to them. 
Chinese schools are not alone in this respect. As Fishman (1980) observes, “Rather than reflections of 
foreignness, ethnic community mother tongue schools are actually reflections of dealing with both 
indigenousness and mainstream exposure. They may thus foster “a particularly American way of being 
ethnic, much more than they foster language maintenance” (p. 243). 
3.6 Functions of the Chinese Language School 
Tom (1941) summarized the functions of the Chinese school as: “family adjustment, cultural 
diffusion, social and recreational functions, and vocational preparation” (p. 557). Except for the last of 
these, many functions of the Chinese school remain as they were sixty years ago. ‘Family adjustment’ 
concerns attempts to resolve the linguistic and cultural divide between parents and children, what Tom 
calls “filling in...the language gap”: 
There seems to be a barrier standing between them; they live under the same roof, yet 
they are spiritually far apart. Therefore discipline is difficult... [the Chinese language 
school] serves as an interceding force...[since] the common language is important to bind 
the first and second generation...Thus the family problems an more easily be adjusted. 
(p. 559) 
“Cultural diffusion,” had to do with counteracting negative representations of Chinese: “Living 
in a country where the Chinese have been looked down upon and ill treated, it is easy for them to develop 
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inferiority complexes. To prevent the children from falling into this conviction, it is necessary for them to 
have a correct knowledge of China and the Chinese civilization” (p. 559). 
Somewhat related to the cultural diffusion function is the “social and recreational function.” This 
function comes about because “children feel more at home in the Chinese school than in the American 
schooL.due partly to the absence of race prejudice and partly to the consciousness of kind.” However “at 
home” children might have been, they nevertheless experienced “a common feeling of dislike toward 
being in a classroom after having attended American school all day” (p. 560). This common feeling of 
dislike remains an element in many Chinese schools though, in most cases, children of today endure it 
only three or four hours a week. 
Leung had predicted that absence of economic urgency coupled with reduced levels of racial 
discrimination would soon make Chinese schools unnecessary and so obsolete. Some years later, Wong 
(1988) agreed that Chinese schools faced a dim future. She pointed to problems arising from diversity in 
dialects; the lack of correspondence between a students’ age and language proficiency; competing 
systems of Romanization coupled with politically charged choices between simplified or traditional 
characters; lack of materials appropriate for use among American-born Chinese; relative lack of 
professional ability among the primarily volunteer staff which led to the tendency to rely on methods that 
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seem irrelevant and burdensome for children accustomed to American teaching; and lack of student 
motivation based on student perceptions of Chinese as irrelevant. Wong also cited Leung’s observation 
that “mainstream society’s denigration of Chinese causes students to dislike Chinese and to look down 
upon Chinese language teachers whose English is less native-like than theirs.” “Mainstream denigration 
of Chinese,” was the same reason, incidentally, that Tom had offered for the success of Chinese schools. 
Writing ten years later, however, Wong (2000) is able to amend this final observation, noting “some of 
the environmental obstacles, such as negative attitudes from mainstream society, have become less 
pressing” and concludes that “on the whole, the prospects for Chinese maintenance have considerably 
improved” (p. 293). She further points to improved materials developed specifically for children in the 
United States. If stigmatization once made Chinese a liability, the language is today a form of cultural 
capital, as evidenced by the increasing numbers of non-Chinese heritage students enrolled in Chinese 
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language schools, constituting up to five per cent of enrollments (Lee, 1996) (a phenomenon that Tom 
could hardly have foreseen) and Chinese anxious to claim identity as Chinese. 
Despite the recent flowering of Chinese language schools, Li (1982) describes Chinese language 
maintenance in the United States as “an uphill, if not unrealistic, struggle” (p. 113). Moreover, despite 
higher enrollments, improved social conditions and better materials, Wong and Lopez are far from 
optimistic about the ability of community language schools to reverse language loss. For one thing, they 
ask whether schools meeting two or three hours a week can hope to maintain proficiency among first 
generation Chinese speakers, much less teach the language to those who have never spoken it. Chao’s 
(1996) survey reports that 85.2% of Chinese community heritage language schools are conducted only on 
weekends and that most do not systematically evaluate their success. Wong and Lopez further cite 
Chuang’s survey of thirty-two Chinese language school teachers in upstate New York, which reports that 
the majority of teachers believed they were unsuccessful in teaching students to speak Chinese (p. 293). 
In addition, only 22% of these teachers said that they thought that the most important goal of the school 
was to teach Chinese. Finally, they observe that there is little interest among children in attending 
Chinese school: “judging from our extensive contact with college-level Chinese Americans, most of those 
who attended Chinese school did so because their parents made them or because they wanted to spend 
time with other Chinese friends, learned very little Chinese in school, and forgot most of it after 
discontinuing attendance.” 
The picture that emerges, then, is of a successful institution—in terms of numbers of, at least, 
dedicated to the preservation of Chinese as a living language in the United States, but whose ability to 
carry out this mission is seriously in question. How, then, is it possible to account for the numerical 
success and durability of the Chinese language school? Why did Leung’s predictions of 25 years ago 
prove so wrong? “One can only conclude,” answer Wong and Lopez “that the schools are in fact not 
primarily language-teaching institutions; rather, they serve vital nonlinguistic functions” (p. 294). This, 
understanding, as I argued above, has been with Chinese schools since their very earliest days. 
More recent reviews of the functions of Chinese language schools add little to Tom’s analysis of 
60 years ago. In a national survey of Chinese schools in America, Lin (1985) found that among 141 
schools responding, 76% stated the goals of their programs emphasized maintaining Chinese language 
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and culture among ethnic Chinese; 9% were more concerned with “promoting bicultures and better 
understanding of ethnic Chinese among non-Chinese within the general public”; 9% believed that 
maintenance of Chinese language helped Chinese Americans gain self esteem and maintain identification 
with Chinese culture and Chinese people; and 5% emphasized the mission to teach both Chinese and 
Christianity. Wong and Lopez say that, in some communities, Chinese schools nowadays function as day¬ 
care centers and serve as places for adults, not just children, to socialize. They point to the growing 
proportion of such “culturally oriented activities” (e.g., Chinese calligraphy, painting, folk dancing, crafts 
and martial arts) as evidence of the declining importance of Chinese language: 
Chinese Americans are increasingly seeing the Chinese language as only a part, and not 
necessarily an indispensable part, of their overall ethnic heritage. Chinese language 
maintenance is taking a new form and serves a new function in today’s Chinese 
American society, (p. 294) 
Contrary to Lin’s findings, above (whose figure on “self-esteem” was only 9%), Wong and Lopez suggest 
“the most important function of contemporary Chinese language schools seems to be to create a sense of 
cultural and ethnic pride” (p. 294). This function corresponds to Tom’s “cultural diffusion” function, 
though in light of declining discrimination, the need for cultural and ethnic pride is unclear. Wong and 
Lopez believe that parents are willing to make the trade-off between Chinese language proficiency and 
ethnic pride: “in the case of massive shift to English, parents would be willing to give up insistence on 
functional proficiency in the Chinese language in order to preserve the children’s interest and pride in 
being Chinese.” Such willingness has clear implications for the ability of local communities to arrest 
language shift. 
Edwards (1985) might characterize the above trade-off as a course representing “the least 
possible disruption to existing life style” (p. 97) with respect to language and ethnic identity. While this 
may appear to be a cynical view of language and ethnic identity, Edwards points out that, in the face of 
inevitable language shift, group continuity may depend upon flexibility and pragmatism. Edwards 
suggests one possible reason for this when he points out that language, like calligraphy, painting, folk 
dancing, crafts, and martial arts, serves to symbolize ethnic identity. Edwards says that language as a 
means of expressing social identity can be separated from its use as a means of forming and expressing 
thoughts. The “communicative function,” is “language in its ordinarily understood sense as a tool of 
communication,” while its “symbolic function” is “language as an emblem of groupness, as a symbol, a 
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rallying-point (p. 17). Edwards believes the symbolic function of language remains intact even when 
groups cease to use it for communicative purposes. Thus, in “studying” Chinese, children may 
satisfactorily fulfill the symbolic function of language while not addressing its communicative function. 
The warrant for language as a ‘cultural’ activity may go some way in explaining the durability of 
Chinese schools, despite their inability to stanch language loss. However, this does not fully explain 
behavior that is not consistent with at least some parents’ expectations that children will acquire 
communicative ability in Chinese. In a survey conducted at the Chinese School of Delaware, parents 
expressed the hope that Chinese school education would provide children with what they considered to be 
“basic Chinese” skills, including the ability to “speak Chinese with any native speaker, understand 
Chinese movies or TV news, and read Chinese newspapers or magazines” (Wang, 1996,(p. 64). As Wang 
points out, these goals, far from being “basic,” are “unrealistically high.” 
In this section I have described Chinese schools in historical perspective and suggested that their 
present role in mediating ethnic identity has been a feature of Chinese schools since their earliest 
beginnings. Considering the importance of the link between Chinese schools and ethnic identity, in the 
following section, I review the literature on ethnic identity. Because ethnicity has taken on the status of a 
common-sense notion, a more careful analysis will help to clarify my subsequent discussion of Chinese 
identity. 
3.6.1 Ethnic Identity 
Edwards (1994) makes the surprising discovery that in an examination of sixty-five studies of 
ethnicity, fifty-two gave no explicit definition of ethnicity or definitions too vague to be particularly 
useful. One possible explanation for this oversight may be that ethnicity, as Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey 
point out, “is a slippery concept” (Ellis, 1994, p. 207) and so one that many writers would prefer to avoid. 
The situation hardly improves when ethnicity is linked to such equally slippery concepts as race, culture, 
and identity. The failure of researchers to define ethnicity, says Ellis, has meant considerable lack of 
precision in the literature of identity and second language acquisition. 
“Ethnicity” derives from ethnos, the Greek term for “nation.” Edwards points out that, 
historically, ethnicity is not neutral, carrying with it associations of outsiders, barbarians, and heathens, 
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connotations which persisted into the nineteenth century. Although in contemporary discussions of 
ethnicity, negative connotations have been replaced by positive ones, the idea that ethnic groups are “not 
a mere aggregate of people or a sector of a population, but a self-conscious collection of people united, or 
closely related, by shared experiences still obtains” (Cashmore, 1996, p. 119). In modem times, ethnicity 
has become linked with the experience of powerlessness and deprivation (Cashmore, 1996; Edwards, 
1995) and, in Crystal’s (1987) view, the idea further evokes images of traditional rural culture. Edwards 
does not agree that such limitations should be placed on ethnicity, since “even the most casual observer 
can see that all people are members of some ethnic group or other” (Edwards, 1995, p. 125). 
Espiritu (1992) distinguishes between “primordialist” and “instrumentalist” ethnic perspectives. 
The latter holds that populations “remain ethnic when their ethnicity yields greater returns that other 
statuses available to them” (p. 5). Ethnic groups, from this perspective, are little more than a kind of 
interest group, jockeying for opportunities to acquire symbolic or real capital serving personal and class 
advantage. A weaker version of instrumentalism holds that it is the cultural homogeneity of ethnic groups 
that allows them to organize more effectively as interest groups. Primordialism, on the other hand, insists 
that ethnic groups form around an “intuitive bond,” or what Cornell calls a “web of sentiment, belief, 
worldview, and practice,” which is “forged somewhere in the primordial past” (Espiritu 1992, p. 4). 
However, as Espiritu points out, primordialism cannot account for (a) absence of solidarity among 
ethnically related groups and (b) the wide range of variation of intensity and manner of ethnic awareness, 
such that who counts as an ethnic relation can depend upon momentary fluctuations in the distribution of 
economic and cultural capital. 
Primordialism often conflates race and ethnicity, though Cashmore argues there is no necessary 
relationship between the two concepts (p. 120). Dikotter (1992) calls race “a cultural construct with no 
relationship to objective reality” and while varied phenotypes are, of course, present among human 
populations, “biological differences do not of themselves induce cultural differences, but are utilized to 
legitimize role expectations: physical features are given social meaning...Races do not exist, they are 
imagined” (p. viii). Long discarded as a useful construct in anthropology, race nevertheless remains 
active and viable in public discourse, “a source of comfort because it allows us to impose order on an 
otherwise complex and confusing phenomenal world” (Royce 1982, p. 19). 
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Cashmore (1996) endorses Michael Banton’s distinction between ethnicity and race: “the former 
reflects the positive tendencies of identification and inclusion where the latter reflects the negative 
tendencies of dissociation and exclusion” (p. 120). Dikotter (1997), too, attempts to distinguish ethnicity 
from race and comes to a similar conclusion. He describes race as 
population groups...imagined to have boundaries based on immutable biological or other 
inherent characteristics and can be contrasted to socially constructed ethnicities, which 
are groups thought to be based on culturally acquired characteristics: the ways in which 
boundaries are created and maintained are distinct, although they clearly overlap in many 
cases, (p. 5) 
Thus, while ethnicities are constructed as flexible and open to change in membership and custom, race is 
an attempt to root difference in the laws of nature itself and so privilege it as an eternal verity. 
Another useful distinction to make here is one between ethnicity and culture. Geertz (1973) 
defines culture as “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of 
inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and 
develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (p. 89). This account argues for a view of 
culture as a resource for communicating experience to others, allowing people to make sense of and 
develop feelings about the world. Geertz’ view of culture as a resource for meaning may be contrasted 
with the idea that cultures contain certain elements that ‘belong’ to a particular group of people. Padilla 
(1980), for example, attempts to track immigrants’ degree of assimilation in terms of retention or loss of 
“cultural awareness,” as evidenced by exchange of such cultural elements as language, history, food, and 
so on. Much like the notion of “pure language” described earlier, this construct suggests the posits ideal 
essential cultures as monolithic, monoglossic, homogeneous units impervious to change or influence. 
An alternative view is that ethnicity does not consist of retention of cultural traits, as in Padilla’s 
formulation, but is itself a cultural construct composed through the process of interaction. The elements 
that in Padilla’s view point to essential culture are here described as unstable, contested, and continually 
changing. A process account of ethnicity does not pursue essential features characterizing various ethnic 
groupings but is concerned, instead, with how ethnicity is produced through social interaction. Barth 
(1969), among the first to propose this alternative view of ethnicity, argued that research should give 
“primary emphasis to the fact that ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the 
actors themselves, and thus have the characteristic of organizing interaction between people.” The 
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relationship between communication and culture is thus one of transaction and reciprocity, not cause and 
effect. Ethnicity, in this view, is not a cluster of stable essences inherent to a group or an individual 
representative of a group (e.g., food, clothing, skin color, or culture) but a dynamic, socially constructed 
inference about group attachment based on these. Barth insisted that the focus of anthropology should be 
not upon putative givens of culture (a practice he refers to as “butterfly collecting”) but upon what 
happens at the boundaries where groups interact to establish claims of personhood. Thus, Barth took the 
position that boundaries do not isolate groups from one another but are actually constitutive of them. As 
Barth says, “ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and acceptance, but are 
quite to the contrary, often the very foundations on which embracing social systems are built” (p. 10). 
Dikotter (1997) expresses very much the same notion when he observes: 
Groups are socially constructed entities that fulfill a purpose of identification and 
organization. The forms which groups assume are largely of an impermanent and 
transitory nature. Changes in the ingroups perceptions and valuations of outgroups will 
led to changes in its membership definition. Group membership is a notion that can only 
exist in a relational context, with reference to other groups, (p. ix) 
With the above distinctions in mind, I next discuss ‘Chinese’ as, in Geertz’ sense, a culture, and, in 
Barth’s, as an ethnic group. I link these distinctions, respectively, to Carbaugh’s concepts of persons 
acting as “cultural agents” and “social actors.” 
3.7 “Acting Chinese”: Two Views of Chinese Identity 
“What makes people Chinese,” says Ebrey (1995) “is acting Chinese” (p. 34). It is possible to 
understand “acting” in two ways, the first having to do with behaving in accord with cultural models and 
the second with maintaining a social identity as a Chinese person. Here, I follow Carbaugh’s (1996) 
suggestion that when individuals partake of common culture, they do so on two levels, as both “cultural 
agents” and “social actors” (pp. 28-29). As cultural agents, they build discourse upon certain taken-for- 
granted cultural premises, earlier described as ’’cultural models” and “cultural codes.” The latter, says 
Carbaugh (1996) 
can be thought of as basic beliefs and values about what constitutes person, about what 
person is (and should be), what person can do (and should) do, and (and should) feel, and 
ways it can (and should) dwell in nature. These premises create a scene of coherence 
about what has often been called ‘personhood.’ (p. 28) 
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As social actors, on the other hand, persons take up particular identity positions allotted within a 
culture. Identities are constrained by the availability of positions and qualifications for incumbents to fill 
them. Carbaugh gives the example American cultural premises about what counts as a kind of person: 
man, woman, husband, wife, teacher, student, worker, owner, environmentalist, developer, and to this list 
one might add various ethnic positions, including, of course, “Chinese.” Each discourse of social 
identification, in turn, plays upon premises of being, doing, feeling, and dwelling. This will have 
implications for immigrants, who may bring with them alternative cultural premises and who may have to 
deal with the identity positions the host culture has prepared for them. Not everybody, of course, 
willingly accepts these positions and the institutionalized conditions that go with them. For this reason, 
the concept of identity is bound with concept of power. 
3.7.1 Confucianism as a Cultural Code 
If, as Ebrey (1995) says, “[W]hat makes people Chinese is acting Chinese” (p. 34) then 
“[A]cting Chinese means behaving in a way consistent with Confucius theory of society” (Wong, 1992, 
pp. 37-38). Wong is hardly alone in equating Chineseness with behaving in accord with a tradition shaped 
by millennia of Confucian scholarship and practice. De Bary (2000), for example, states: 
Many Chinese have professed themselves to be Taoists, Buddhists, and even Christians, 
but seldom have they ceased to be Confucianists. For Confucianism since the time of its 
general acceptance has been more than a creed to be professed or rejected; it has become 
an inseparable part of the society and thought of the nation as a whole, of what it means 
to be a Chinese, as the Confucian Classics are not the canon of a particular sect but the 
literary heritage of a whole people, (p. 15) 
In many respects, Confucianism resembles Philipsen’s (1992) “cultural code,” and Gee’s (1999) 
“cultural model,” described in the previous chapter. A cultural code informs a “whole people,” allowing 
its members to exist “in some integral relation to each other...bound together in some relation of shared 
sentiment and mutual responsibility” (p. 14). It thus provides 
individuals and societies with ways to answering questions about why they exist and 
where they fit in a scheme of sense and meaning a code of speaking provides the 
resources for creating a sense of coherence and form. (p. 16) 
In similar fashion, Gee’s cultural model offers 
“Appropriate” attitudes, viewpoints, beliefs, and values; “appropriate” ways of acting, 
interacting, participating, and participant structures; “appropriate” social cultural and 
institutional organizational structures; “appropriate” ways of talking, listening, writing, 
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reading, and communicating; “appropriate” ways to feel or display emotion; 
appropriate ways in which real and fictional events, stories, and histories are organized 
and end, and so on and so forth, (p. 68) 
Yet, Confucianism also shares features of a philosophy and religion. Thus, rather than providing 
implicit and so taken for granted rules of appropriacy, it also contains an elaborated meta-commentary on 
group life. While Confucians might agree with Gee’s formulation of cultural models, they would dispense 
with the linguist’s quotation marks around the central idea of “appropriate,” since, as Tu (1985) points 
out, “academic compartmentalization between religion and philosophy (and, of course, sociology) are 
generally blurred in East Asian thought” (p. 22). 
DeGlopper suggests that Confucianism might be regarded as the world’s first sociology because 
it “provided the major categories that people in Chinese culture and society used to apprehend their own 
society and to conceptualize their own lives in that society”: 
As sociologies go, Confucianism is quite a respectable one, of the structuralist- 
functionalist variety. It begins with the idea of a social system, considers shared value 
orientations the foundation of social solidarity, contains a well-articulated functionality 
theory of ritual, and an initially clear concept of roles and role-sets. It appreciates the 
importance of the proper performance of roles and distinctions between roles and the 
actors playing or occupying them...a king is a king because he acts like a proper king, 
not because his father was a king before him. It is also strong in what we might call social 
psychology and small group studies, devoting much attention to socialization, mutual 
influence, and the way attitudes are reinforced and changed by group pressures. One 
could make a case for the Chinese invention of sociology and functionalism, along with 
the better known inventions such as paper, printing, and gunpowder, (p. 17) 
Yet Confucianism is not strictly functionalist because it also shares with contemporary, post-modernist 
sociology an anti-foundationalist perspective, one that understands that “our world is not static but a 
changing and often chaotic ecology of interdependent systems” (Abowitz, 2000, p. 883). 
Confucianism originated within a culture whose sense of the cosmos is expressed by the 
following creation tale. In this anecdote, translated by Graham, Chaos, “Hun-t’un” 
is the primal blob which first divided into heaven and earth and then differentiated as the 
myriad things. In Chinese cosmology the primordial is not chaos reduced to order by 
imposed law, it is a blend of everything rolled up together; the word is a reduplicative of 
the type of English “hotchpotch” and “roly-poly,” and diners in Chinese restaurants will 
have met it in the form “wuntun” as a kind of dumpling. (Hall & Ames, 1995, p. 231) 
Hall and Ames (1995) invite us to imagine wontons (soft, amorphous wrappers of dough, stuffed with 
chopped meat) wildly rolling and flapping, submerging and reemerging in boiling soup. This thought may 
help us understand the Chinese view of the Cosmos as a “dynamic sense of order which, rather than 
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separating what orders from what is ordered, locates the energy of change within chaos itself by insisting 
that order is always richly vague” (p. 231). The roiling activity of the soup is as much a part of its 
“soupness” as its ingredients. Hall and Ames contrast the “natural order” of the dao, this order within 
disorder, permanently creating and subverting itself, with Judeo-Christian ideas of a fixed, ideal, and 
unchanging cosmos, one in which the human spirit is located, as it were, outside the soup to fulfill its 
natural end. In Chinese philosophy and religion, natural order is simultaneously natural disorder and mind 
and matter components in the same cyclical process. 
This view of the cosmos is reflected in the Chinese view of the person as likewise always 
changing. This is in contrast, with Geertz’ (1976) formulation of the “Western conception of the person,” 
quoted earlier, as a “more or less integrated cognitive and emotional universe...organized into a 
distinctive whole...set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural 
background” (p. 225). In the classical Chinese tradition, says Ames (1997), 
the human being (or better the human “becoming”) is something that one does rather 
than what one is; it is how one behaves within the context of the human community 
rather than some essential endowment that resides within one as a potential to be 
actualized, (p. 149) 
Thus the phrase, “acting Chinese” literally describes Chinese selfhood as activity, rather than being. 
Neville (2000) similarly explains that in the Confiician scheme the self is less a matter of 
existential “being” than a “doing” between two cosmic poles zhong, the ‘center,’ and yong, the myriad or 
‘ten thousand things’ of the phenomenal world. The “self consists of all the structures in... [a] person that 
mediate the connections between that person’s ordinary, objective world [yong] and the zhong, that 
person’s readiness to respond to them” (p. 176). In the epigraph for this chapter, Mencius (an ancient 
Confiician interpreter whose own work is included in the sacred texts of Confucianism) refers to the 
center as the “ultimate root of the world.” It is, says Neville, “the central point of balance before pleasure 
and anger against and sadness and joy” (these being among the myriad things), arise in consciousness. 
Zhong is thus “the readiness to respond normatively to the ten thousand things” (p. 176). As a natural 
human endowment, zhong, by itself, was neither good nor bad, existing only as potential, “a kind of 
aesthetic sensitivity to the value content of other things and an innate taste regarding how to honor those 
values” (Neville, p. 177). Yong, at the opposite end of the pole, is the ten thousand things themselves, all 
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earthly phenomena and locations, histories, emotions (Mencius’ “pleasure and anger against and sadness 
and joy”) that issue in response to these things. 
Ultimate sagehood and various states of personhood in between are attained through cultivated 
response between the poles of zhong andyong that constitutes self. “People’s ordinary worlds differ by 
context and circumstance, by geographical location, historical place, and by one’s associations” (Neville, 
p. 175), but the incipient ability to respond in measure is a human endowment. A famous example of this 
ability is what Mencius believed would be a universal human response to a save a child about to fall into 
a well. This response would be one that coincided appropriately (as Mencius says “in measure”) with the 
phenomenon eliciting it. 
The example of the child and the well illustrates the human potential for people to respond in 
measure to life’s circumstances but, for most people in most situations, such ability needs to be 
cultivated. While occasions to respond are offered by life’s circumstances, it is the concern of education 
to help individuals respond appropriately. The Doctrine of the Mean says, “What Heaven (Tien) imparts 
to man is called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way (Dao). Cultivating the Way is 
called education” (Neville, p. 176). What prevents people from following their nature in the first place 
and so making education necessary, is the tendency to behave selfishly (Neville, 2000). Appropriate ritual 
action (If) disrupts selfish behavior so that the self can be made “sincere and subtly transparent so that the 
centered heart [zhong] can see the ten thousand things [yong] without distortion and act upon them 
appropriately without perversion” (Neville, p. 5). 
In traditional Chinese thought, then, the sense of the person as a fixed, unitary agent independent 
of the world she perceives is a detrimental illusion. The view of the cosmos encouraged by Confucianism 
resonates with post-modernist formulations, which characterize the self “in terms of‘sentential attitudes,’ 
shifting patterns of desiring and believing” and of the ‘world’ as “...but the vague background or 
ambiance of self’ (Hall & Ames, p. 146). 
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3.7.2 Language and Ritual 
For Confucians, “The social order, everything from the rules of kinship, to the structure of the 
state, to the etiquette of funerals, was an aspect of the natural order” (DeGlopper, p. 12). The natural 
order is expressed and embodied through //, ritual action. Tu (1985) observes, 
« 
to the Confucian every human act is perceived as the reenactment of a time-honored 
ritual. Each gesture, such as eating, requires numerous practices before it takes the proper 
form. Only through socially recognized forms can one establish the communication 
necessary for self cultivation, (p. 22) 
When conducted properly, (i.e., according to If) “common experiences, such as eating and walking, are 
respected as having great symbolic significance for moral and spiritual self-development” (Tu, 1985, p. 
22). Chen (1990/1991) examined the way in which the dinner table constitutes a cultural ritual in many 
Chinese families. Her ethnographic study, which considered the way in which food is prepared, offered 
and received, concluded that dinner is “...a highly pre-coded cultural event which engenders group 
bonding and promotes social harmony” (p. 133). 
Li is thus more than manners understood as social conventions standing between civilized life 
and natural self-centeredness; it is, instead, “a way of life that connects the human heart in resonance and 
harmony with all the things in the universe, including the rituals, symbols, and institutions that facilitate 
that harmony” (Neville, p. 35). Although li is generally glossed as ‘propriety,’ DeGlopper says this term 
does not adequately convey its scope. Li refers, first, to the “customary definition of social roles and the 
approved pattern of behavior of individuals standing in definite relations to each other, as father and son 
or husband and wife.” Second, li is rights and responsibilities as this is established in the hierarchy, along 
with, third, the code of morality enforcing it through the social conscience of society members. Finally, li 
is the projected possibility of human fulfillment as social harmony achieved through shared human 
obligation. Li, then, is the various rituals, conventions, social habits, and social institutions, which, when 
conducted appropriately, make for civilization, because they bring collective action into harmony with 
cosmic order. 
Language, when broadly considered, is an aspect of ritual: “When Confucian propriety (li) is 
properly generalized, language itself appears as a learned, conventional ritual behavior” (Neville, p. 10). 
Philipsen (1987) similarly explains ritual as “a communication form in which there is a structured 
sequence of symbolic acts, the correct performance of which constitutes homage to a sacred object” (p. 
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250). Tu states the converse of this proposition, noting that li is “like language... a form of 
communication and self expression. Without a growing awareness of the ritual language, one cannot 
become a fully participating member of one’s own society.” 
Earlier in this chapter, I described a “social practice account” of language as acknowledging the 
way in which words and symbols constitute the reality they are often said to represent. Neville (2000) 
traces this understanding to pragmatics, the American philosophical movement founded by James, Peirce, 
Dewey and Mead. Describing Mead’s conception of the social person, Henderson (2002) says the self is 
a discursively constituted, multifaceted, work-in-progress collection of‘selves’ made 
possible only in interaction with others. This existentially ‘postmodern’, situationally 
contingent subject functions like a text as it is ‘read’ and interpreted by others in 
interaction. However, unlike text, this human subject engages in a reciprocal process of 
interpreting and responding to the actions of the interacting others in specific 
situations .-..from this perspective, the impossibility of a fixed ‘core self gives human 
interaction a degree of flexibility, unpredictability, and ambiguity, (p. 245) 
Long before its formulation by pragmatist thinkers, however, Chinese philosophers understood that 
Interpreters...are natural things whose interactions with the world and one another are 
guided by their representations. With well-guided interactions the interpreters construe 
the world accurately and do not miss the distinctions that are important for the 
interpreters’ welfare and purposes...rather than focus on the mental property of 
intentionality, which makes the causal connections between minds and external things 
unintelligible, pragmatism analyzes intentionality as a special kind (or kinds) of causation 
having to do with purposive interaction...For Peirce and Dewey, knowing as having a 
mental picture is subordinated to learning as the connection of the representations that 
guide interaction. (Neville, pp. 11-12) 
Neville contrasts the above formulation, which he refers to as “pragmatic semiotics,” with 
Saussure’s idea that language ‘re-presented’ (i.e., present again) objects that were otherwise absent, or, 
alternatively, invoked the existence of an object that could not otherwise be presented. Saussure’s 
semiotics derives from the Western cosmogenic tradition, premised on the idea that the cosmos consists 
of essential pre-linguistic meanings that can be represented by arbitrary words. In pragmatic semiotics, on 
the other hand, language is not something different from what it represents but, rather, is an aspect of it. 
The Confucian conception of “rectification of names” suggests the way in which the world and 
the language that symbolizes it are not arbitrary conventions but part of a reciprocal system of meaning. 
In the Analects (XHI/iii), Confucius says that the first thing to be done in establishing government is to 
make sure that the names of things match “the truth of things”: “If names be not correct, language is not 
in accordance with the truth of things. If the language is not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs 
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cannot be carried on to success” (Legge, Analects, pp. 263-264). Rectification of names is the principle 
behind Confucius’ advice to Duke Ching of Ch’i (Xll/xi): “There is government when the prince is 
prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father and the son is son” (Legge, p. 256). 
The traditional Chinese view of language, like the social practice account, maintains that 
language, rather than reflecting nature, produces, maintains, repairs and transforms it (Cary, 1975, p. 10). 
However, as Ames and Hall point out, a social practice account also promotes the view that the multiple 
ways of being and speaking, as these are devised by various groups, are equally valid. Thus, social praxis 
is a matter of individual groups developing transformative language to improve their own social 
conditions. Bogdan and Bicklen (1992) offer a version of the social constructivist account of personhood 
and praxis when they say 
The self is a social construction, the results of persons perceiving themselves and then 
developing a definition through the process of interaction. This loop enables people to 
change and grow as they learn more about themselves through this interactive process, (p. 
37) 
Confucianism, on the other hand, does not encourage a view that cultures are able to select their own 
version of the good life. Instead, it insists that language must accord with “the truth of things” to produce 
stable government and satisfactory human relationships. In the Confiician view, language is a repository 
of tradition and essential human meanings that are the foundation of the good life. However, its 
components cannot be held up to individual scrutiny, as Bogdan and Bicklen suggest, because individuals 
and societies are inescapably within their tradition. Thus, as Hall and Ames (1995) say, “protesters 
themselves are always implicated in the existing order, and hence any criticism of it is ultimately self- 
referential.” Therefore, “the Chinese sage is not prone to tie the significances of language to the norms of 
present praxis. He insists upon deferential access to the appropriate traditional models” (p. 229). 
Deference is activated through ritual behavior. Hall and Ames play off Derrida’s notion of 
‘difference’ to explain how the Chinese idea of language can be summed up by the term ‘deference,’ and 
the sage’s willingness to yield to received tradition. Rather than referring to an object “out there,” 
putative or real, the language of deference “is based upon the recognition of mutual resonances among 
instances of communicative activity. There is no referring beyond these acts of communication as they 
resonate with one another and with the entertained meanings of the models from the tradition” (p. 229). 
The scholars point to Confucius’ analogy of words to music. The names of things are like musical notes 
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and so Harmony is a function of the particularity of names and notes and their mutual resonances. ..The 
Chinese language is the bearer of tradition, and tradition, made available through ritualistic evocation, is 
the primary context of linguistic behavior” (p. 229). While not all languages and cultural forms can 
equally embody the dao, it is also true that no particular linguistic code of one group could do so better 
than any other. Confucius would have been well aware of the multiplicity and diversity of languages as 
he traveled around China, even to the next village. A code must simply be able to produce ways of acting 
necessary for civilized social life: 
Being conventional, languages differ from one another, but the normative question is 
whether the language in question can convey what is needed. Those languages able to 
support deep civilization are good; those that are impoverished so that friendship, family 
relations, and good government cannot be expressed and exercised linguistically are not 
so good” (Neville 2000, p. 10) 
Rituals, like other forms of symbolic communication, contain no meaning in themselves (a view 
with which Saussure would agree); however, neither do they refer to meanings beyond themselves. Thus, 
as Confucius allowed, the particular forms that rituals took were not important and might differ from time 
to time and place to place. Yet to have a positive effect, they must enact universal rules of social 
deference. 
Confucius’ theory receives a measure of support from the empirical work of Brown and 
Levinson (1990), who argue 
deference is not encoded in language by the use of arbitrary forms...polite forms cannot 
be fully understood with a Sassurean structural perspective of an arbitrary system that 
thus varies from culture to culture; rather they are systematically motivated by a 
reasoning from the proper treatment of the social person, and thus have the universality 
they empirically do. (p. 23) 
During the Han Dynasty a branch of Confucian orthodoxy committed to the idea of mutual 
accommodation based on social deference began to emerge (Hall & Ames, 1995). The philosopher, 
Xunzi, encouraged a notion called jianshu—“the art of accommodation.” The first character, jian is used 
to indicate “simultaneity” and “at one and the same time” and, by extension, “indiscriminately” and 
“equally” (Dobson, 1974, p. 392). The second character, shu, means “skill” or “art.” Thus jianshu is the 
art of balancing things that might otherwise not go together. Jianshu is thus 
patterns of deference which accommodate and harmonize differences in desires, attitudes, 
and actions. Ideally, dispute is a cooperative exercise among responsible participants that 
leads to a search for alternatives upon which all can agree. There is a fundamental 
disesteem for coercion of any kind, since aggressiveness or violence threatens to disrupt 
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rather than reinforce or improve upon the existing social order. After all, the goal of 
protest is not victory in contest, which is necessarily divisive, but the strengthening of 
communal harmony. (Hall & Ames, p. 209) 
Jianshu recognizes that difference contains generative opportunities. The Chinese term for “crisis,” weiji, 
as is sometimes remarked, contains characters for both “danger,” (wei) and “opportunity” (/'/'). The 
character thus symbolizes the dynamic, paradoxical nature of dispute and the notion that within 
dissonance there is harmony. Through “patterns of deference” (i.e., ritual action), the divisive potential of 
difference is modulated so that it can be embraced. Hall and Ames (1995) cite with approval Cua’s 
definition of ritual as “schemes of mutual accommodation of differences in attitudes, belief, and values in 
social intercourse.” The authors comment that “ritual practices are negotiated at the intersection of 
personal commitments and communally important values” (p. 209). 
The principle of jianshu remains a feature of Chinese social life and Confucian social life 
outside of China. Kim’s (1996) study of Asian immigrants’ adaptation to American cultural life similarly 
describes the way in which intercultural identity is one that “conjoins and integrates, rather than separates 
and divides”(p. 348). Seventy years ago, Louis (1932) attributed the disruptions of Chinese family life 
America to a “clash of cultures” as Confucian ways ran headlong into American ones: 
In the Chinese homes...there is a great social distance between older and younger 
generations. The difference in the social heritages of the two generations is responsible. 
The American-born Chinese have had their most vital contacts with American life 
through American school, which represents a social world largely unknown to their 
parents... since conflict is the result of lack of understanding between the persons of 
different points of view, we discover conflict between the parents and children due to the 
clash of the two cultures...The conflict process is usually followed by the process of 
accommodation [but] in many instances the younger generation have strong an 
inclination to regard their parents ideals and customs as old-fashioned, without stopping 
to find out their virtues; while the people of the older generation expect the young people 
to be as they were. (p. 251) 
As a formulation of jianshu, the “process of accommodation” is a characteristically Confucian 
solution to social conflict, an attempt to harmonize competing agendas through communication rather 
than conflict. “Stopping to find virtues” requires openness to the point of view of the other generation and 
culture and so the need for an attitude of deference. Deference is not toward the opinion of the other 
person, of course, but to the dialogical process, which entails a willingness to bracket one’s own truths so 
that one can listen attentively for the truths of the other. Stopping to find the virtues can be understood as 
ritual communication, leading to new forms of understanding to produce social harmony. To repeat a 
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point made above, harmony is a matter of finding resonances among words, which are like resonances 
among musical notes made available through ritualistic evocation in language. The following table, 
adapted from Jin and Cortazzi (1998) includes some of the preceding points. 
Table 1 
Key Features of a Chinese Culture of Communication 





depends on authority 
Communication 









works by analogy 
COMMENT 
The chief aim of communication is to bring 
harmonious relationships rather than mainly to share 
information functionally. 
Communication follows tradition and authority 
rather than originality or spontaneity. Speakers defer 
to experts, including the teacher. 
Speakers say what is known rather than regarding 
saying as a way of knowing. 
Often inductive patterns are used—background first, 
main point later or reason then result, rather than 
vice versa. 
Opposites may be part of a larger truth, so there is a 
tendency to think ‘both—and’ rather than ‘either— 
or’ as in binary thinking. 
Both participants have responsibility for 
understanding. Not everything needs to be explicit— 
hearers/readers can work out implications. 
Proof can come from analogy, examples or 
indications rather than by explicit sequential links. 
In this section, I have considered some of the cultural foundations of what might be regarded as 
a Chinese world view and I associated this with Confucianism. In the next section. I will consider a 
second way of being Chinese, as a certain sort of person among others sorts of person. 
3.7.3 Chinese as Social Identity 
If, as Philipsen (1992) says, a cultural code provides people “with ways to answering questions 
about why they exist and where they fit in a scheme of sense and meaning,” then social identity provides 
specific positions available for fitting into a scheme of sense and meaning. In other words, when persons 
invoke social identity, they do so against a backdrop of cultural code. Cultural identity establishes the 
“discursive parameters...for what is coherent as identity” (Carbaugh, 1996, p. 13) in a particular social 
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scene. For example, being recognized as the incarnation of Avalokitesvara, a ‘person of color’ or a 
Chinese, entails the presence of shared premises about the nature of the world and kinds of persons that 
can populate it; identities self-evident to one group may be incomprehensible to another or provoke an 
entirely unexpected response. This is why Carbaugh (1996) says, “Without a social scene in which to 
enact an identity, and without having some degree of validation of that identity in those scenes, as many 
immigrants know, the force of that identity is communally empty, or without social life” (p. 25). 
Immigrants discover that, in the new culture, the old identities no longer apply and so, as 
Varenne (1998) points out, they must “act in terms of the identifications their interlocutors have made for 
them.” Lindo Jong’s mistake was in thinking that a person could have American circumstances without 
becoming an American-that America might serve as the object of one’s desires but that one need not 
become America’s subject. Chinese character, which Lindo a little later summarizes as “How to obey 
parents and listen to your mother's mind. How not to show your own thoughts” (p. 289), is ultimately a 
matter of deference to family and the thoughts of others. In America, Lindo says, Chineseness morphs 
into that most narcissistic of commodities, “fashion.” As Pan (1990) comments, “How American it is, 
after all, to protest one’s ethnicity. A Chinese American is never more American than when he tells me, 
‘I’m proud of my Chinese heritage’” (p. 295). 
3.7.4 Foundations of Ethnic Identity: Idioms of Biology. Psychology, and Cultural and Social 
Identity 
Carbaugh says that in America claims to social identity are popularly spoken through one or a 
combination of three idioms: the idiom of biology, psychology, and/or cultural social identity. In this 
section, I will review these spoken idioms and trace their importance, particularly with respect to Chinese 
identity. Carbaugh’s view of identity as shared communication shaped by the forms that express it 
corresponds to John Dewey’s view that communication and social life entail three “modes of inquiry.” 
These modes of inquiry suggest an ontological base for Carbaugh’s idioms of identity, psychology, 
culture, and pragmatism. 
The first of Dewey’s modes, Abowitz (2000) explains, is “self action,” which “describes the 
state in which things are viewed as acting under their own power” Self action is the ground of 
Carbaugh’s biological and psychological idioms. The second, “interaction,” “refers to the state in which a 
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thing is balanced against another thing in causal interconnection.” Here, identities are produced through 
cause and effect, as when “two cultures collide and like two marbles, fly off into opposing directions” (p. 
882). An interactionist response to “Who am I?” considers personhood as generated through such external 
categories as social class or individualist/collectivist forms of social organization. The third mode of 
inquiry, transaction, 
the condition of seeing things not in isolation, nor in terms of their ‘true’ nature or 
essence, but in terms of their systemic context, their tentative and preliminary status as 
points of inquiry, their places in an organic world of expanding space and time. (pp. 878- 
879). 
This will be discussed in the context of the pragmatic idiom. 
3.7.4.1 Idiom of Biological Identity 
It is through this idiom that many Chinese assert that 90% of persons living in China are 
members of the Han race, Hanzu (Chow, 1997). The result, says Chow, is “a sense of belonging to a 
group which shares more or less the same culture, a history and a vague sense of belonging to the yellow 
race” (p. 34). Ebrey (1995) describes this sense of ethnic unity as “one of the wonders of world history” 
(p. 19) shared as it is by more than a billion people. In contrast, a smaller number of people distributed 
across Europe claim allegiance not to a single nationality or ethnic group but to multitudes of both. 
Despite this sense of racial oneness, ‘race,’ as it is understood in the West, is a recent 
development in Chinese history. Ebrey (1995) argues kin-based metaphors of solidarity, like those of 
China, do not lend themselves easily to racial categorization. While partilineal descent is, of course, 
biological, it does not leave straightforward evidence of genetic inheritance: 
In cases of intermarriage, when a Han Chinese man married a local woman, the 
children...got genes from both sides...but identity was tied to the name...Even if we go 
back only five generations, each person has thirty two forebears who contributed to his or 
her genetic endowment, but only one of these thirty two was the ancestor providing a 
surname... 
What Ebrey refers to as the Chinese “mental framework” “...made it difficult for them to identify to 
physical traits such as body build, facial features, hair curliness or skin color, traits inherited from many 
forebears randomly” as genetically transmitted. Surnames, of course, are hardly reliable evidence of 
shared ancestry, yet Pan (1990) notes their powerful influence on China’s ethnic mix: 
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barbarians...to enhance their social acceptability, substituted their polysyllabic tribal 
names for monosyllabic Chinese ones. All this made for confused genealogies. To 
assume that all those who bear the same surname share a common origin is patently 
absurd, but the idea that every Li, say, is related to every other Li from the same region 
has nevertheless a tenacious hold on the minds of the Chinese, (p. 12) 
Keeping in mind the previous discussion of the Chinese cosmos, the “mental framework” that did not 
allow Chinese to see this as patently absurd derives from a cosmology less concerned with biological 
origins than the social conduct among human groupings. The Chinese mental framework, Hall and Ames 
(1995) suggest, is informed by “correlative thought.” Correlative thought arises from the “non- 
cosmogenic cosmos.” This cosmos is compared to the “cosmogenic” tradition of the West, where 
Nature’s multitudes of things are broken down into their essential elements to discover their first cause 
(1994). Curiosity about the origins of things leads Westerners to ask such questions as “How did the 
cosmos begin? What are its first principles? What are the fundamental elements from out of which it was 
constructed? What is the origin of the existence and growth of natural phenomena?” (p. 149). 
The Western interest in origins, when translated into the idiom of biological identity, produces 
the idea of ‘race’ as a viable explanation for difference among human phenotypes. An alternative, non- 
teleological account of racial difference led an indigenous group in Taiwan to inform anthropologist 
Melissa Brown that her fieldwork among them was causing her to look more like them. They “perceived 
that physical characteristics change in individuals over time as those individuals change culturally” 
(Brown, 1996, p. 39). From the viewpoint of the non-cosmogenic cosmology “it is entirely reasonable to 
conclude that most acorns become squirrels” (Ames, 1994, p. 201). 
“Correlative thought” (occurring, as it does, within the non-cosmogenic cosmos) organizes items 
and events in terms of analogies to one another and then reflects on the implications of these analogies: 
Correlative thinking involves the association of image- or concept-clusters related by 
meaningful disposition rather than physical causation. Such thinking is a species of 
imagination grounded in necessarily informal and hence ad hoc analogical procedures 
presupposing both association and differentiation (p. 125) 
Hall and Ames provide the example of totemic classifications, which do not infer causal connections or 
shared essence between a family and a particular sort of animal. Instead, a “field of meanings” is created 
on the basis of analogy with human qualities to elicit aspects of character and association desirable to the 
group. A further implication of correlative thinking is its tendency to hold “interdependent” rather than 
mutually exclusive views of phenomena (including identities) and their locations in time and space. Here 
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figure and ground are mutually generating, the identities of objects change depending 
upon context, but would be no less real for that...because no supposition is made 
equating permanence and reality there is no need to assume that contingent identities— 
the phenomena in the flux—are unreal. (Hall & Ames, 1994, p. 81) 
Powers (2000) compares inquiry into the origins of things by the philosophers Zhuangzi and 
Aristotle. For the former, “Reality resides in activity, not substance. For this reason a prime mover has 
little to contribute to the system.” For Aristotle, on the other hand, “substance is real, a solid presence 
maintaining its integrity against the ‘ground’ of the world. Motion is not real for, by definition, it is not 
permanent” (p. 81) 
In the non-cosmogenic cosmos, correlative thought directs genealogical curiosity not toward 
how things began but to consideration of human affairs as history and rhetoric: 
who and what are our historical antecedents that have given us our present definition? 
What are their achievements that we can appropriate to acculturate ourselves?...The 
thinker’s role in the non-cosmogenic tradition...will not be as much to discover answers 
as to create a model of humanity that is persuasive and that evokes emulation. (Ames, 
1994, p. 149) 
Ebrey tells us, “[W]hen Chinese in the early twentieth century became interested in Western 
racial theories of the period, it marked a major departure in their thinking.” This interest was hardly 
academic, since it served reformist ambitions to lift China from Western colonialism (Dikotter, 1997). 
Chow traces the construction of the “Yellow” race to the influential writings of political activist, Zhang 
Binglin (1869-1936), who cobbled together contemporary Western notions of race and social Darwinism 
imported by missionaries in nineteenth century with indigenous notions of kind (zhong) and positive 
symbolic associations with the color yellow as evidence of a unified racial lineage. Like many eighteenth 
and nineteenth century European nationalists, Zhang recognized the need for a homogeneous identity, 
along with its limited notion of self and other, to help craft a nation-state. 
I should note, however, that while Dikotter (1997) agrees that the nineteenth century was 
watershed in shaping Chinese racial discourse, he draws upon historical records to suggest that Western 
racial discourse simply nourished and helped articulate indigenous accounts of racism: 
Racial discourse in China and Japan thrived and evolved over time because it 
reconfigured pre-existing notions of identity (since ancient times, the subject of 
metaphysical, often invidious speculation) and simultaneously appealed to a variety of 
groups from popular audiences to groups of scientists, (p. 8). 
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Dikotter faults “some modem scholars” for yielding to the “delusive myth of a Chinese antiquity that 
abandoned racial standards in favour of a concept of cultural universalism in which all barbarians could 
ultimately participate” (p. 3). He cites zuohuan, a fourth century text: “If he is not of our race, he is sure 
to have a different mind (fei wo zulei, qi xin hi yi),” and goes on to describe invidious explanations for the 
presence of racial difference in the known world of ancient China as “part of a mentality that integrated 
the concept of civilization with the idea of humanity, picturing the alien groups living outside the pale of 
Chinese society as distant savages hovering on the edge of bestiality” (p. 4). Dikotter goes on to observe 
how discourses of race, in various guises, continue to inform national policies: “Its flexibility and 
variability is part of its enduring appeal, as it constantly adapts to different political and social contexts, 
from the racial ideology of an economically successful city-state like Singapore to the eugenic policies of 
the communist party in mainland China” (p. 32). This will be discussed further in a subsequent section. 
3.7.4.2 Idiom of Psychology 
A second response to “Who am I?”, according to Carbaugh, may be presented in terms of 
psychology. As an answer to “Who am I?”, Nieto’s (1997) emotional definition of ethnicity is spoken 
from the psychological idiom: 
On a personal level for me, ethnicity means my language and it means my languages. 
And how I combine my languages and how I express myself. And it’s a primary part of 
my identity, but its only a part. It means my birth family, and my home, and my 
childhood memories, and the senses and smells of my past and also my present, (p. 177) 
This claim recognizes a preeminent internal cognitive reality, existing on an individual level and held to 
be responsible for personal orientation toward self and others. The idiom of psychology is often 
combined with the idiom of biology. Thus the category of‘female’ attributes essential psychological and 
spiritual factors as hard wired into one’s biology, (e.g., “a woman’s way of knowing”). Carbaugh (1996) 
says 
Biological and psychological idioms,” “are operationalized at the level of individuals. 
That is, through these idioms, we lay claims to identities, or attribute identities to others 
largely on the basis of biological and psychological factors and dimensions that apply to 
that particular individual or organism, (p. 20-21) 
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It is tempting to consider the idea of ‘hybridity’ through the idiom of biological identity. 
Carbaugh offers the example of white parents who adopt black children with the stated goal of creating a 
multicultural world: 
their belief is that the biological and psychological composition of their child is “black” 
just as theirs is “white” and their family will demonstrate how these different identities, 
so conceived, can live together. As a result, each of us can be led to thinking that “who I 
am” is, at least to some degree, predetermined by basic biological or psychological 
factors and dimensions, (p. 21) 
This idiom is responsible for the currently popular construct “bi-racial,” as it was for ones like “half- 
breed,” “mulatto,” “octoroon,” and “mongrel,” which no longer seem as natural. 
3.7.4.3 Idiom of Social and Cultural Identity 
Similar to biological and psychological idioms, the idiom of social and cultural identity 
attributes to individuals traits that belong to all group members. Luke and Luke (1999) point out that 
...public policy on multiculturalism has been dominated by assumptions about the 
organic solidarity of cultures, whether these are premised on monocultural elite traditions 
or, alternatively, on anthropological views of kinship and custom, (p. 227) 
Narratives of multiculturalism, informed by idioms of social and cultural identity, depict 
minority children in schools “struggling to negotiate a bicultural positioning almost always to the defeat 
of the minority cultural norms and values” (Abowitz, p. 893). 
One such formulation proposes a “four stage model of ethnic identity development” (Tse, 1998, 
pp. 15-29). As the name of this model suggests, members move through various stages of “awareness” of 
their identity, from the first stage of “Unawareness... a relatively brief period when EMs [ethnic 
minorities] are not conscious of their minority status...” and through various stages of discomfort until 
they reach stage four, where “much of the confusion and uncertainty experienced during stages 2 and 3 
[“ethnic ambivalence/evasion” and “emergence,” respectively] are resolved...this last stage is 
characterized by acceptance of oneself as an ethnic minority and by improved self image” (p. 16). Tse 
links these stages of development to possibilities for heritage language development, depending upon the 
availability of comprehensible input and possibilities for “club membership.” The premise of this model 
is that an ethnic self is located somewhere inside the person and that discomfort results from 
“internalizing of White standards” (p. 21), with which the ethnic self is incompatible. Because each of 
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these stages is reducible to “attitude,” the model rests on what Ellis (1994) terms a “socio-psychological 
view,” a notion parallel to Carbaugh’s idiom of social and cultural identity. This view insists that attitudes 
that learners hold toward the second language, “reflect the intersection of their views about their own 
ethnic identity and those about the target-language culture (p. 207). 
The individual/collective dichotomy might be recalled here. While it is allowed that individuals 
or groups may not fully conform to the qualities that are attributed to them, it is nevertheless presumed, 
says Carbaugh, that persons are predisposed to a certain way of being because of their culture; the 
essence of one’s group is thought to reside “inside” the individual person while an individual’s culture 
resides “outside,” making the proper relationship between a person to her culture one of homeostasis. For 
this reason, relocating persons of one culture to the zones of another is problematic, since what is 
“outside” does not match inner essence and so disturbs the natural homeostasis. 
Xing Lu’s (2001) study reflects on the plight of immigrants to America, who, she contends, are 
confronted by demands for “the complete renunciation” of ancestral culture in favor of the behavior and 
values of those of the “Anglo-Saxon group” to achieve “total assimilation.” Total assimilation “may lead 
to cultural genocide and identity crises for immigrants and ethnic groups” (p. 207). The idiom of social 
and cultural identity may further imply the idiom of biological identity. Xing Lu cites a study of Hmong 
males who died of Sudden Death Syndrome due to cultural shock and the discontinuation of Hmong 
traditional ritualistic and religious practices. One might point out that Xing Lu’s (2001) dramatic analysis 
of Hmong immigrants’ doomed struggle helps to perpetuate the very racism it purports to oppose since, 
by rejecting the possibility of Hmong agency, it provides Darwinian evidence of inability to cope with 
life in the modem world. 
Erikson also argues (if less dramatically) from the idiom of social and cultural identity when he 
says that while “positive, coherent identity” (Phinney & Rosenthal, 1992, p. 143) is a fundamental goal 
for all adolescents. 
For adolescents from ethnic minority groups, the process of identity formation has an 
added dimension due to their exposure to alternative sources of identification, their own 
ethnic group and the mainstream or dominant culture. Growing up in a society where the 
mainstream culture may differ significantly in values and beliefs from their [or their 
parents’] culture of origin, these youths face the task of achieving a satisfactory and 
satisfying integration of ethnic identity into a self-identity, (p. 145) 
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1 Erikson’s formulation supposes “own” and “other” as twin axes along which minority identity must be 
plotted to achieve satisfying integration. Values, beliefs, and cultures, both dominant and dominated, are 
understood as fixed quantities, whose integration (though not transformation) yields positive, coherent 
identity. 
A similar view of identity motivates the suggestion that heritage schools and other communally 
oriented sites provide a “subculture,” giving children a higher level of “institutional completeness” than 
individual families alone are able to provide when “the community lacks cohesiveness and a sense of 
kinship and also cannot provide role models for ways of being a successful member of a group” (Phinney 
& Rosenthal, 1992, pp. 154-155). The view has led some to recommend a model of cultural pluralism that 
can guarantee ethnic integrity through a kind of isolation of groups from one another. Guthrie and Hall 
(1981), for example, regard the conflict between parents and children, described previously, as 
consequence of growing up in a “racially stratified society” and suggest, as a remedy, the promotion of 
what they call “cultural pluralism,” which they define as 
that situation in a society where different cultures coexist on an equal basis, and ethnic 
and cultural minorities are neither dominated nor polarized into ethnic interest groups. 
Cultural pluralism would allow each and every child of majority or minority cultures to 
develop not only a positive concept of self and group identity, but a larger cultural 
repertoire as well. (p. 7) 
Guthrie and Hall’s notion of pluralism as equal coexistence lays racially stratified society on its side so 
that it remains, if not hierarchical, nonetheless stratified. This recalls discourses of “difference” as 
expressed on the walls of the middle school cafeteria. Pluralism as “equal coexistence” is premised on the 
assumption that identities are monolithic, and stable essences rather than fluid and dynamic systems of 
communication. 
The idiom of cultural identity also drives Chun-Hoon’s search for the “essential elements” of 
Asian-American cultures: 
Perhaps the most important obstacle to the preservation of personal self-determination by 
Asians in America is the threat of cultural extinction. Assuming that the right to 
determine one’s own lifestyle and culture is a basic and inherent human right and that not 
all Asians in America desire to become fully assimilated, it is both logical and necessary 
to define the essential elements of Asian-American cultures. Only with such definitions 
and a clear understanding of those forces working to preserve and subvert Asian- 
American cultures will it be possible for the individual Asian-American to evaluate the 
cultural alternatives available to him and to exercise his independent right to personal and 
cultural self determination, (p. 125) 
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Ironically, voices on behalf of the “independent right” to maintain a “lifestyle alternative” could 
hardly be sounded within the matrix of obligations, commitments, and responsibilities that comprise the 
collective culture. An independent right to a lifestyle alternative of one’s choosing is grounded in the 
American cultural insistence that adult individuals have equal capacities to make up their own minds and 
should be respected for their decisions, even when these decisions do not accord with dominant views 
(Carbaugh, 1996). “To have rights is to have individual rights” (Carbaugh, 1989, p. 27) and so issues 
framed as “rights,” “highlight fundamentally the capacities of individuals rather than their duties within 
roles institutions” (p. 26). Chun-Hoon speaks the language not of a “collective” Asia, real or imagined, 
but of an individualist America, where the conversation is always premised on the inherent human right, 
enshrined in the Constitution, to pursue whatever leads to happiness. The idea that each person should 
have the right to determine her own lifestyle is, says Eagleton (1996), a “condition of the modem era,” 
now thoroughly naturalized in our heads, in which we fail to see eye to eye on all the 
most vital matters...a condition which would have been mind-bendingly unimaginable 
for some of the ancients and which seems to forestall all possibility of constructing a 
life in common... If there are many different conceptions of good, then the state must be 
so constructed to accommodate them all. (p. 76) 
Among Eagleton’s ancients would be, of course, Confucians. Ames (1997) further notes that the idea of 
“rights” derives from a view of persons as fully autonomous agents, 
hyperconscious, self-constructing, and self choosing... who hold sovereignty over their 
own interiority...Each individual has irrevocable membership in humankind, where the 
rank of humanity on the chain of being guarantees the ultimate sanctity of each individual 
life. (p. 149) 
Put another way, the “good reasons” for intentional construction of “Asian-American” identity are 
constrained by a “deep sense” that its builders are not aware of, making the category partial and 
contradictory. 
Emphasis on individual agency, says Varenne (1998), tends to obscure the degree to which the 
American conversation about diversity is regulated. Varenne calls its language 
the language of the socially constituted self: (“I am a so-and-so”) with particular rights 
(“as such I am entitled to...”). In this conversation, such a call is responded to with a 
recognition of the call to a self (“indeed you are a son-and-so”) and then with a reminder 
of a long list of responsibilities (“You must respect other selves in the manner in which 
you hope they will respect you”). In America one may have any self one may develop, 
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but the relationship with other selves, in myth and political discourse is fully regulated. 
(p. 45)1 
The right to develop a preferred self is granted in the rules of the American conversation, consisting in 
part, of “historical remnants of old constructions” (p. 44) and distributed to immigrants upon entry to 
America. 
It might be helpful to introduce at this point Gee’s construct of “Conversation,” which consists 
of “long-running and important themes or motifs that have been the focus of a variety of different texts 
and interactions (in different social languages and Discourses) through a significant stretch of time and 
across an array of institutions” (p. 13). Immigrants are caught up in this Conversation about what it means 
to be a particular sort of person, and positioned with respect to race, ethnicity, and religion, which, in 
turn, links them to broader sets of values, beliefs, and symbols. The rules of the Conversation give new 
Americans the choice to assimilate or to separate but they must think of themselves as autonomous and 
self-directed agents who freely take up the choice to do so. 
Espiritu considers “Asianness” the result of “categorization,” “the process whereby one group 
ascriptively classifies another.” Ascription is bound up with power relations and so is a means by which 
one group is able to exert authority over another; institutionally powerful and ethnically unmarked 
‘whites’ produce representations of a generalized ‘other’ who belong to the equally generalized and 
partially imagined location of‘Asia.’ Some persons, as we have seen, embrace this location because, 
Luke and Luke (1999) explain, being positioned as what one is not relative to the dominant class leaves 
subjects without the “conceptual capacity to signify self or identity presence” (p. 232). Subjects thus 
resist such positioning by appropriating and redefining “Asian” as a coherent identity, a unitary Diaspora 
with shared cultural traditions and social perspectives. The category ‘Asian’, then, is appropriated to 
serve as a counter-narrative to undermine and so transform hegemonic, oppressive representations that 
deny agency and so the power for self-definition. 
In a recent radio news item, an advocate for the rights of transgendered individuals insisted that “No 
person should ever, ever be denied employment, or thrown out of their home, or out of the school because 
of who they are” [underlines indicate stressed words]. To be a particular sort of person even when one has 
transformed one’s gender, is to remain fundamentally unchanged. 
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Whether the source of ethnicity is ascription by dominant others (and so an instrument of 
control) or resistance to assimilation, its rhetoric draws upon the idioms of social and biological identity 
to express “the desire for social wholeness, symmetry, a security and solid identity which is objectified 
because affirmed by others unambiguously” (Abowitz, 2000, p. 900). “Shared subjectivity,” as Young 
calls this desire, “signals homogeneity and normalization, assimilation and closure, an idea of community 
as homogeneity and normalization... a common, single vision of shared existence” (Abowitz, 2000, p. 
900). Thus, for example, Guthrie and Hall’s idea of “cultural pluralism,” along with Chun-Hoon’s call for 
pan-Asian identity is established on the desire to bring about the wholeness and security of normative 
uncontested culture. However, such “wholeness and security is an illusion, but more critically, it is one 
that threatens the pluralism of a democracy, instilling racism, classism, and other exclusionary norms” (p. 
900). 
Many Discourses of Chinese as a social identity indulge in ethnic jingoism or Asian 
triumphalism. Refuting the myth of Chinese ethnic and cultural purity, from which such discourses 
derive, Chow (p. 24) cites with approval David Yen-ho Wu’s view that 
for centuries the meaning of being Chinese seemed simple and definite: a sense of 
belonging to a great civilization and performing properly according to the intellectual 
elites norm of conduct. This is what Wang Gungwu referred to as the Chinese “historical 
identity.” The Chinese as a group traditionally believed that when a larger Chinese 
population arrived in the frontier land, Sinicization was the only possible course. It was 
inconceivable that any Chinese could be acculturated by the inferior non-Chinese 
“barbarians”; however, such acculturation has been a common course of development for 
Chinese in the frontier land and overseas, although people still insist that an unadulterated 
Chinese culture is maintained by the Chinese migrants. (Wu, 1991) 
DeGlopper (1995) agrees with Yen-ho Wu that China’s monolithic culture is a fiction and that 
China, like most other locations, is a mix of cultures, ideas, and ethnicities, bubbling up at the outer edges 
and mixing in toward the center: “it is perhaps not too far-fetched to regard Chinese culture as like a long- 
simmering stew in which all the ingredients have had a chance to swap flavors around, and in which it is 
very hard to say which single taste or ingredient is the base or substratum” (p. 263). Tu (1997) similarly 
observes that recent archeological evidence further challenges the assumption that the Chinese people 
were created in the center and at a single historical moment. Rather than beginning at a particular core 
area and radiating out to include present-day China, the weight of current archeological evidence suggests 
that a number of comparable Neolithic civilizations eventually coalesced to form the beginnings of 
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Chinese civilization. The amalgam of peoples constituting the Chinese is conveniently conceptualized as 
the dragon, 
the mythic symbol of potency, creativity and transformation to signify this process of 
integration. As a composite totem, the dragon possesses at least the head of a tiger, the 
horns of a ram, the body of a snake, the claws of an eagle and the scales of a fish. It’s 
ability to cross totemic boundaries and its lack of verisimilitude to any living creature 
strongly suggest that from the very beginning the dragon was a deliberate 
construction...the modem Chinese ethnic self-definition as the ‘dragon race’ indicates a 
deep-rooted sense that Chineseness may derive from many sources, (p. 4) 
It may be that this metaphor, not ones that imagine cultures living in contented isolation from one 
another, offers more satisfactory possibilities for cultural pluralism. 
3.7.4.4 Cultural Pragmatic Idiom 
From the pragmatic idiom, the ground of “own” and “other,” is neither biology nor culture but 
communication. This view was earlier described in the review of Barth’s conception of ethnicity as being 
composed during the process of interaction. The cultural pragmatic idiom belongs to a set of academic, 
rather than popular, theories of personhood that Collier (2000) places under the rubric of “interpretivist.” 
Interpretivist scholarship attempts to explain the means by which group members enact cultural identity 
as they interact with others. It assumes that identities do not exist in a prelinguistic world awaiting 
expression into words and symbols but are co-created as interlocutors transact social meanings. 
In the field of second language acquisition, interest in ethnicity as a communicative 
accomplishment has focused on attempts to find pattern in the variety of heteroglossic forms occurring 
among bilingual speakers. Based on the Accommodation Theory of Howard Giles (which, in turn, is 
informed by the work of Irving Goffinan), these researchers have argued that ethnic and other social 
markers influence the variety of forms that interlocutors produce. Beebe (1988), for example, found that 
bilingual Thais of Chinese descent tended to use Thai phonological variants when they spoke to Thai 
interviewers and Chinese phonological variants when they spoke on the same topic to ethnic Chinese 
interviewers. The process of tailoring one’s speech to fit the expectations of an interlocutor is referred to 
as “impression management,” and here the link to Goffinan, whose work Carbaugh (1996) characterizes 
as concerning “how selves are fundamentally subjects in social presentations, with each sense of self 
hanging upon the ongoing lines of face-to-face interaction” (p. 25) is clear. Rampton (1987) used 
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anecdotal evidence to suggest that his first-language Punjabi informants presented themselves as English 
language learners by using primitive forms of English, well below their actual competence, to tone down 
the face-threatening speech acts of boasting and refusing. Thus, “me no” constructions (e.g., “me no do 
it”) were not indicators of a stage of language development but, rather, were “successful in their appeal to 
shared perceptions of social reality [and]... they are honest in their recognition of linguistic inability 
prejudice” (pp. 54-56). Rampton’s study provides an instance of the way language, by mapping form to 
function, “symbolically produces, maintains, repairs and transforms reality” (Cary, 1975, p. 10). In this 
view, selves are not so much communicated in the passing back and forth of symbolic information as they 
are constructed during the creation of shared meaning, with expectations of personhood being modified 
moment to moment through mutual activity (Abowitz, 2000, p. 883). 
Recent work in post-colonial theory, say Luke and Luke (1999), has begun reconceptualizing 
such “victim narratives” of ‘ascribed identity’ in favor of a more transient, malleable, and flexible view 
of ethnic identity and identification. This work “falls outside ‘traditional’ identity politics theorizing, 
which tends to be couched in dualisms where one half of the equation fixes cultural difference upon the 
outsider or Other” (p. 234). Luke and Luke endorse Bhabha’s formulation of “third space,” which 
opens up a conceptual space that exceeds epistemological dualisms of insider-outsider or 
‘us’ and ‘them’ representations. The third space is the site and moment of hybridity, of 
ambivalence, of reworking and renaming, of subverting and recreating identity from 
among multi-embedded social constructions of Otherness, (p. 234) 
Thus, the idea of hybridity goes beyond ethnic identity as a choice of either assimilation into the host 
society or retention of original cultural traits. 
To the degree that horticultural terminology suggests a biological explanation for the 
establishment of new forms from prior, naturally occurring ones, “hybridity” is an unfortunate term. 
Bhabha acknowledges this problem, noting that hybridity does not index any identifiable a priori identity 
discourse: 
The importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two original moments from which 
the third emerges, rather hybridity is the “third space” which enable other positions to 
emerge... the importance of hybridity is that it bears the traces of those feelings and 
practices which inform it, just like a translation, so that hybridity puts together the traces 
of certain other meanings or discourses. It does not give them authority of being prior in 
the sense of being original: they are prior only in the sense of being anterior. The process 
of cultural hybridity gives rise to something different, something new and 
unrecognizable, a new area of negation of meaning and representation. (Luke & Luke, 
1999, p. 234) 
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Despite this caveat, it is difficult to conceive of a hybrid without at the same moment imagining 
the original or to think of a “third space” without assuming the presence of prior (and so more authentic 
and authoritative) first and second spaces. The notion has also, in some educational circles at least, reified 
such notions as ‘bicultural,’ and ‘biracial,’ as forms of person. Thus, the project of giving rise “to 
something different, something new and unrecognizable” merely validates reified, static notions of race 
and culture. When I use this term, then, I emphasize the dynamic, changing, processive nature of human 
categories as these ride momentary currents and eddies of talk and symbol. Because the pragmatic idiom 
holds that no real “me” is available to answer the question “Who am I?”, inquiry is focused upon sets of 
communicative practices subject to social negotiation, situated as Carbaugh (1996) says, “in a particular 
social somewhere and not just an abstract anywhere” (p. 23). 
Although Carbaugh uses the term “interactive process” to describe the way identity is negotiated 
in face-to-face communication, it is clear from his description that ‘transaction’ better describes the 
tentative, situated nature of identity as understood through the pragmatic idiom: 
What exactly one is being, or saying, or doing, by, by being such a person as a worker, or 
a woman, or a man, or an environmentalist, or a German, is largely contingent upon the 
scene in which one is acting, and the way that scene is set, cast, and communicationally 
improvised, (p. 23) 
Transaction, then, is not simply the action and reaction between people engaged in communication. 
Rather, culture is constituted and reconstituted as people converse with one another. In this view, persons, 
cultures, and ways of being are not closed systems disturbed by contact with others but, on the contrary, 
the result of such contact. Transactionalism shifts inquiry from the distinction between subjects to how 
and why these subjects identify distinctions as significant in the first place, what social purposes 
distinctions serve, and how these can be harmoniously be integrated. 
Weider and Pratt’s (1990) research provides an example of the way in which members of a 
Native American group, the Osage, transact identity. The researchers say that 
To be a certain kind of person...requires that one elicit the enabling responses of others 
that permit the enactment or performance of a persona... What one does in making it 
evident that one is a particular type of person is necessarily correlated with what others 
recognize in recognizing that particular type of person. 
Therefore, “being a real Indian is not something one can simply be, but is something that one becomes 
and/or is, in and as ‘the doing’ of being and becoming a real Indian” (pp. 49-50). The premise here is that 
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being a real Indian (or Chinese, woman, teacher, or any other social identity) is created intersubjectively, 
as interlocutors negotiate insider-outsider relations. Carbaugh (1996), commenting on Weider and Pratt’s 
research, says: 
Who am I? Depends partly on...where I am, with whom I am, and what I can ably do 
there, in that scene, with those people, given the (material and symbolic) resources that 
are available to the people there, (p. 24) 
Thus, “...whether one is Native American or White is...contingent upon whether one is being subjected to 
(or making a bid for) a conversational scene in which one is deemed a Native American or White” 
(Carbaugh, 1996, p. 27). This is the meaning of Carbaugh’s (1996) observation that “I know who I am, in 
part, by the way I symbolize in situated social scenes” (p. 30). 
Gee endorses a view of identity as a communicative achievement. Reviewing the work of 
Weider and Pratt, Gee notes that notes that being a “real Indian” is not something one can do on one’s 
own; the ‘problem’ is getting others to recognize one as a real Indian and, in turn, recognizing others as 
real Indians. This is accomplished by various communicative actions. For example. 
In their search for the other’s “real Indianness” and in their display of their own 
“Indianness,” real Indians frequently engage in a distinctive form of verbal sparring. By 
correctly engaging in this sparring, which “Indians” call “razzing,” each participant 
further establishes cultural competency in the eyes of the other. (Gee, 1999, p. 15) 
While Gee notes that recognizing and making one’s self recognizable as a “real Indian” involves 
more than language use alone, e.g., “acting-interacting-thinking-valuing-talking” (p. 17), these elements 
are nevertheless reducible to some form of symbolic communication. A similar analysis, of course, 
extends to all social identities, since ‘tests’ for who is (or is not) a ‘real’ feminist, gang member, patriot, 
humanist, cutting-edge scientist, yuppie, or regular at the local bar (to use some of Gee’s examples), are 
embedded in local scenes of acting and talking. Identities are always contingent upon local scenes, since 
no ‘once and for all’ test is ever administered to determine who is essentially a certain sort of person. This 
is the basis of Garfinkle’s admonition, quoted earlier, that there is 
‘no time out’ from the here-and-now character of all sense making, every usage of a 
category or a collection. It has to be decided in each and every case what the category 
means and this will involve a figuring out of what collection the category belongs to, for 
this occasion. Similarly, in the absence of contextual detail, it is difficult, if not 
impossible to say what a particular device, say ‘family’, means and hence what its 
constituent membership categories are. (Hester & Elgin, 1997, p. 18) 
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If, as Fishman (1980) insists, heritage language education is concerned with answering such 
questions as: “Who am I?” “What is special about me?” “Who are my own kind of people?”, then focus 
on ways persons systematically symbolize selves through statements about language provides key 
information about what it means to the member of a group. “Who am I” can have no simple, 
straightforward answer since, from the pragmatic idiom at least, the answer does not lie in finding a true 
identity and protecting it from the culture around one. Conflicts between the home and mainstream 
culture arise because, in a complex society, identity cannot be reduced to a simple choice between “us” 
and “them.” The ethnic self is woven into a complex fabric of competing claims upon identity, and so is 
always problematic, constituted as a range of intermediate positions activated in communication with 





In this section, I detail the methods and procedures used to collect and analyze data. I review 
ethnographic commitments and show how they overlap with discourse analysis. This dissertation follows 
tenets of qualitative research (Bogdan & Bicklan, 1992; Dabbs, & Faulkner, 1982; Lincoln & Guba, 
1985; Lofland & Lofland, 1984; Silverman, 2001) which stress the primacy of context and the 
I 
situatedness of speech and action. Silverman (2001) summarizes Hammersley’s “preferences for 
qualitative researchers,” as consisting of 
1. preference for qualitative over quantitative data, i.e. the analysis of words and 
images rather than numbers 
2. preference for naturally occurring over experimental data; unstructured over 
structured interviews 
3. preference for meanings over behavior, i.e. an interest in the world as it appears 
from participants’ points of view 
4. “rejection of natural science as a model” 
5. preference for an inductive, hypothesis generation over hypothesis testing (p. 
38) 
The fourth preference, in particular, hints at a foundational assumption of much qualitative research, that 
human meaning does not lie “out there” as impersonal facts in the world awaiting discovery (Silverman, 
2001, p. 90) and generalizable to phenomena elsewhere. For this reason, many qualitative researchers, 
particularly those adopting a “constructivist” (Silverman, 2001) point of view, make no claims with 
respect to uncovering evidence that applies equally to other cases. The transient and situated nature of 
human meaning suggests that interpretations are valued not for their generalizability to other contexts but, 
say Lincoln and Guba, for their transferability-for their resonance with other contexts. This research on 
language ideology at the Williamston Chinese School should thus not be read as an explanation of 
language ideology in other settings or, by the same reasoning, as even a comprehensive survey of 
attitudes within a particular setting. Rather it produces an interpretation of a “slice of life” (Gee & Green, 
1998; Hall, 2002) among many other such possible slices at the Chinese school. 
This research stance assumes that people are always in the process of interpreting their 
environments and that the researcher, no less than other people, is involved in the business of 
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interpretation, thus producing what Geertz refer to as “interpretations of interpretations.” Geertz’ insight 
reflects current understandings that ethnography can no longer claim to provide “a clear, unmediated 
record of a knowable world” (Van Maanen, 1995, p. 7) with marks of ink on paper. Such claims, which 
rest upon what Tyler calls the “descriptive adequacy of language as a representation of the world” (p. 
123), were critiqued in the previous chapter of this dissertation. Because ethnographic texts cannot claim 
to fully represent the knowledge of others or to be able to present their social reality, ethnography must 
rely upon its capacity to ‘evoke’ local settings: 
Evocation is neither presentation nor representation. It presents no objects and represents 
none, yet it makes available through absence what can be conceived but not presented. It 
is thus beyond truth and immune to the judgment of performance. It overcomes the 
separation of the sensible and the conceivable, of form and content, of self and other, of 
language and the world, (p. 123) 
Thus, as Tyler’s comment may suggest, doing ethnography has turned into what Van Maanen describes 
as “something akin to an intense epistemological trial by fire” (p. 2). Recognition that ethnography is 
evocation rather than representation has caused constructivist researchers to direct their gaze as much 
inward as outward. Holstein and Gubrium (1997), for example, note how one data source, the 
“interview,” should be regarded as a co-construction between the interviewer and the respondent: 
Respondents’ answers and comments are not viewed as reality reports delivered from a 
fixed repository. Instead they are considered for the ways that they construct aspects of 
reality in collaboration with the interviewer. The focus is as much on the assembly 
process as on what is assembled, (p. 127) 
The constructivist researcher calls attention to the interpretation itself by not only describing what a 
respondent means but by explaining how she means it. The respondent’s words are not enough; the 
burden is on the interpreter to explain how she or he has arrived at an interpretation of them. 
4.2 Ethnography of Communication 
While researchers have taken a number of approaches to language ideology, Woolard and 
Scheiffelin (1984) note that those working from the perspective of ethnography of communication have 
pursued the “grounding of language beliefs in other cultural and social forms... [and] have demonstrated 
connections among folk theories of language acquisition, linguistic practices, and key cultural ideas about 
personhood” (p. 59). This project follows from the ethnographer’s commitment to provide what Sherzer 
(1992) calls 
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a description in cultural terms of the patterned uses of language and speech in a particular 
group, institution, community, or society that includes native theories and practices of 
speaking, both as overtly articulated by individuals and as enacted by them in a range of 
activities, situations and interactions (p. 76) 
Carbaugh (1988/89, p. 183) states that ethnography of communication must observe four 
criteria: 
1. observe the descriptive theoiy outlined by Del Hymes to study communication practices; 
2. consider communication practices from a “native’s” point of view; 
3. involve cross-cultural comparisons; 
4. be studied by a participant observer within a cultural context. 
With respect to the first of these, Hymes’ framework for analyzing speech situations has become 
nearly synonymous with ethnography of communication itself (Carbaugh, 1994a). Hymes has identified 
three analytic units, speech situation, speech event, and speech act as ways of analyzing communicative 
resources (Hymes, 1972). Hymes (1974) updated these units by broadening the term “speech” to include 
any kind of interpersonal communication (e.g., a wink) and so added “communicative act,” 
“communicative style,” and “ways off speaking.” A speech situation, the most fundamental unit of 
analysis, refers to the context in which speaking occurs, i.e., the circumstances associated with particular 
speech behavior, definable in terms of the people who are taking part in it and its goals, distinguishing it 
from other speech situations (e.g., baby showers, fishing trips, family meals, and seminars). Speech 
events occur within speech situations and are indicated by a major change in participants. Hymes says 
that a party would be considered a speech situation while a conversation at a party would be a speech 
event. Speech acts are the smallest unit of speech used in ethnographic analysis and refer to what 
communicative work is getting done with words or other symbols. Examples here include apologies, 
leave-taking, compliments, and the like. 
Hymes (1972) provides the mnemonic SPEAKING to help researchers analyze the complexity 
of speech. SPEAKING stands for: setting, participants, ends (including goals and outcomes), acts, key 
(including tone and manner), instrumentalities (including forms of speech, i.e., language and dialect; and 
its codes, i.e., variety and register), norms (i.e., norms of interaction and interpretation), and genre. The 
mnemonic, while not providing a list of specific questions, gives researchers the means to generate their 
own questions about a communicative scene (e.g., What kind of field is this?; Who does it belong to? 
What are the special characteristics of this place? Who are these people? Why are they here?) (Agar, 
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1996, pp. 141-142). Hymes notes that it is not necessary to use all components of SPEAKING when 
analyzing speech or even to rigorously follow this formulation. Milbum (1998), for example, suggests 
that a focus on questions of personhood could use Participants, Acts and Situation, “examining who the 
participants...are and how their actions...delineate personhood in particular situations.” 
Because my area of interest is language ideology, I attempt to identify themes, motifs, or images 
that revolve around axes of language and identity to produce what Hymes refers to as topic-oriented 
ethnography, ethnography that focuses on one or two aspects of culture. As discussed earlier, Moerman 
urges that questions with respect to “Who,” “What” and “Why” be recast as questions of “How” since 
this redirects (positivist) interest from essential reality hidden behind communication toward the form of 
communication itself and this accomplishes certain actions in social scenes. 
4.2.1 Ethnography and Discourse Analysis 
While many researchers treat discourse analysis as an ethnographic tool, Gee and Green (1998) 
regard it as a distinct method of inquiry, albeit with considerable overlap with ethnography. According to 
Silverman (2001), both discourse analysis and ethnography of communication draw upon a variety of 
texts and adopt much the same constructivist epistemology; and both use various data sources, including 
transcripts of talk, both naturally occurring and elicited, sometimes, as in this dissertation, combined 
together in the same study (Silverman, 2001). Most importantly, they share a focal interest in “dialogue.” 
Finally, they are conceptually related by virtue of their ethnographic perspective. To establish this point, 
Gee and Green (1998) cite Spindler and Spindler (1987): 
Within any social setting, and any social scene within a setting, whether great or small, 
social actors are carrying on a culturally constructed dialogue. This dialogue is expressed 
in behavior, words, symbols, and in the application of cultural knowledge to make 
instrumental activities and social situations work for one. We learn the dialogue as 
children, and continue learning it all of our lives, as our circumstances change. This is the 
phenomenon we study as ethnographers—the dialogue of action and interaction... (p. 
126) 
Yet, there are also distinctions between ethnography and discourse analysis. 
While both ethnography and discourse analysis take “situation” as the unit of cultural analysis, 
the former is often interested in the physical context in which texts are produced (though this is not 
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invariably the case since, as noted above, SPEAKING can be applied selectively). In contrast, Psathas’ 
(1995) remarks about conversation analysis apply equally to discourse analysis, where 
[T]here is, in general, no interest in the ethnographic particulars of persons, places, and 
settings. Rather, the interest is in discovering structures of interaction, the orderliness of 
phenomena that are independent of cohort particulars... that is, the orderliness does not 
depend on particular persons or particular settings.” (p. 45) 
In place of physical setting, discourse analysis stresses the worlds constructed by words themselves. 
Thus, says Potter (1997), emphasis is 
with texts and talk in social practices.. .the focus is...on language as...the medium for 
interaction; analysis of discourse becomes, then, analysis of what people do. One theme 
that is particularly emphasized here is the rhetorical or argumentative organization of talk 
and texts; claims and versions are constructed to undermine alternatives (p. 146, Potter’s 
emphasis). 
Silvermah (2001) says that discourse analysis tends to treat themes that are of traditional concern 
to social science. Thus, for example, studies conducted by means of discourse analysis 
have considered both the way in which such inequalities [as gender] are constructed, 
made factual, and justified in talk and they are also considered the resources [i.e., 
identities, membership categories] that are used to manufacture coherent and persuasive 
justifications that work to sustain those inequalities (Potter, 1997, p. 148) 
The above commitment stems from a “meta-theoretical emphasis on anti-realism and constructionism,” 
stressing 
the way versions of the world, of society, events and inner psychological worlds are 
produced in discourse...this leads to a concern with participants’ constructions and how 
they are accomplished and undermined... and... to a recognition of the constructed and 
contingent nature of researchers’ own version of he world. Indeed, it treats realism, 
whether developed by participants or researchers, as a rhetorical production that can itself 
be decomposed and studied, (p. 146) 
The view that reality is a discursive construct within which worlds, societies, threats, invitations, 
identities, and so on are made sensible and actionable may be contrasted with what Heritage (1997) calls 
the “bucket” theory of institutional discourse. The bucket theory (which I earlier discussed in terms of 
macro-sociological perspective) of context proposes that rather than interaction constituting institutions, 
“pre-existing institutions are seen as enclosing interaction” (p. 163). The bucket theory looks at talk in 
terms of how it is constrained by institutional discourses; a constructivist theory, on the other hand, tries 
to understand “how participants build the context of their talk in and through their talk” (p. 163). They 
are concerned, in other words, with the way in which communication (which includes various symbolic 
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resources at a group’s disposal, e.g., documents, pictures, buildings, and legal arrangements) reflexively 
patterns group life. 
1 
Because constructivist analysis is concerned neither with tapping the truth behind individuals’ 
words, nor with spilling out the contents of the institutional bucket, analysis does not entail inventories of 
the number of times an item has occurred in a single stretch of speech, nor an item’s statistical frequency 
of occurrence among speakers. Instead, analysis focuses on how symbols are heard as sensible within a 
context and how symbols reflexively make the context sensible. Ethnographers of communication and 
discourse analysts would agree with Duranti (1999) that “[C]ommunity” is “always and everywhere an 
active building process,” (p. 11) constructed by means of language. Gee (1999, pp. 85-86) identifies six 
areas in which speakers build reality and proposes a heuristic for reflexively coming to terms with how 
order is produced in social scenes and how to produce coherence in reports of those scenes: 
Semiotic building: the way words assemble situated meanings with respect to which 
communicative systems are relevant to (and so allowed to count) in a particular 
situation 
World building: What is here and now taken as “reality;” i.e. what should be 
considered ‘concrete’ or ‘abstract’, present or absent, real or unreal, “probable, 
possible, and impossible.” 
Activity building: Cues and clues that constrain the meanings of activities that are 
occurring in a certain scene, as well as what elements constitute and should 
constitute a particular activity 
Socioculturally situated identity and relationship and building: Assembling situated 
meanings “about what identities and relationships are relevant to the interaction, with 
their concomitant attitudes, values, ways of feeling, ways of knowing, and believing, 
as well as ways of acting and interacting” 
Political building: “using cues or clues to construct the nature and relevance of 
various ‘social goods’, such as status and power, and anything else that counts as a 
‘social good’ here and now” 
Connection building: using cues or clues to make assumptions about how past and 
future of an interaction, verbally and non-verbally are connected to the present 
moment and to each other [i.e., the way in which the present interaction is coherent 
with other moments of interaction]. 
The above building tasks take place in “situations,” “the key unit of analysis for which discourse 
analysis is used across a number of current theoretical perspectives” (Gee & Green, p. 134). The concern 
here is not with the physical situation in which the speech was produced but the situation invoked by the 
discourse. Gee further (1999, pp. 82-83) identifies four “inextricably connected components or aspects” 
that constitute a situation.” These are: 
1. a semiotic aspect (including such “sign systems as speech, gestures, images along 
with the knowledge of how to interpret them as possible”); 
2. an activity aspect (the particular activities in which participants are engaged); 
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3. a material aspect (“the place, time, bodies and objects present during the interaction); 
4. a political aspect (how ‘social goods, as these are considered valuable among 
participants, are distributed); 
5. and a sociocultural aspect (“the personal, social, and cultural knowledge, feelings, 
values, identities and relationships relevant in the interaction...”) 
In a slightly earlier formulation, Gee and Green (1998) called the “political aspect” the 
“sociocultural aspect” and referred to these four aspects collectively by the mnemonic MASS system 
(material, activity, semiotic, and sociocultural). While these aspects are presented separately, this is for 
...heuristic purposes. In actuality, they cannot be separated. However, since it is not 
possible during analysis to consider all of these aspects simultaneously, it is necessary for 
an analyst to foreground particular aspects while backgrounding others. 
Speakers use the four aspects of discourse in speech situations to accomplish the six building 
tasks. As a further analytical tool, Gee lists “representative questions” that can be asked during the 
analysis. Similar questions constitute the sub-questions with which I consider the three functions of 
identity in this dissertation. Analysis, then, consists of “asking questions” about each of the building 
tasks: 
Essentially, a discourse analysis involves asking questions about how language, at a 
given time and place, is used to construe aspects of the situation network as realized at 
that time and place and how the aspects of the situation network simultaneously give 
meaning to that language. (Gee, 1999, p. 92) 
The overall analytic strategy is to search for “themes, motifs, or images that co-locate with each other” (p. 
137) by noticing metaphors, words, images, and other ways of symbolizing culture and personhood 
among the aspects of language. For example, to become sensitive to the area of “Semiotic building,” the 
researcher would ask: “What sign systems are relevant (and irrelevant) in the situation (e.g., speech, 
writing, image, and gestures)? How are they made relevant and in what ways?” This line of questioning 
rejects the idea that interview data should be judged in terms of their fidelity to the world that they 
describe. Rather than “systematically coding, grouping or summarizing the descriptions and providing a 
coherent organizing framework that encapsulates and explains aspects of the social world that 
respondents portray,” the goal of constructivist analysis, say Holstein and Gubrium (1997), “is to 
explicate how meanings, their linkages, and horizons, are constituted in relation to, and within, the 
interview environment” (p. 126). Thus, Holstein and Gubrium continue, the analyst is concerned with the 
“dynamic interrelatedness” between what a member says about experience and how meaning unfolds in 
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discourse. Analysis aims to “‘deconstruct’ participants’ talk to show the hows and the whats of the 
narrative dramas conveyed” (p. 127). 
Gee’s framework for analyzing a discursive “situation” parallels, in many respects, Hymes’ 
SPEAKING, used to analyze a speech situation. Gee’s “semiotic aspect” would include Hymes’ “speech 
acts” along with other aspects of the linguistic code and sign system in general. The activity aspect 
corresponds to Hymes’ “speech situation,” in that it concerns the particular activities in which 
interlocutors are engaged. Hymes’ speech situation subsumes Gee’s “material aspect,” i.e., “place, time, 
bodies and objects present during interaction.” Gee’s sociocultural aspect, which includes “personal, 
social, and cultural knowledge, feelings, values, identities and relationships relevant in the interaction...” 
would be under Hymes’ amorphous category of ‘ways of speaking.’ Gee’s political aspect (which, in its 
earlier formulation, was called a “sociocultural aspect”) refers to “the distribution of social goods in the 
interaction, such as, power, status, race, gender, sexual preference, and anything else deemed a social 
good” (p. 83) does not appear in SPEAKING. However, my purpose here is not to establish that Gee’s 
schema is identical to Hymes’, but that, as a heuristic to sensitize the analyst to patterning of social life, it 
is consistent with his insights about speech in social interaction and so compatible with ethnography of 
communication, as well as discourse analysis. While all the elements in Gee’s taxonomy are 
interconnected, like the elements in SPEAKING, they can be focused on separately: 
All the elements in the situation network are like connected threads, if you pull on one 
you get all the others. Though discourse analysis usually focuses on the language 
(semiotic) aspect, it can start from any of these aspects of a situation and will, in the end, 
get right back to all the others, (p. 84) 
4.2.1.1 Linguistic Analysis 
While not all discourse analysis is concerned with linguistic detail, Gee (1999) recommends a 
close syntactic analysis to help validate interpretations of texts. Therefore, following Gee, some of my 
analysis pays particular attention to the way in which linguistic structure sequentially foregrounds and 
backgrounds certain kinds of information and so produces particular meanings over other possible 
meanings. One of the tasks of the analyst, says Gee, is to consider 
How has a speaker or writer connected his or her clauses so as to signal their logical 
relationships? What information is being foreground and asserted? What information is 
85 
being backgrounded and assumed? How could things have been said or written 
differently and with what communicative consequences? (p. 158) 
Gee (1999) draws on Halliday’s functional linguistics to analyze the grammatical features of discourse 
for “cues and clues to social meanings.” Gee notes that the way one clause is related to another is part of 
the “logical function of language.” Because it constructs logical connections among different pieces of 
information, the linguistic code is part of the information itself. Speakers use grammar to highlight certain 
information and to provide it with particular connotations. In so doing, they prejudice the listener toward 
certain interpretations (e.g., what sort of moral orientation a listener ought to have toward this 
information); such a fact has clear implications for an understanding of cultural notions of personhood. 
In addition to features within the text, linguistic analysis must concern itself with shared 
knowledge of the world beyond the immediate linguistic environment. Cook (1992) observes, 
The fact that meaning is not constructed from the formal language of the message alone 
is crucial in explaining what it is that makes people perceive some stretches of language 
as coherent discourse and others as disconnected jumbles” (p. 41). 
The field of pragmatics is an area of language study concerned with language in use and so with 
meaning that occurs outside the grammatical system. 
One important aspect of pragmatics concerns a consideration of “face,” “the public self-image 
that every member wants to claim for himself’ (Brown & Levinson 1990, p. 61). I turn to Grice’s theory 
of conversational implicature and to the work of Brown and Levinson (1990) who ground their 
considerations of face in Grice’s theoretical framework. Grice (1975) proposed the co-operative principle 
of conversation, which offers four “maxims” that listeners use to interpret a speaker’s discourse: 
be true (the maxim of quality) 
be brief (the maxim of quantity) 
be relevant (the maxim of relevance) 
be clear (the maxim of manner) 
Frequently, however, speakers “flout” these principles because observing them would result in a loss of 
face. Thus, analysis is concerned not only with sentence level interpretation but with the pragmatic 
dimension of face. 
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4.2.1.2 Narrative Analysis 
Silverman (1997) says “analyzing how people talk to one another one is directly gaining access 
to the cultural universe [of the speakers] and its content of moral assumptions” (p. 113). I paid particular 
attention to “extended sequences” (Psathas, 1995). In conversation, speakers request and are granted the 
right for a long turn at speech on the implied promise that something significant is to be said about the 
way the world is or ought to be. Beginning with Labov, some scholars have distinguished “narrative” as a 
particular type of extended sequence (Langlier, 1989). Polanyi (1985) suggests that narratives, rather than 
describing a current state of affairs, follow a past time-line of events. I follow Gee, however, in treating 
all extended sequences as narratives since, whether told in the past or the present, they remain “important 
sense-making devices. People often encode into narratives the problems that concern them and their 
attempts to make sense or resolve these problems” (Gee, 1999, p. 134). When it does seem important to 
distinguish the two forms of narrative, however, I use the term “stories” to refer to past states of affairs 
from those describing current conditions. 
Narratives, according to Polanyi (1985) have a transpersonal, cultural dimension. To hear 
narratives as cultural texts, the analyst continually asks, “So, what’s the point?” For the speaker, the point 
is “self-evidently important and true.” To understand this truth, it helps the analyst to ask: “what kinds of 
rules must there be in a world in which it is possible, acceptable, desirable (or not) to act and talk this 
particular way and say these particular things?” Answers appear as moral imperatives for how the world 
is (and is not) arranged; how people ought (and ought not) to live the world; what is worth (and not 
worth) knowing about; what people are (and are not) like; and what people should (and shouldn’t) want 
for themselves and others (p. 78). Self-evident truths, ones which persons take for granted and which 
speakers appeal to as rationales for their stories, constitute the cultural substrate that makes them sensible. 
Narratives, Polanyi says, contain “morals that construct morally comprehensible patterns.” 
Sometimes the speaker’s moral position is issued as evaluative ‘comments’ about people, places, and 
events that have occurred in the storyworld of the speaker. Comments inform a hearer of the speaker’s 
evaluation of events and propositions of the world she narrates. At the level of social identification, 
cultural communication systems provide resources for communicating specific social identities (e.g., an 
‘American’ person; a ‘Chinese’ person). Thus narratives enact Discourses that “will play upon presumed 
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(i.e., cultural) premises about what a person is (and should be), can (and should) do, feel (and should feel) 
and how the person dwells within nature” (Carbaugh, 1996, p. 29). I follow Polanyi’s (1985) suggestion 
that providing an “adequate paraphrase” of a story or narrative helps unpack some of the complexity 
contained in its original presentation and reveals what makes it interesting and worth telling. The 
adequate paraphrase is not an attempt to recapitulate what has been said but an interpretation of how a 
text achieves meaning. 
Because this research focuses primarily on community members educated in Taiwan, narratives 
may contain cultural premises that can be misinterpreted if heard from a different code. My analysis thus 
incorporates intertextual references that help to explicate participants’ meanings. 
4.2.2 General Procedures 
Analysis in this dissertation is informed by various sources of data, as will be described in the 
next section. Analysis proceeded in three broad phases. However, these stages were not distinct and 
clearly marked off from one another. Gee (1999) points out 
Discourse analysis is a reciprocal and cyclical process in which we shuttle back and forth 
between the structure (form, design) of a piece of language and the situated meanings it is 
attempting to build about the world, identities and relationships, (p. 99) 
Such “shuttling back and forth” occurs because the researcher, in attempting to build a coherent 
interpretation, continues to ask questions to test hypotheses against the data, which leads to discarding 
some ideas and developing others. This, in turn, brings about more questions. The phases of research 
reflect the kind of questioning that occurred during each and the sorts of research activities that 
accompanied such questioning. 
The first stage of research involved conducting interviews, collecting field data, and gathering 
documents that seemed to fit tentative interpretations. These interpretations were informed by my 
previous association with the Chinese School community and by a general familiarity with Chinese 
language and culture that began about 25 years ago. As interviews and naturally occurring data were 
transcribed, field-notes written and re-written, and documents studied, general ideas about the data began 
to take shape. At some point during the preliminary analysis, and inspired by Philipsen’s (1985) analysis 
of Mayor Daley’s Council Speech, I recognized the necessity for further “outside” reading to better 
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understand the situated meanings produced by words, phrases, and activities I observed. These outside 
readings also helped provide data for the cross-cultural analysis that Carbaugh, above, says characterizes 
ethnography of communication. Further cross-cultural analysis was suggested by participants themselves. 
Gee advises students of discourse analysis that a way to start is to “[P]ick some words and 
phrases and ask what situated meanings...these seem to have...given what you know about the overall 
context in which the data occurred” (p. 97). This further entails “thinking about what cultural models 
these situated meanings appear to implicate.” Because cultural models are situated not only in the 
moment of speaking but in tradition, it behooves the researcher to familiarize himself/herself with the 
traditions of the people whose discourse draws upon these models. My reading, which continued 
throughout the research process, consisted of discussions of Chinese history, philosophy, and culture, as 
well as primary and secondary documents related to Confucianism. I also read treatments of American 
culture and discourse to sharpen my meta-awareness of my own implicit (American) cultural models. 
During the second phase, I reviewed my data and re-entered the field to ask more focused 
questions, particularly with respect to identity and language use. I increasingly became sensitive to the 
presence of Discourses, Conversations, and socially situated identities in the texts. Details that seemed 
important during the first phase of analysis sometimes receded in value while other half-remembered 
fragments began to emerge as significant evidence toward a coherent interpretation. Following Gee, I 
asked “what linguistic details appear to be important for situated meanings, cultural models, social 
activities, socially situated identities, social languages and Discourses are being ‘designed’, enacted or 
recognized?” (p. 97). Such questioning proceeds with certain answers and hypotheses in mind, and these 
are eventually confirmed or discontinued by the data. 
The third phase of analysis narrowed and deepened my questions. Here, I began to ask Gee’s 
eighteen “building questions” (pp. 92-94) to clarify the means by which speakers accomplish their social 
worlds through talk and the texts they use. For example, with respect to “semiotic building,” above, I 
would ask “What sign systems are relevant (and irrelevant) in the situation (e.g., speech, writing, images, 
and gestures)? How are they made relevant (and irrelevant), and in what ways?” In terms of 
socioculturally situated identities, I might be concerned with “What relationships and identities (roles, 
positions) with their concomitant personal, social, and cultural knowledge and beliefs (cognition), 
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feelings (affect), and values, seem to be relevant to the situation?” I found Polanyi’s set of imperatives, 
which could be easily elaborated and condensed, a helpful shorthand with which to consider Gee’s 
eighteen building blocks: How is the world arranged or not arranged?; How ought or ought not people to 
live in the world?; What is worth and not worth knowing about?; What are people like and not like?; 
What should people want and not want for themselves and others? (Polanyi, p. 78). Still, another way of 
putting this is 
what kinds of rules or patterns must there be in a world in which it is possible, 
acceptable, desirable to act and talk this particular way and say these particular things 
about these particular people, display these particular images, and use these particular 
items, and texts? (Gee, 1999) 
As I related these questions to the theme of language maintenance I increasingly saw the issue in 
terms of identity building. Thus, for example, the phrase “our spiritual center,” which I had hardly 
noticed in earlier readings, became a central image that emerged from a cluster of situated meanings. 
Motifs, along with related data from the field and in the literature, provided validity as symbols 
“converged” (Gee, 1999, p. 97). Motifs began as tentative proposals for meaning, which sometimes had 
to be abandoned if they were disconfirmed by the data. The above procedures yielded a picture of the 
Chinese school as a universe of symbols, creating and created by Discourses, situated meanings and 
identities. 
4.3 Data Collection 
To gain a purchase on the social life of a community, the ethnographer “observes (audits?) the 
flow of social life in order to discover there, and to represent, in writing, the portion of a culture that is 
devoted to communicative practices” (Philipsen, 1992). Through field notes, interviews, and “anything 
else that documents the social situation under study” (Spradley, 1980, p. 57) the ethnographer develops a 
“thick description” of a setting. 
Ethnography is committed to the gathering of empirical evidence from a variety of sources, 
including interviews, documents, and participant observation, “the process in which an investigator 
establishes and sustains a many-sided and relatively long-standing relationship with a human association 
in its natural setting for the purpose of developing a scientific understanding of that association” (Lofland 
& Lofland, 1995, p. 18). Spradley says that such participation can be considered in terms of degree, 
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ranging from “nonparticipation” to “complete participation” (p. 61), “a situation in which they 
[ethnographers] are already ordinary participants.” As the parent of a child who studied at the Chinese 
School for six years-during the last three of which I also served as principal, my level of participation 
was toward the ‘complete’ end of that scale. However, I was an ‘observer’ for only the final year of my 
tenure. Whatever a researcher’s degree of involvement, say Lofland and Lofland, the participant observer 
differs from the ordinary participant in that the former intends to produce an ethnographic record, a 
representation of the culture produced primarily for non-members of that culture. 
To build an ethnographic record I: 1) collected field notes; 2) tape-recorded interviews with 
teachers, parents, and children; 3) tape-recorded natural interaction between children and teachers; 3) 
video-taped and still-photographed two successive New Year celebrations; and 4) collected (either in the 
form of field notes or physical artifacts) various documents, including ones produced by the Chinese 
school (e.g., announcements, rules of procedure, a mission statement) and others used by the school (e.g., 
textbooks, communications, banners). These various data sources are presented not as pieces of puzzle 
that could, when combined with other such pieces, give a complete picture of institutional life at the 
Chinese School. Rather, I present these data in a way that amplifies the patterned nature of Discourses 
and provides a context for my interpretation. As in all ethnographic studies more data were collected and 
considered than can possibly appear in the final report. Table 2 summarizes the data appearing in the 
analysis section of this dissertation. 
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Table 2 
Data Collection Summary 
Type of Data Examples 




Electronic Individual Interviews: Ong Laoshi, Guo Laoshi, 
Chen Laoshi 
Focus groups: #1 Mrs. Mao, Mrs. Tu; #2 Guo 
Laoshi; Wong Laoshi; Chen Laoshi 
In-depth interview: #1 Ong Laoshi 
Naturally occurring classroom interaction: Wong 
Laoshi (teacher); Yi Ling, Li, Elsie, Michael, 
Louise (students) 
Video: Chinese New Year Celebration 




With respect to the first source of data, field notes were produced in accordance with methods 
suggested by Emerson, Fretz and Shaw (1995) and consisted of “jottings” created on the spot and 
recopied onto computer, usually within a few hours. These became “at the desk” notes, and were 
expanded to include filling in from memory and reflections on the meanings of events at the school. In 
transcribing field notes into desk notes, questions might arise, which I later attempted to clarify with 
community members. Field notes included data on physical arrangements at the Chinese School, various 
visual data (pictures, decorations, posters, furniture placement, etc.), and documentary evidence 
(teachers’ contracts of service; school archives). Field notes were collected in a number of locations, 
including the Chinese School, participants’ homes, Annual Teachers’ Banquet, and following talks with 
officials at the Chinese Culture and Language Center. 
Altogether, I recorded approximately twenty hours of interview data. Interviews were conducted 
mostly in Chinese, though with a considerable amount of code switching into English. Naturally 
occurring data included audio tapes of four classrooms and three teacher meetings, as well as a video tape 
of a Chinese New Year celebration. I selected for analysis only one of the classroom tapes, as this seemed 
representative of the proportion of English use. Unfortunately, the sound quality of the teacher meeting 
tapes was poor and the multiple and overlapping conversations made them all impossible to transcribe. 
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Interview data consisted of: 1) individual interviews of various lengths; 2) focus group sessions; and 3) 
“in depth” interviews. These are described below. 
I interviewed a number of participants individually. Excerpts from four of these interviews are 
presented in this dissertation. These interviews ranged from 30 to 90 minutes in length and followed 
Holstein and Gubrium’s (1997) advice for conducting “active interviews.” As its name suggests, the 
active interview differs from some other interview formats in that the interviewer is an active participant 
in the conversation with informants. As interpretivist scholars, Holstein and Gubrium suggest that 
interview data should not be heard as ‘true’ or ‘false’ reports on external reality but are part of the very 
reality they describe. Thus, active interview researchers orient themselves toward “how” people say 
rather than “what” they say. In terms of analysis, a focus on “whaf' people say leads to the process of 
“systematically coding, grouping or summarizing the descriptions, and providing a coherent organizing 
framework that encapsulates and explains aspects of the social world that respondents portray” (authors’ 
emphasis). 
In contrast to “what” people say, the analytic objective of a focus on “how” people say is, as 
noted previously, concerned with “how what is being said relates to the experiences and lives being 
studied” (p. 127). Carbaugh (1996) captures distinction similar to Holstein and Gubrium’s “what” and 
“how” when he contrasts “reports about action,” with “meanings in action.” Whereas attention to the 
former produces a record of what members say about their social worlds, concern for the latter yields a 
description of the resources that “order, interpret, and motivate an action” (p. 64). 
The second sort of interview follows Seidman’s (1998) “in-depth” interview structure. This 
consists of a series of three 90 minute interviews, approximately one week apart. In the first interview, 
the informant describes her life leading up to her current situation; the second interview is intended to 
elicit responses with respect to present situation; and the third interview aims to elicit response to the 
question “Now that you have talked about how you came to your work.. .and what it is like for you to do 
that work...what does it mean to you?” (pp. 20-21). Whenever possible, I encouraged my respondent to 
follow up on questions from the previous session. However, although Seidman urges that “we 
t 
interviewers work to keep our egos in check” and so, with occasional exceptions, refrain from entering 
into conversation with informants, I agree with Holstein and Gubrium, above, that a participant’s words 
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are less a window on the soul than a discursive construction, built in collaboration with the interviewer. In 
another departure from Seidman’s recommendations, a second teacher from the Chinese School was 
invited by my respondent to participate in third session of one in-depth interview. While her contributions 
remain limited, these are included in my data. 
There were two focus-group sessions, one conducted in situ in the middle school cafeteria with 
three mothers and the other in my home with four teachers. The first of these focus group interviews 
lasted approximately 45 minutes while the interview with teachers was about an hour and a half. These 
were free-ranging discussions loosely following the question, “Why is the Chinese School important to 
you?” Although discussants frequently interacted with one another, I primarily include as data “extended 
sequences,” (Psathas, 1995, p. 21) relatively long conversational turns, rather than brief interactional 
exchanges. 
In answer to the question “How many participants are enough?” Seidman (1998) suggests two 
criteria: “sufficiency” and “saturation of information.” The first of these follows criteria of random 
sampling in that it attempts to achieve validity by providing “sufficient numbers to reflect the range of 
participants and sites that make up the population so that others outside the sample might have a chance 
to connect to the experiences of those in it...” (pp. 47-48). Saturation of information refers to the “point 
in a study at which the interviewer begins to hear the same information reported. He or she is no longer 
learning anything new” (p. 48). Yet, as Kvale (1996) observes, “[T]he number of subjects necessary 
depends on a study’s purpose” (p. 102). If the purpose is to provide an inventory of attitudes and opinions 
as facts about the world, then sufficiency and saturation are useful criteria. Sufficiency and saturation are 
part of a “statistical logic,” which assumes that “where the reality is imperfectly represented by an 
account, checks and remedies are to be encouraged in order to get a truer or more complete picture of 
how things stand” (Silverman, 2001, p. 87). 
In contrast, the “purpose” of the following analysis is to understand the meaning of what 
members say about language and the implication this has for identity construction. With talk about talk 
regarded as a specific social action (rather than reports ‘about’ action), analysis turns to how a text draws 
on various cultural and linguistic resources to make sense. If the analyst’s business, as Kvale (1996) 
suggests, is to consider “//ow do I go about finding the meaning of the many interesting and complex 
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stories my interviewers told me” (p. 179, author’s emphasis) and, further, if “[A] text is meaningful only 
within the pattern...it forms at a specific time and place with other pieces of language... and this 
pattern... is itself meaningful only within a specific Discourse or at the intersection of several Discourses” 
(Gee, 1996, p. 149), then the task of analysis is to show how talk and other kinds of texts are part of a 
social configuration that gives them meaning and moral value. A discourse focus encourages listening to 
informants not as personal biographies but as “carriers of Discourses that proceed will live after them” 
(Gee, p. 18). It is because of Discourses, and the cultural codes of which they are a part, that 
two people who meet for the first time can partake of a common culture and use it in 
making sense with each other. Likewise, two people might never meet and yet partake of 
a common culture, a culture that is available to all who hear its terms spoken in public 
life. (Philipsen, 1992, p. 8) 
Thus, any single speaker has available to her the cultural resources of her community that allow her to 
accomplish meaning. 
Philipsen’s (1992) analysis of Mayor Daley’s Council Speech, for example, assumes that the 
Chicago politician speaks not as an individual but as a cultural agent. Philipsen’s analysis therefore 
deconstructs how the mayor draws on a repertoire of cultural symbols to invoke a coherent moral world, 
one which, importantly, does not match the interpretive repertoire of some of its hearers. To explicate the 
cultural patterning of Mayor Daley’s speech, Philipsen consults an ethnographic report describing the 
cultural patterns of the Mayor’s ancestral Ireland. The mayor’s speech, which is “intelligible and 
convincing to those who shared the speaker’s culture but contains a different message for outsiders,” 
provides a lesson in the need for ethnographic researchers to familiarize themselves with the traditions in 
which texts are grounded. 
While two cultures may use the same term to describe a type of phenomenon or person, different 
cultural premises of personhood constrain the way in which members understand this term. For this 
reason, I draw on ethnographic reports from Taiwan, as well as Confucian primary and secondary texts, 
which informed the educational backgrounds of teachers at the Chinese school, to broaden an 
understanding of my data. In much the same way that it suited Philipsen’s purpose to find the deep 
cultural patterning in Mayor Daley’s Council Speech, I listen primarily for ways in which cultural notions 
of identity are spoken through the narratives of one of my informants and search for consistent and 
recurrent patterns that converge within the texts themselves as well as with other data. 
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In my analysis of a classroom scene, I focus on interactional sequences and turn taking in terms 
of Discourse construction, though here the text is shaped through moment-to-moment-improvisation. As 
Heritage (1997) observes “in constructing their talk, participants normally address themselves to 
preceding talk and, most commonly, the immediately preceding talk. In this simple and direct sense, their 
talk is context shaped’ (p. 162, author’s emphasis). Such shaping demands that interlocutors share an 
understanding of discourse features (e.g., when one talk turn ends and when another begins), though 
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understandings are also shaped during the course of interaction itself. In building conversation, 
interlocutors, moment by moment, reach mutual understandings, a process that Heritage refers to as 
“architecture of intersubjectivity” (p. 163). Analysis here pays particular attention to the way in which 
situated meanings and identities are interactionally achieved-“talked into being,” as Heritage (p. 161) 
puts it, contested and revised. 
4.4 Setting and Participants 
While fifteen people participated in this study, I did not transcribe interviews in full, nor did I 
transcribe all interviews, owing to the tediousness of translation and transcription, as noted above. 
Informants who volunteered to be interviewed and/or allowed me to tape record their classes were 
teachers, parents, and teachers who were also parents. I also recorded interviews with others whose words 
do not appear directly in this dissertation but who added to the overall interpretation. All but one 
interviewee, from China, are from Taiwan and all are women. I have used pseudonyms to ensure the 
privacy of individuals and, when necessary, concealed identities by altering certain details, though in a 
way that does not effect overall meaning. 
Ong Laoshi—A teacher at the Chinese school for fifteen years. 
Chan Laoshi—A teacher at the Chinese school for ten years 
Guo Laoshi—A teacher at the Chinese school for six years 
Wong Laoshi—A teacher at the Chinese school for ten years 
Mrs. Mao; Mrs. Huang; Mrs. Sun; Mrs. Li—parents 
Chen Laoshi—A former teacher at the Chinese school 
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I also include children in interactional data, but not interview data. Names of children are also altered. 
Given research questions having to do with positive identities, my choice to not include children as 
interviewees may seem puzzling. However, the concern here is not with assessing the effectiveness of 
particular practices in promoting embodied positive identities but with the discursive construction of 
identity categories. The need to focus my research also accounts for not including the voices of non- 
Chinese members of the community (except, of course, my own!). However, I acknowledge the 
importance of the contributions of these community members to the culture of the Williamston Chinese 
School and look forward to including their voices, along with the voices of children, in future research. 
4.5 Trustworthiness 
Validation, says Riessman (1993), is “the process through which we make claims for the 
trustworthiness our interpretations.” From some ethnographic perspectives, trustworthiness is a matter of 
ensuring a disconnect between the interpreter and her/his interpretations. Researchers develop methods to 
ensure that personal bias has not intruded upon their records of social reality. The need to eliminate bias 
follows from a view of ethnography as a largely utilitarian enterprise, whose purpose is to produce maps 
of social reality. Zarlich and Green (unpublished manuscript), for example, insist that the purpose of 
ethnography “is to develop a description that captures ‘daily life’ for members of the culture...that can be 
used by a stranger to guide participation under study.” 
In contrast, Philipsen and Katriel (1990), writing from the perspective of ethnography of 
communication, cite with approval Ricoeur’s view that the “aim of ethnography is to reach an 
understanding of the self via an understanding of the other” (p. 92). Realization that an ethnographic 
researcher must inevitably be part of the interpretation itself, Philipsen and Katriel continue, “has led us 
to think of ethnography less as a journey into a foreign land or culture, and more as a journey into a no¬ 
man’s land, which is neither the territory of the self nor the other” (p. 92). Herda (1999) expresses this 
hermeneutic principle when she explains that trustworthiness is not so much a matter of explicating the 
relationship “between the structure of the world and our knowledge of it, but rather the interconnection 
between the two.” Social reality, however vigorously we pursue eliminating bias, cannot be known 
objectively. Data, in this view, do not ‘contain’ meanings and so analysis does not consist of discovering 
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pre-existing categories present within them. Because data, like other objects in the world, do not possess 
their own meaning, researchers confer meaning upon them. Researchers, like the people in the scenes 
they study, develop interpretations through interaction with others. For this reason, Geertz famously 
referred to the ethnographer as providing “interpretations of interpretations.” 
Geertz’ insight suggests why validity in discourse analysis cannot involve claims that it reflects 
the reality of participants. Gee (1999) further clarifies the point. First, says Gee, people put together their 
realities from what is “out there” in the phenomenal world, beyond human control, and so researchers are 
not able to say that reality is a purely human construction reflected solely in people’s words. Second, the 
analysis itself helps to construct the world it conveys. This is because analyses are constituted by 
language and language partly constitutes situations: “The analyst interprets his or her data in a certain 
way and that data so interpreted, in turn, renders the analysis meaningful in certain ways and not others” 
(p. 94). Thus, “Validity is never ‘once and for all.’ Other people working on our data, or similar data, 
will discover things that either support, revise, or challenge own conclusions. Validity is social” (p. 139). 
Despite the care with which a researcher follows methodologies, qualitative researchers must ultimately 
recognize their own work as cultural texts, produced in particular times and particular circumstances and 
so grounded in particular sets of interests and assumptions. In much the same way that researchers 
deconstruct the texts of others, researchers invite others to deconstruct their texts as cultural productions 
(Silverman, 2001). 
Gee points out that a discourse analysis is based on presenting certain details of speech or 
writing that the analyst assumes are relevant to the situation and, importantly, relevant to the arguments 
that the analyst is trying to make (p. 88). Because what goes into a transcript, as well as what is left out of 
it, are the result of the analyst’s theories of language and social situations, a transcript amounts to a 
theoretical entity... It does not stand outside an analysis but, rather, is part of it... The 
validity of an analysis is not a matter of how detailed one’s transcript is...It is a matter of 
how the transcript works together with all the other elements of the analysis to create a 
‘trustworthy’ analysis, (p. 88) 
Even speech that an analyst chooses to preserve can be pitched toward supporting a particular 
interpretation by segmenting it in one way or another in the transcript. 
Gee (1999) says situated meanings, identities, and cultural codes at once constitute a perspective 
on social patterning and provide the conceptual tools for inquiring into this patterning. My overall 
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strategy is to show how ideas generated from the data provide “coverage” for other data and that, taken 
together, they will “converge toward the same conclusions” (p. 139). Validity of an analysis, “will reside 
in how the ideas we can generate...from the data help to illuminate other data (coverage, data that we 
hope will lead us to similar conclusions (convergence).” This other data, as noted above, consists of 
documentary evidence, field notes, and interviews, along with “outside reading” that provides them with 
further structure. 
The previous section considered Seidman’s (1998) question “How many participants are 
enough?” to make claims with respect to the validity of an ethnographic report. I noted the criteria of 
“sufficiency” and “saturation of information” may not be entirely appropriate for constructivist research. 
Thus, I base my validity claims on Gee’s criteria of coverage and convergence. I also described another 
strand of validity provided by linguistic structure (1999). In pointing to the way that a text biases certain 
interpretation through various lexical, syntactic, and pragmatic choices, validity is enhanced. 
Moerman (1975) has suggested that, for a report to be valid, an analyst must be either a member 
of the community from which data is recorded or have a close familiarity with a social scene. I support 
Moerman’s suggestion, that in an absence of understanding of the culture from which data is gathered, 
interpretations will be overly subjective and so unreliable. For this reason, I also rest claims for 
trustworthiness upon two further criteria: (a) prolonged engagement, and (b) persistent observation. 
Regarding the first of these claims, I have been associated with the Chinese school for a number of years 
and served as principal for three of them. I have spent time in many classes and have been a substitute 
teacher on several occasions. Although I did not conduct formal research throughout the entire period, my 
length of association with the school serves to enhance the strength of my claims. 
4.6 Researcher Perspective 
Having worked for many years overseas, I appreciate that all pedagogies, as Kramsch (1994) 
observes, have ideological foundations and so differ from culture; for this reason there can be no essential 
set of best practices. This view makes it easier to ask questions about language ideology, since it directs 
inquiry away from a concern about language teaching as a deliveiy system and toward language teaching 
as part of a sociocultural system (Willett, 1995). 
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In addition to attempting to understand language ideologies at the Chinese School, the proposed 
research has a personal dimension. Like many members of multi-cultural families, I often have moments 
when I feel myself an observer in what Philipsen and Katriel, cited above, call a “no-man’s land, which is 
neither the territory of the self nor the other.” I acknowledge a personal interest in harmonizing tensions 
between cultural systems and believe that with understanding this territory can become better known. 
Thus, the desire to understand the “culturescape,” as Carbaugh refers to it, helps drive my interpretation. 
Thus, the proposed study constitutes an effort (once again citing Ricoeur), “to reach an understanding of 
the self via an understanding of the other.” 
4.7 Limitations 
As noted above, this research constitutes a narrow “slice of life” (Hall, 2002, p. 180) within 
a complex setting. It only touches upon, for example, the contributions of non-Chinese members of the 
school. Nor does it consider how the stories of the school’s children merge or depart from the stories of 
its Taiwan-born adults. Among these Taiwan-born adults are more stories to be heard, which would 
contribute to an overall understanding of how identities function at the Chinese school. 
Like much qualitative research, this dissertation makes no claims for generalizability across 
contexts but invites readers to consider its conclusions in light of their own situations (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). Thus, no recipes are offered to improve language teaching practice nor practical suggestions 
offered to help ensure cross-generational use of the home language. Given the complexity of human 
interaction and motivation, as well as the variability of settings in which these operate, such advice would 
be ill-founded. However, in the same way that this research adds to that of others who have worked in 
researched heritage language settings, further work may provide direction to those directly involved in 
making pedagogical decisions. 
4.8 Further Research 
As noted above, this research considered only one “slice of life” in a single social scene. Within 
this scene, many other such “slices” remain to be explored and the relationship between them elaborated. 
In the two years since I left the field, significant changes have taken place at the Chinese School. A 
higher proportion of non-Chinese learners now attend classes, many of them adoptive parents of children 
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from China whose family structure does not, to say the least, conform to conventional Chinese notions of 
family. What symbolism does the Chinese school hold for these families and how does the administrative 
core of the Chinese school understand their responsibilities toward these families? A small number of 
Mainlanders also study at the Chinese school. How is Chinese identity constructed between two 
(possibly) differing Discourses of Chinese personhood? 
This study did not highlight the perspectives of children at the Chinese School. While Belden’s 
study did consider this area and found broad areas of agreement between children and their parents living 
in Houston, would similar agreement be found in Williamston? This last question raises consideration of 
cross-cultural comparisons among Chinese schools. Some children study at the Chinese school for only 
one semester. What caused them not to continue? This research did not include the voices of families 
who were not at the Chinese school. A potentially productive area of study, then, might be to direct 
inquiry toward negative cases of study to better understand identity construction at the Chinese School. 
A number of adolescent and college-age Chinese-Americans attend programs of study in 
Taiwan. Narratives of students as they encounter points of connection and disconnection with the place of 
their ancestors would contribute to the growing literature of Diaspora cultures. Related cross-cultural 
accounts of American expatriate communities in Taiwan would also be of great interest. Such studies 
would add to an understanding of complex forms of cultural adaptation, and discursive construction of 
identity. 
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4.9 A Note on Transcription 
In Chapter 5,1 follow Gee’s (1999) protocol in dividing streams of speech into “lines,” and 
“clauses” (p. 89). I have further divided texts into “stanzas.” Stanzas represent topic shifts, rather than 
“clumps of tone units that deal with a unitary topic or perspective and which (from various linguistic 
details) have been planned together” (p. 89). Transcribing “tone units,” which Gee says consists of a 
“final contour of falling or rising pitch, closing off a unit of speech,” is problematic with a tonal language 
like Chinese. I have therefore chosen not to transcribe this aspect of speech. If a speaker breaks off what 
she has been saying, I transcribe the initial sounds of the word, followed by ellipsis marks. 
When texts are spoken primarily in Chinese, I provide a line-by-line and side-by-side translation. 
I use the pinyin system of Romanization to transcribe Chinese. Where there is a high degree of code 
switching, however, this method is impractical. In such cases I provide English translations in curly 
brackets { } alongside the Chinese. I indicate inaudible or doubtful portions of a tape with question marks 
in square brackets [?]. Occasionally, I skip over transcript lines that do not seem relevant to the purpose 




5.1 “We are all Overseas Chinese”: Connection building 
In this section, I consider the way in which Chinese School written and spoken texts establish 
connections between past epochs and distant locations and the current place and moment. In other words, 
I am interested in how texts used at the Chinese school takes up threads of historical and social 
conversations. I discuss implications for the way in which language training is ideologically linked to 
Chinese peoples’ place in the world, i.e., how they dwell in nature (Carbaugh, 1996). 
The term “Diaspora,” Luke and Luke (1999) say, is from the roots dia and sperein, meaning, 
respectively, “through” and “scatter.” Thus, the term 
invokes notions of place, center, and home from which dispersion into other locations 
emanate that entail journeys, border crossings and... ‘deterritorialization’...Diasporic 
identity this is never stable or fixed or even predictable but in a state of immanent and 
permanent morphology, (p. 229) 
Naficy (1993) says Diasporic identity is characterized by a sense of “liminality,” the feeling of “in¬ 
betweenness” and ambivalence experienced by many transnational immigrants. Belden’s (1997) 
ethnographic research at a Chinese school in Texas convinces her that, 
unlike a number of other immigrant/exilic groups, the Chinese had no sense of 
liminality—of being at the threshold of a door leading to a new and better (?) life all the 
while wondering if what they came from wasn’t more appealing, (p.35) 
Belden continues that “This sense of loss of the motherland is inapplicable to Chinese immigrants” 
because China “had always existed in some comprehensible state” (p. 36) in the minds of Chinese people. 
While dispersion and deterritorialization remain material facts in the lives of members of the Williamston 
Chinese School, they are not emotional facts. What may have inoculated Chinese against the condition 
experienced by Naficy’s Iranian liminars in Los Angeles was the decision by the Qing government, 
discussed previously, to confer upon Chinese living abroad the understanding that wherever they 
happened to be living, they belonged to an ethical elite connected permanently to China. The Chinese 
School nurtures this identity, helping to project a vision of China as a continual presence in the lives of its 
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members. The following comments by a teacher at the Chinese school who has lived in the United States 
for more than twenty years express a sense of duty to the Chinese state: 
1 a They asked me to be a teacher 
1 b so that’s why I get involved into the Chinese school 
2a and since I was like a professional, uh, professionally trained teacher 
2b so just perfectly fit into that situation 
3a so sometimes I feel if I quit the job 
3b I feel guilty because I have these skills. 
4 Why not I will not share my training with the kids? 
5a Of course, I can do something else 
5b can have more money from another job 
5c but it will be shamed with this kind of training 
5d from the government that I grew up with. 
6 I will feel shamed. 
7a And always is a mission that as a Chinese 
7b we just need to share this one with our own kids 
7c and also like the people in this country. 
8a Once they like the culture, 
8b they like you like people 
8c and then they will study the language 
8d and then they will do some, uh, 
8e to build up some good relationship 
8f with the country where the language is spoken 
The term “mission” expresses not only a sense of commitment but also acceptance of the demand for 
personal sacrifice. The need to “build up good relationship with the country where the language is 
spoken” suggests the diplomatic context of her work. 
Ong Laoshi’s mission is guided by what Belden refers to as the “harmonious impulse” among 
Chinese for organizing their lives, an impulse requiring “a sense of continuity and ‘proximity’ to the 
‘homeland’ [which] is imprinted on the Chinese through efforts within their families and in the Chinese 
community... ” (p. 91). Williamston Chinese school, like many other Chinese schools serving families 
from Taiwan, is aided in these efforts by the Overseas Chinese Culture and Language Center (OCAC). 
Textbooks written especially for overseas Chinese children and distributed to for free, attempt to instill a 
sense of Chinese national identity. Hua Yu. rChinese Language! is used in eighty percent of Chinese 
Schools in America (P-F. S. Wang, 1996). This provides OCAC a preeminent position, not only because 
of the wide distribution of its materials but because in Chinese culture “true knowledge has been popularly 
held to reside in written texts, especially classics and authoritative works” (Hu, 2002, p. 97). 
Hua Yu is patterned after Guo Yu, [National Language], the government-approved basal series 
used in Taiwan, where Taiwanese students who may have grown up in non-Mandarin speaking homes 
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must learn that they are part of a collectivity extending beyond the village level (Stafford, 1995, p. 59). 
Because of the shared goal to connect children to wider cultural and historical traditions, Hua Yu and Guo 
Yu provide similar rhetorical treatment. In both series, scenes from daily life are interspersed with 
exploits of Chinese historical figures and explicit messages having to do with proper conduct. To the 
casual observer, Chinese or otherwise, it would be easy to mistake Hua Yu for Guo Yu. though the former 
has a more modest character count and an English glossary. 
In terms of content, a significant difference between Hua Yu and Guo Yu is the attempt to 
provide an historical context for Overseas Chinese. One lesson concerns the role of Chinese in building 
the American railroads and another tells of the role Chinese immigrants played in fighting for the freedom 
of Central and South America against Spanish colonialists. Such stories account for and validate the 
presence of Chinese in foreign lands. The message, both implicit and explicit, is that there is no 
inconsistency in being Chinese living among non-Chinese, a notion only about a century old and contrary 
to many years of Chinese thought and practice. As another example, Lesson 11, Book 9, titled “The Four 
Seas [i.e., ‘all places’] Have Chinese People,” describes the way in which China’s geography has 
produced an outward looking people. Moreover, the Chinese work hard, and are unafraid 
of difficulties. Because there are Chinese people all over the world, there is a saying that 
goes “wherever there are people under the sun, there are overseas Chinese.” Wherever 
they are in foreign places, all Chinese people work hard and apply their energy to 
improving this place. This is why they are very helpful and at the same time, warmly 
public spirited. Nor do they forget about their ancestors and help the land of their 
ancestors in important ways. (p. 15) 
The transformation of Chinese from what Wang Gungwu refers to as “earth bound,” inward¬ 
looking people into “outward-looking sea”-going people (previously maligned as un-Chinese) is necessary 
to establish the premise that a person, whether bom in Shanghai or Sheboygan, is equally Chinese. By 
pointing out that Overseas Chinese do not forget the land of their ancestors, Hua Yu provides a crucial 
counter-narrative to the claim, as explained in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, that a person who would quit 
the graves of ancestors could no longer be regarded as Chinese (Pan, 1990, pp. 21-22; Wang, 2000). 
Practically as few non-Chinese appear on pages of Hua Yu as on those of Guo Yu but, 
interspersed among folk-tales of China and biographies of scholars, artists, and politicians from China’s 
past, are local American scenes—Santa (really Father, of course) takes off his beard while children gather 
under the tree to unwrap presents; a group of children meet friends on an autumn day (a white church in 
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the background evokes New England); a tiny blonde figure pumps gas as a Chinese family sets off for 
vacation; two light haired people (or is it faulty ink registration?) sit in a distant boat at the lake. For the 
most part, however, settings like the library, the supermarket, the department store, and the park are eerily 
depopulated of the ethnic variety one would expect to find in public spaces in the United States. These 
scenes ‘belong’ to the images of the people that populate them, visually confirming Belden’s observation 
that 
rather than serve as hybrids or America’s newest ingredients to the melting pot, these 
people [Belden’s Chinese school informants] intend to live here as a paracommunity. 
That is, they live beside and with non-Chinese; but in their minds they remain set apart. 
(p. 140). 
In Lesson 1, Book 2 of Hua Yu. titled “I am Chinese,” children learn to recite, in Chinese: 
I am Chinese. I am an Overseas Chinese. I love China. I also love the country where I am 
from. We are all Chinese. We are all Overseas Chinese. We all love the country we are 
from. We also all love China. 
“The country I am from” is an open and temporary slot, easily filled in according to wherever the 
materials are used. China remains a fixed location, the source of ancestral connection and permanence. There 
is no conflict in loving “the country we are from” and loving China because the two are held in harmonious 
balance. This does not imply hyphenated, or hybridized identity. Belden also notes the way in which her 
informants, while remaining civic-minded, were secure in their identities as Chinese and so “the need for 
approval of the white majority—so common a thread in immigrant history—does not even occur to these 
people” (pp. 152-153). This security may be part of the reason that Chinese schools have always assumed an 
auxiliary educational role, as noted in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. As Belden suggests, unlike some other 
minorities, they have not felt threatened by assimilation. 
That “we are all Chinese” is demonstrated by an illustration depicting China and “the country 
where I’m from” as one vast land following the curvature of the earth. Running through this land is a 
river, possibly the Pacific Ocean, across which children wave to one another. Indeed, the only way of 
distinguishing “The country where I’m from” (a phrase echoing Ong Laoshi’s “the country where the 
language is spoken”) from China is the architecture. A pagoda set at the back of a long, uninterrupted 
meadow, corresponds to no conceivable reality in traffic-snarled, overpopulated Taiwan. Yet, the pagoda 
evokes collective Chinese tradition and the meadow reminds parents of a hometown village, jiaxiang. 
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This symbolism is underscored by contrast with anonymous high-rise buildings in the background of “the 
country where I’m from.” Jiaxiang, according to Pan (1990) is among the most evocative terms in the 
Chinese language, “far more emotive than its equivalents in English,” because it links the idea of village, 
countryside, and rural simplicity, xiang, with that of family and so filial piety (p. 21). In other words, the 
picture supports the premise of the text that living abroad does not constitute having forgot about one’s 
ancestors, since ‘abroad’ is actually a dimension of home. 
In addition to textbooks, OCAC provides annual teacher training sessions and, on Teachers’ Day, 
hosts an annual banquet. While most support is directed toward maintaining a sense of national belonging 
among overseas Chinese, another strand aims to engage foreigners. The mission statement of OCACs 
educational website, Global Chinese Language and Culture Center Online, announces the following goal: 
By offering overseas Chinese and foreigners the opportunity to learn Chinese over the 
internet, the Global Chinese Language and Culture Center Online is serving as a new hub 
of Chinese, language, art and culture. Center is offering a lifelong learning opportunity, 
fostering communication between Chinese and foreigners and effectively promoting the 
Chinese language and culture all over the world. (OCAC, 2000) 
China is referred to by Chinese themselves as the “Middle Kingdom,” a term that reflects that “[T]o 
ordinary Chinese, the traditional view of being at the center of existence has always been an important 
aspect of being Chinese” (Wu, 1991, p. 160). As an omnipresent middle, the global hub provides the same 
perspective toward “foreigners” as China’s terrestrial location. “Foreigners” is also an everyday term used 
by members of the Chinese School to refer to non-Chinese, especially white people. The transliteration of 
“foreigners,” is ‘outside country people’ (waiguoren), a term that indexes selves as being perpetually 
inside and so immune to the experience of deterriorialization described by Luke and Luke (1999) at the 
beginning of this chapter. The corollary of HuaYu’s Lesson 9, “wherever there are people under the sun, 
there are Overseas Chinese,” is that wherever there are Overseas Chinese people there is China. Thus the 
term Chinese Diaspora, as it refers to the experiential dimension of deterritorialization, is something of an 
oxymoron. In making Chinese culture available to foreigners, the website alludes to the ancient motif of 
Chinese culture having a civilizing effect upon those living beyond the gates of the Middle Kingdom. This 
notion will be discussed further in a later section of this dissertation. 
In addition to instilling a sense of “Chinese” national identity, Hua Yu, like Guo Yu, is 
concerned with moral education. The dichotomy between “Chinese” identity and “moral education,” 
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however, is not entirely accurate since, as noted previously, to be Chinese is to act Chinese and to act 
Chinese means behaving in accordance with Confucian principles. As Tu (1985) says, “[I]t is vitally 
important to know...that learning to become a good person in the Confucian context is not only the 
primary concern but also the ultimate and comprehensive concern” (p. 32). Therefore, “self cultivation is 
an end rather than a means, learning motivated by reasons other than self knowledge...cannot be 
considered true learning” (p. 56). 
Although learning to become a good person is a lifetime study, the locus of this concern is 
school. Eight hundred years ago, Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi, 1967) offered advice on how everyday school 
practices are imbued with sacred meaning and so should be regarded as points on a continuum leading to 
sagehood: 
The moral principles to be taught must be based on human relations and must make clear 
the principles of things. The teaching, from the elementary training of sweeping the floor 
and answering questions on up must consist in the cultivation of filial piety, brotherly 
respect, loyalty and faithfulness...There must be proper pace and order in inducing, 
leading, arousing, and gradually shaping the students and in bringing their character to 
completion. The essential training should be the way of choosing the good and cultivating 
the self until the whole world is transformed and brought to perfection so that all people 
from the ordinary person up can become sages, (p. 219) 
To illustrate the connection between education and learning to become a good person, Stafford 
(1995) cites a text used among all Taiwan fifth graders. The text describes the error of giving undue 
importance to the contents of learning. Titled qiuxueyu zuoren, “Studying and being a person,” or 
alternatively, “Seeking learning and conducting oneself as a person,” the text argues 
Studying and being a person are inseparable. The goal of our studies is to learn the proper 
way of being a person; we must be clear about the proper way of being a person, 
otherwise study is impossible. From this we see that studying and being a person are 
inseparable...We can say: all of life is a great book; the society we are bom into is a great 
school...And when it comes to learning, those who know the proper way of being persons 
will inevitable show great skill [gongfu]. (p. 57) 
As Stafford summarizes the argument, “the opposition between studenthood and personhood is false. To 
put this another way, the school should be embedded in communal life” (Stafford 1995, p. 57). 
Hu (2002) similarly observes, 
the notion that education is cultivation necessarily entails the inclusion of moral education 
as a major component of education. Traditionally, moral education included teaching how 
to relate to other people in society and cultivating moral virtues such as loyalty, fidelity, 
altruism, modesty and conformity—that is, how to be a good person, (p. 97) 
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Jin and Cortazzi (1998) note that some Chinese teachers prefer to use the termyw ren, “cultivate 
the person,” over “teach,” since the former term stresses the teacher’s role as “a moral example, a model 
of learning and... a parent or friend, since this is considered the crucial standard of relationships which 
nurtures a person” (p. 103). In the following chart, Jin and Cortazzi summarize some of the key cultural 
premises of learning: 
Table 3 
Key Features of a Chinese Culture of Learning 




















Students should love learning, be curious, expect to learn. 
Filial piety is extended to teachers. They are respected 
experts, parents, friends. Teachers give care, concern and 
help. 
Teachers and students have duties and responsibilities to 
each other; both learn academically and morally. 
Self-development occurs in a collective setting. Key 
relationships should achieve harmony, not disagreement. 
Learning is incomplete without deep reflection, practical 
application; therefore students focus on products and 
results. 
Learning involves long-term strategies of hard work now for 
later rewards. It involves following a ‘master’ in word and 
deed. 
Learning involves memorization and accumulation of 
knowledge. What is memorized is later understood for 
further development and used for creation. 
Memorizing (even by rote) is a concession to the collected 
past experience and authority of others. Memorizing is part 
of progress. 
The message in the following lesson, “Thank You, Teacher,” from Guo Yu. the basal series used 
in the national curriculum in Taiwan, would not be culturally credible in an American third grade 
classroom, but its principles, some of which are outlined above, would have been as cogent in Zhu Xi’s 
day as they are to families in Taiwan today: 
I was a little scared of entering first grade and when I got to school. I wanted to go home 
but Teacher knew I was scared and so always came over to talk with me. When I was in 
second grade, I quarreled with the other children and when I got home, I didn’t want to do 
my homework. I just waited for vacations. But the teacher helped me work things out with 
the other kids and taught me how to study. Now I’m in the third grade, and I’ve changed. 
I don’t get mad any more, and my schoolwork gets better every day. I also like being with 
my classmates. Whenever I see Teacher she has a smiling face. Thank you, Teacher, for 
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your open heart; thank you teacher, for leading me down the right path; I don’t know how 
I can ever return your kindness and care and protection. 
Through study and guidance, the child has learned to establish human relationships necessary, as Zhu Xi 
says, to bring the ordinary person to sagehood. The first three illustrations are drawn in round panels, 
visually depicting the young spiritual pilgrim’s transformation. In the first picture, the boy sits at his desk 
with his head leaning on arm. His face is up, not tending to the open book on his desk. This picture 
corresponds to his first grade experience of isolation. The next panel depicts the boy with an expression of 
anger, his fist raised against another student. The message here is that he has not yet learned how to 
behave it in the company of others. The third illustration has him chatting happily with three other 
classmates; he has learned to be a social person. The final panel, larger than the others and symbolically 
superimposed over them, depicts the child bowing to his smiling teacher in gratitude for his 
transformation. The child understands that his teacher has induced, led, aroused, and shaped his character 
toward completion. He is able to recognize his mistakes and, with his teacher’s guidance, become more 
cooperative and hard working. By cultivating the qualities of gratitude, humility, studiousness, sociality, 
and filial piety, the child is able to suppress his willfulness so that he can be lead toward higher stages of 
personhood. 
The following lesson from Book 12 of HuaYu, the basal series used at the Chinese school, 
illustrates even more clearly the importance of self-cultivation and self-discipline. It is difficult to imagine 
a comparable text being finding its way into a modem American classroom: 
Lesson 11, “My Enemy” 
Who is my enemy? My enemy is always me. My laziness, my dirtiness, my pride, my 
rudeness; these are all my enemy. Laziness makes me fall behind in my study, so my 
grades cannot improve and I will not be able to keep up with other students. This makes 
laziness the enemy of my scholarship. Filth is also my enemy because it makes my body 
unclean; my clothes untidy and my food unwashed. It diverts my attention from the 
cleanliness of my environment. This dirtiness can cause health problems and so it is my 
enemy. 
Pride fills me with the sickness of complacency and self-satisfaction. It makes 
me look down on other people and places me on top so that I cannot be touched; In fact, I 
am really hollow and empty. Pride is the enemy of my heart-mind. 
Rudeness makes me fail at everything. I cannot go deeply into my studies; I blurt 
things out so it is easy to offend others and makes me conduct myself like a barbarian. 
People cannot stand me for this. 
Starting today, I am going to defeat my enemy. I am going to face my 
difficulties. I am not going to be afraid of working hard to overcome laziness to and to 
vanquish the enemy in myself that keeps me from studying. 
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I will often take baths, change my clothes and eat clean food. I will pay attention 
to the environment and use sanitation to eliminate dirt and defeat the enemy of my health. 
I will examine myself meticulously; and treat others with consideration; I will use 
modesty and self-effacement to overcome pride to win the battle over the enemy of my 
heart-mind. I will use my brain more often; speak more carefully and my gestures and 
movements will show propriety (limao)\ use refinement (wenya) to overcome coarseness 
(chulu) and win the battle over myself. In this way, I can conquer my self-enemy and 
become a modem teenager. 
Through the efforts of the Chinese School, spiritual cultivation, so evident in schools in Taiwan, 
is maintained in America. Although Wang (1996) argues that the themes of some of the lessons in Hua Yu 
reflect the “cultural perspective of Taiwan, which is very different from the students’ perspectives and 
daily experiences” in America, it is just this difference that Hua Yu and the Chinese school hope to 
diminish. Wang offers an example from a lesson in Book Six, “Emperor Yu harnessing the flood. Some of 
the students do not understand why the Emperor refused to enter his own home after an absence of 
thirteen long years. The students are unable to take the story seriously” (p. 22). Yet, it is precisely because 
some of the students do not understand this story or take it seriously that it becomes necessary to teach it: 
In thirteen years, he passed his home three times, but he was so bent upon efforts to 
control the flood that he didn’t have time to go in and look around. Everyone greatly 
respected him. (Hua Yu. Book 6, p. 66) 
The point is that, during the thirteen years Yu spent directing community efforts to prevent future 
flooding, he gave no thought to personal matters, devoting himself, instead, to public service. It is not, of 
course, that modem American children are unable to conceive of personal sacrifice for the public good; 
what they have trouble taking seriously is how idealized epochs from the past can serve as models to 
guide current behavior. 
In this section, I argued that Williamston Chinese School helps maintain a sense of identity by 
invoking China as a continuous presence in the lives of its members. It encourages the view that a person 
remains Chinese, even when she is bom in America. This entails connecting Diasporic life to the central 
China location of China. It further involves prescriptions for acting like a Chinese person based on 
Confucian social principles and moral values. 
Ill 
5.2 “Our Spiritual Center”: World Building 
In the previous section, I discussed Discourses connecting children at the Chinese School to their 
cultural “home.” Here, I am interested in details of what it means for some persons to be members of the 
Chinese school. 
Paraphrasing the positions of cultural theorists, Geertz and Hymes, Carbaugh (1996) says, “if 
one wants to understand the action persons do, from their point of view, one should listen to the terms 
they use to discuss it” (p. 63). The “action” in the following narrative is that of maintaining the Chinese 
school and one of the terms central to this action is “spirit.” In this section, I will argue that “spirit,” as 
Ong Laoshi uses the term, is among the cues and clues used to assemble situated meanings about the 
material world of the Chinese School. To show how actions give meaning and value to the material world, 
Gee offers the following example: “I enter a plain, square room, and speak and act in a certain way (e.g., 
like someone about to run a meeting), and lo and behold, where I sit becomes the ‘front’ of the room” (p. 
12). Certain people doing certain things, “ Who-doing-what” (p. 13), constitute what will be taken as the 
reality of the room. The people, in other words, give the room meaning, not the other way around. In the 
following analysis, ‘spirit’ serves as the focal point organizing the activities of the actors and providing 
actions within the location of the school with certain meanings. Although my data do not contain 
examples of other speakers using this same term or responding similarly to the same question, I suggest it 
represents an effort to convey, in English, a set of commonplace notions that constitute “basic truths about 
the nature of the world and the proper conduct of human relationships” (Polanyi, 1985) from a Confucian 
point of view. The attempt here is to show how themes in this text converge with those in the Confucian 
cultural code. 
Ong Laoshi is able to speak in an “informed way” (Carbaugh, 1996, p. 71) about the community 
with which she has been involved for more than ten years. A teacher, mother, and former principal at the 
Chinese school, Ong Laoshi knows about the life of the Chinese school. Hers is not the only voice at the 
Chinese school, of course, but it is one deeply familiar with the traditions and beliefs that have 
accompanied the Chinese school since its founding 25 years ago. Here, Ong Laoshi offers a common 
sense theory about the necessity of having a Chinese school. To begin answering the central question of 
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this dissertation, namely, “What is the ‘deep sense’ for the ‘good reasons’ that members provide for 
talking in certain ways about identity,” I ask, “what cultural assumptions are necessary to understand the 
metaphor of school as a spirit?” I further inquire what this has to say about the three functions of identity, 
to define the Chinese person, guide her/his actions, and encourage certain sorts of behavior. 
Just how “spirit” may be an appropriate metaphor for a weekend language school may not be 
self-evident to many Americans. To understand what makes it so demands consideration of cultural 
premises from which it is derived and so notions of, “what a person is (and should be), can (and should) 
do, feel (and should feel) and how the person dwells within nature” (Carbaugh, 1996, p. 29). The 
following analysis demonstrates how Ong Laoshi similarly speaks of everyday school rituals as 
transformative practice. Thus, she speaks of more than a language school, more than a venue for “culture 
on the weekend” (Friedman, 2000). Her topic is ‘community,’ not ‘school,’ and she presents an array of 
symbols to express who can belong, what community is supposed to do, desired relationships among 
people in the community, and the meaning of community itself. My question was, “Why is it important to 
have a Chinese school?” 
I a I will feel the school is a center, 
lb is a spirit. 
2a When kids see there’s a school exist in there... 
2b Of course they’ll experience study in American school. 
2c and once you have a Chinese school in here 
2d they will feel there is a mission to go to the school 
2e and to study something fun. 
II 
3a So the school is not the one that is kind of serious place for them 
3b to just learn the academic language or skills or simple characters. 
4a Doesn’t matter how many characters they learn, 
4b most important thing is to motivate them to learn. 
5a Once they are motivated 
5b then they will do anything 
5 c so that they can do it. 
6a That encouragement, 
6b that movement, 
6c its just you just cannot stop it. 
III 
7a So I feel that school is this kind of spirit 
7b to help the kids to go forward. 
8a And once they go there 
8b they have a nice interaction with the students 
8c and also with adults. 
9 They will know they are not alone 
10 There are many people like them 
12 especially when they see the people their face is not look like them 
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13 They American, they speak Chinese and they want to learn. 
14 That kind of motivation is so strong there. 
15 So I just feel its important that we have a school. 
16a Individualized teaching in the home of course, 
16b yes, we can do it 
17 but social life, uh, what kind of situation, like the Chinese school is 
(in?)evitable; 
18 we have to pursue it no matter how hard the situation in this area 
19 like in Williamston we have to let the Chinese school exist in there 
20 so realize everybody’s efforts on that. 
Ong Laoshi qualifies the first clause with the adverbial phrase “I will feel.” Gee terms such 
statements (along with such others as “I know” and “I think”) as “cognitive statements,” “signposts to 
socially situated identity” (p. 124). As such, they are part of the ‘interpersonal function’ of language, 
which “involves designing your sentences so as to shape how your hearers or readers can interact and 
negotiate with you over meaning” (Gee, p. 153). Cognitive statements are external to the events and states 
of affairs narrated within the discourse itself. They orient the hearer with respect to the position the 
speaker will take toward the content of the discourse. “I will feel” is a particular type of cognitive 
statement, an “opinion hedge,” whose function. Brown and Levinson (1990) say, is to distance the speaker 
from commitment to subsequent propositions as “true facts-in-the-world.” 
Drawing upon Grice’s theory of conversational implicature. Brown and Levinson (p. 145) treat 
opinion hedges as face-saving devices to ensure speakers avoid violating the principles that speech should 
be, among other things, relevant, truthful, and informative. By flagging statements as opinion, the speaker 
mitigates the consequences of being proved wrong, since this makes her responsible only for how well 
they accord with her feelings (of which she is the sole arbiter), rather than for the non-opinion world 
beyond them (p. 164). 
“I will feel” (a word-for-word transfer of the Chinese term Wo hui juede) is a two-edged sword, 
however, for while it may reduce the personal consequences for producing poor quality discourse (in the 
Gricean sense of fidelity to the real world), it potentially exposes the speaker to the consequences of being 
the sort of person who holds such opinions. “I will feel” makes the speaker particularly accountable for 
the proposition that follows, since it connects the proposition to her value system. The risk of exposing a 
defect in character may tend to ensure that the discourse will not consist of idiosyncratic opinions but 
commonplaces with which the listener can readily agree. It is just such commonplaces that constitute the 
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ideologies of language. “I will feel also serves as a request for a relatively long and uninterrupted turn. 
As described previously, listeners trade the usual right for equal time in a conversation for the promise of 
a relevant tale from one speaker (Polanyi, 1985, p. 32). 
That the school is a ‘center’ is true in the dictionary sense of its being a place where a particular 
activity or service is concentrated. For many Chinese, the term “center” also has significant cultural and 
spiritual resonance, as noted in the previous section. The next claim may also be literally true for the 
speaker. “Words,” says Gee, “have histories...they have circulated through other Discourses and within 
other institutions” (p. 54) and the linking of “school” with “spirit,” can be interpreted as an explicit 
reference to education as a spiritual and moral endeavor. 
One can also hear “school is a spirit” as a metaphor for the relation of group members to the 
school. Not only are metaphors not literally true, but also as Brown and Levinson (1990, p. 222) point out, 
they are literally false and so represent a violation of Grice’s ‘quality’ condition. For this reason, 
metaphors may be hedged to make their metaphorical quality explicit, as is the case here. Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) have suggested that metaphors give meaning to experience since “our ordinary 
conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is metaphorical in nature.” Characterizing the 
school as a spirit is what Lakoff and Johnson term a “novel metaphor,” one used less to structure thinking 
than to reinvigorate the familiar. The metaphor is sensible because it is grounded, like all metaphors, in 
deeply held cultural assumptions, ones that do not necessarily match an “American” understanding of 
“spirit.” 
While Americans do speak, of course, of “school spirit,” by this they imply positive attitudes of 
the people toward the school. To say that the school is a spirit reverses this idea since it proposes that the 
school gives meaning to the people that attend. The assertion that the school is a spirit follows 
immediately upon the assertion that it is a center. Because these two assertions share the same subject, 
‘school’ (i.e., they are coordinated in apposition to it), they are structurally are related (Quirk, 
Greenbaum, Leech, & Svartvik, 1972, p. 362). Lines la and lb are doubly marked as significant. “Is a 
center, is a spirit” is an instance of repetition, a stylistic device often used to stress the importance of an 
item (Polanyi, 1985). Moreover, it has an unconventional structure. A more usual rendering of the 
relationships among ‘school’, ‘center’, and ‘spirit’ would be ‘the school is a center and a spirit’. 
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In my version, above, ‘center’ and ‘spirit’ are coordinated and so share equal status (Gee, 1999). 
The ‘ logical function of text constrains the meaning of propositions by virtue of their grammatical 
relationship. By repeating the copula while maintaining the same subject, Ong Laoshi conceptually 
overlaps ‘spirit’ and ‘center.’ This patterning is socializes “spirit” and spiritualizes “center” in keeping 
with Chinese cultural notions of community. Note that I treat lb as a separate clause because, while the 
subject of this clause is elipted, the verb is not (i.e., The school is a center, a spirit). 
Line 2a begins to tell us not about a state or condition of the school but about what happens when 
the kids learn about the existence of the school. The logical relation of text in the following sentence is 
one of subordination. The first clause, “when the kids see there’s a school exist in there,” prepares the 
listener for information in the main clause. In English, “assumed information” (i.e., background 
information that the speaker assumes the listener will agree with) (Gee, 1999, p. 157) is the first 
information in the clause. This ‘theme,’ says Gee, citing Halliday, is the departure point for the rest of the 
message, since “What goes first creates the perspective from which everything else in the clause or 
sentence is viewed” (p. 156). In 2a, the assumed message is that the school precedes the kid’s realization 
that it exists. This will also be taken up in Line 9, were the kids “will know they are not [and so have 
never been] alone.” Everything after the theme is the ‘rheme’. In most English sentences, the theme is 
expressed in the subject of the clause (Malmkjaier, 1991, p. 143), in which case, the clause is 
“unmarked.” In a subordinate clause, however, the subject is moved to the back of the sentence to provide 
what would normally be the rheme with unaccustomed authority. In this case, the clause is “marked.” In 
2b, where one would expect to find the main clause, an aside interrupts the delivery of the rheme. “Of 
course,” combined with changes in pitch, signals a time out before the conclusion of the proposition 
begun in the previous clause. 
“Of course,” is a hedge against violating Grice’s Maxim of Quality. It belongs to a category of 
hedges that begs the listener’s indulgence to suffer a non-informative message (Brown & Levinson, 1990 
p. 165). Why does Ong Laoshi interrupt a message flagged as significant, for one the listener could hardly 
be unaware aware of? I suggest that this allows this information to piggyback on the significant clause 
and so establishes the compulsory American school as a negative contrast to Chinese school, described in 
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the rheme of this clause. The “American school,” as I will later discuss, is a cultural category that 
packages dynamic contrasts with the Chinese school. 
To recover the theme potentially lost during the aside, 2c repeats the information given in 2a, 
again as a subordinate clause. Here, however, the theme undergoes a slight transformation; “Once you 
have,” replaces “when the kids see.” I do not believe the temporal difference is significant since, in both, 
the school operates as the agent for the children’s actions. From their location at the American school, the 
children respond to knowledge of the school’s presence with a sense of mission to study something fun. 
The common-sense Chinese notion that community precedes the individual may be contrasted to 
the common-sense American notion that “communities are not given but must be constructed or built” 
(Carbaugh 1996, p.28) by individuals who freely choose to constitute them. The contrast may be tested by 
reversing the order of the clauses. To say ‘Children feel there is mission to go to the school when they see 
it exists’ provides the same information, but what counts in my version is the personal volition of the 
students is assumed while the role of the school in creating the sense of mission is muted. 
5.2.1 Children Should Study Something Fun 
Scollon and Scollon (1996) point out that the way cultural groups understand the basic nature of 
humans with respect to “their assumptions about humans are good or evil, their views about whether the 
group or the individual is the basic unit, and their understanding of the human life cycle” (p. 152) will be 
reflected in educational theory and practice. Ong Laoshi’s statement that children feel a “mission to study 
something fun” will be interpreted differently, depending upon whether one hears if from Chinese or 
“American” Discourses of personhood. While it would hardly be unusual to hear an American 
schoolteacher describe her classroom in terms of “serious fun,” the Chinese translation of this phrase, 
“yanzhong de haowan” is a meaningless oxymoron. An explanation involves consideration of differing 
concepts of personhood and the role of education in helping to develop it. To consider a “situated 
meaning” for “fun” I am guided by Gee’s (1999) heuristic for considering key words or families of key 
words. Gee encourages the analyst to ask the following questions: 
What specific, situated meanings is it reasonable, from the point of view of the 
Discourse in which these words are used, to attribute to their “author”? 
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What specific, situated meanings is it reasonable, from the point of view of the 
Discourse in which these words are used, to attribute to their “receiver(s)” 
(interpreter(s))? 
What specific, situated meanings is it reasonable, from the point of view of other 
Discourses than the one in which the words were uttered or written.... To attribute to 
actual or possible interpreters from these other discourses? (e.g. what sorts of situated 
meanings might a creationist give to a text in biology...? 
What specific, situated meanings is it reasonable, from the point of view in which 
these words were used or of other Discourses, to assume are potentially attributable to 
these words by interpreters, whether or not we have evidence that anyone actually 
activated that potential in the current case? (p. 53) 
Gee’s tools of inquiry underscore the interplay between D(d)iscourse and its interpretation. Cultural 
models, says Gee 
are things that exist in the mind and in the world...But it is important to realize that, in the 
end, these terms are ultimately our ways as theoreticians and analysts of talking about, 
and, thus, constructing and construing the world, (p. 52) 
Appreciation that meaning, language and interpretation are woven inextricably together lead Philipsen and 
Katriel (1990) to cite with approval Ricoeur’s view that the “aim of ethnography is to reach an 
understanding of the self via an understanding of the other” (p. 92). The fundamentally reflexive nature of 
cultural inquiry must be acknowledged when discussing whether a key word ‘belongs’ to one Discourse or 
another and what sort of identities are being constructed though its use. 
To recall Philipsen’s (1992) framework of “code of dignity ” and “code of honor,” a code of 
dignity “refers to the worth attached to individuals by virtue of their being a person” (p. 113). Philipsen 
says a code of dignity emphasizes a person’s “intrinsic humanity divested of all socially imposed roles or 
norms. It pertains to the self as such, to the individual regardless of his position in society” (p. 89). He 
goes on to note that a concern for dignity “does not merely de-emphasize a person’s social roles but 
positively emphasizes the uniqueness and legitimacy of each person’s cognitive and affective world” (p. 
114). What Hsu terms “progressive principle of education,” based upon a code of dignity, assumes “the 
unique and precious inner qualities” (Philipsen, 1992, p. 117) of each child. Classroom interventions must 
address unique sets of abilities, talents, attitudes, and emotions that are at the center of each American (p. 
113). A code of honor, on the other hand, has to do with the esteem in which a person is held as a member 
of society. A code of honor assumes that personhood is acquired through participation in the social order. 
Many (though not all) Confucian scholars agree that individuals are basically “good” (if hardly ‘unique’), 
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but that goodness exists as an impersonal and neutral potential until, through effort and discipline, it is 
cultivated within the social context. 
American schools are informed by a code of dignity and so it is important to stimulate the 
attention and creativity of each child. Thus, says Hsu, American teachers “feel compelled to reduce even 
the rudiments of a child’s education to a matter of fun” (p. 83). On the other hand, “Chinese teachers and 
students...regard education as a serious undertaking that is least likely to be associated with light¬ 
heartedness but requires deep commitment and painstaking effort” (Hu, 2002, p. 97). Hu maintains the 
traditional Chinese conception that knowledge downplays the need for “creative learning,” since 
education “has been traditionally viewed more as a process of accumulating knowledge than as a practical 
process of constructing and using knowledge for immediate purposes” (p. 97). This focus on the past may 
be contrasted with “presentism,” which Philipsen identifies with a code of dignity. This will be further 
discussed in a later section. Wu’s (1994) study of preschools in present-day China similarly finds that 
most parent-informants saw the role of preschool as “teaching children to behave properly and instilling in 
them an appreciation for the values of self-control, discipline, social harmony, and responsibility. School 
is a place for learning, not for fun” (p. 240). As final evidence that Chinese schools are a place for 
learning and not fun, I cite Johnson’s (2003) report of correspondence with a former student, who had 
recently taken the secondary school teacher test in Taiwan. One of the items asks future teachers to 
describe the actions of students behaving inappropriately in class. While valid responses included “noisy” 
and “bad,” the response “play” was disallowed. Johnson concludes that this restriction was an entirely 
arbitrary decision on the part of test makers. 1 would argue, however, that “play” in school is not simply 
misbehavior; it is impossible behavior and so a patently “wrong” test response. 
How then, should we hear Ong Laoshi’s comments about the mission to have fun? This may be 
an instance of what Gee (1999) calls hybridized or, alternatively, “borderland” Discourse (p. 22). 
Borderland Discourses occur when different ethnic groups come together. While it is reasonable to 
interpret the situated meaning of “fun” as a thread in the fabric of mixed Diasporic discourse (i.e., one that 
brings with it the different values, norms, perspectives, and assumptions that Gee says can accompany 
hybridized Discourses), it may not be necessary to depart from the Confucian code to interpret its 
meaning. 
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Returning to their point that educational practice reflects cultural notions about whether people 
are basically good or evil, the Scollons (1996) quote the Confiician classic San Zi Jing that “Man, by 
nature is good; people’s inborn characters are similar, but learning makes them different” (p. 125). 
Scollon and Scollon comment: 
If you assume that humans are basically good, in trying to teach them you will assume that 
they are trying to do what is right and that what is needed is to show them the right thing 
to do. Motivation will be based on the learner’s own intrinsic desire to do what is right 
(p. 152) 
Education is needed because the desire to do right and knowledge of how to do right are not the same. 
Knowledge of right and wrong is acquired through learning in society; for Chinese, the child is not the 
solitary moral subject that it is in progressive educational discourse. The Scollons’ conclusion that the 
desire to do right amounts to intrinsic motivation, however, is warranted only if the individual, not the 
group, is the basic social unit. Their interpretation turns on a translation Mencius’ terms ‘renxing' as 
‘human nature’ but, as Ames (1994) points out, the Western idea of‘human nature’ stresses what one 
starts with and so “invokes unwarranted associations...and invites us willy-nilly to impose the 
presuppositions of alien models on the Chinese self.” The Scollons’ interpretation overlooks the idea of 
the self as an ongoing process and states that “[Sjtrictly speaking, a person is not a sort of being, but first 
and foremost a doing or making and only derivatively and retrospectively something done” (p. 200). Thus, 
I interpret Ong Laoshi as suggesting that children begin with an intuitive understanding that it is 
appropriate to be part of a community of Chinese people since they “feel a mission to go to the school” 
[Line 2a], but it is up to teachers to cultivate and nurture this fundamental stirring. 
Ames (1994) refers to “the ‘stirring’ or ‘germination’ (duan) of the initial fundament and the full 
blown creative achievement” (p. 51) which the teacher must cultivate by various means. The stirring, as 
Zhu Xi says, must be “induced, lead, aroused and gradually shaped to bring children’s character to 
completion” (Chu His, 1967, 219). Whether or not it is empirically true that children have an “actual” 
sense of mission to attend school on Sunday is beside the point, since language rationalizations are not 
scientific assessments of reality but a rendering of a coherent, ordered cosmos. An interpretation 
consistent with “fun” being a “mission” might be restated as: “children begin with the unformed 
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knowledge that they are part of a spiritual community, which they feel as coming to school for fun but 
they are really there for something far more important.” 
During a different discussion with Guo Laoshi and me, Ong Laoshi defended the idea that fun 
and education are not only compatible elements in Chinese educational discourse but the connection is of 
Chinese origin. 
1 a I have heard a lot of things from the friends from the parents 
lb saying and where they are from like in Taiwan or in China 
lc the education they learn is a kind of stuffy stuff. 
2 What they learn is no creative learning. 
3 Here I have a chance, publicly; I want to say that’s wrong. 
Following a description of “creative educational environment,” “to get the kids involved into the studies,” 
Ong Laoshi notes that teachers in China and Taiwan were doing 
13a Exactly what we are doing in here [in American Schools], 
13b but we did it a long time ago. 
14 It’s just people they don’t...they don’t...they did not recognize this. 
15 They say: “Hey, we don’t have it this way; 
16 Chinese don’t have this way. 
17a Maybe they are not have good luck 
17b Maybe they don’t have good luck at that time” 
Ong Laoshi offers her views [Line 3] as a matter not simply of personal opinion (which would be 
accompanied by a hedge like T think’), but a declaration of fact, one that seeks to set the public record 
straight with respect to a common misperception. This declaration assumes that hearers appreciate the 
speaker as an agent with a particular moral status in the world of the Chinese School and so able to weigh 
in on a matter of considerable importance to the community. It is thus heard as an authoritative voice in a 
Conversation (Gee, 1999) that has been a matter of some contention within the community. It seeks to 
settle, for once and for all, any misconception of Chinese education being somehow inferior to American 
education and of “fun” being a foreign import into Chinese educational discourse. Fun and motivation in 
school are not recent innovations appropriated from American educational discourse but “exactly what we 
are doing here but we did it a long time ago” 1 [Line 13a-b]. She locates the source of the misperception to 
the views of “friends and parents” [Line la] from Taiwan and China who regard Chinese educational 
1 Zhu Xi (1967), some eight hundred years ago, suggested: “In teaching people, if no interest is aroused, 
the people will surely not enjoy their study...I want to write some poems generally instructing boys to 
attend to the duties of sprinkling, sweeping, answering questions, and serving elders [the first items in a 
boy’s education]... and let them sing these morning and evening. This should be of some help (p. 263). 
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tradition as “stuffy stuff” and so not “this way” [Line 16], a term referring back to “creative learning” 
[Line 2]. She counters that such a view entails the assumption that Chinese educational tradition is mired 
in history of a hapless people: “maybe they [the Chinese] don’t have good luck at that time,” i.e., “a long 
time ago” [Line 17b]. Thus, unfavorable comments with respect to Chinese education demand redress 
since, especially given the importance of education in the life of the Chinese people, they threaten 
fundamental aspects of Chinese personhood and so the ultimate value of Chinese heritage language 
education. 
To return to Ong Laoshi’s response to my question regarding the importance of the Chinese 
school, many components of meaning are constructed syntactically, that is, through use of clause 
subordination and coordination occurring within the content of the proposition itself, rather than as a 
comment from ‘outside’ the world being described. ‘Outside’ evaluation occurs in what Gee calls 
“satellite comments,” when the speaker overtly comments on a piece of information, as in “I feel” [Lines 
la & 7a]. Evaluative devices, whether created through syntax, vocabulary choice (e.g., “mission” vs. 
“responsibility” in Line 2d), or satellite comments provide evidence for interpretations that take into 
account a speaker’s attitudes toward the circumstances she reports on. Thus, it is possible to distinguish 
between things and the speaker’s situated attitude toward those things. 
In Lines 4a and 4b, “Doesn’t matter ...most important thing” is a comment not on the 
unimportance of learning characters but on the importance of the role of the teacher in motivating the 
child. This theme runs through much Chinese educational Discourse, from Zhu Xi’s advice to school 
masters to the lesson, “Thank you, Teacher,” in the third grade textbook, considered previously. Hu notes 
that a child’s lack of progress is held to be the failure of the teacher to motivate the child to learn, rather 
than a flaw in the child’s internal learning mechanism (Hu, 2002, p. 99). The Chinese expression for 
motivation, yinqi dungji, uses the character “to lead,” “to guide,” “to entice,” “to seduce,” “to draw out” 
“to stretch,” and “to extend” with the character combination for “movement.” The first character, yin, 
depicts the drawing of a bowstring. While, in English, we often speak of motivation as being an internal 
quality and so it is expressed in the noun form, in Chinese it tends to be thought of as an external force 
and so is used in its verb form. In other words, Chinese do not say that children ‘have’ motivation but that 
something motivates him to do something. Thus, for example, the phrase “motivate the child to learn new 
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words” (yinqi xiaohai xuexixin ze dungji) literally means, “drawing [the] child to learn new words.” 
While it is possible, of course, to speak of “internal motivation” in Chinese (just as it is possible to speak 
of external motivation in English), this is not the default meaning and so the notion requires the 
combination of‘self (ze) and ‘move’ (dung). In America, as will be later discussed, it is assumed that 
motivation is a matter of inducing the force within the child to respond to stimulation and so express her 
innate abilities and talents, while a Chinese view is that personhood is acquired through learning and 
following appropriate models. 
Recall at this point the epigraph from Chapter 1. Following the lament over Waverly’s lack of 
Chinese character, Lindo Jong explains “American circumstances” as counter-narrative to Chinese 
acceptance of things as they are: 
I taught her how American circumstances work. If you are bom poor here, it's no lasting 
shame. You are first in line for a scholarship. If the roof crashes on your head, no need to 
cry over this bad luck. You can sue anybody, make the landlord fix it. You do not have to 
sit like a Buddha under a tree letting pigeons drop their dirty business on your head. You 
can buy an umbrella. Or go inside a Catholic church. In America, nobody says you have 
to keep the circumstances somebody else gives you. She learned these things, but I 
couldn't teach her about Chinese character. How to obey parents and listen to your 
mother's mind. How not to show your own thoughts... (p. 289) 
Here, Lindo echoes an important motif in American discourse that the only obstruction to change is the 
absence of will; the American is master of her fate. Lindo contrasts this with the traditional Chinese reflex 
to accept things as they are. While both American and traditional Chinese discourse acknowledge the 
importance of‘will’ in the conduct of life, Americans tend to see it as instrumental in changing 
circumstances while Chinese understand its importance in changing character to adapt to circumstances. 
Tu (1994) gives the example of Confucius’ best disciple, Yen Hui, who died before achieving sagehood 
but who nevertheless receives his teacher’s highest praise. Thus one’s ‘proper destiny’ 
is inseparable from one’s willingness and ability to take oneself to task inwardly. One’s 
calling...is none other than the inner voice that enjoins one to become what one ought to 
be. This critical self-awareness informed by one’s openness to an ever-expanding circle of 
human relatedness, is the authentic access to one’s proper destiny, (pp. 62-63) 
“Will” and “steadfastness of purpose,” are deployed to achieve “proper destiny,” as it is constrained by 
one’s cosmic situation. Thus, within Confucian tradition (as well as in the Buddhist tradition that Lindo 
invokes), “will” is directed toward the perfection of self and so the very act of willing is a component of 
attainment. 
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Interpreted in this way, Ong Laoshi s claim that with “motivation” children “will do anything” 
[Lines 5a-b] is not so much a hyperbolic statement about the invincibility of the Cartesian self but a 
comment on what it means to become a person at the Chinese school. This interpretation would helps us 
understand the utterance in 2b that the children “experience study” in the American school as a comment 
on the failure of American school to address matters of character. That the children study at the American 
school is an obvious fact in the world and so to utter it would constitute a violation of Grice’s relevance 
condition unless the fact had certain implications. The implication, I suggest, is that while knowledge may 
be the goal of the American school, cultivating character is the goal of the Chinese school. 
Line 6b and 6a together constitute an instance of repetition, marking the information as 
significant; “movement” explains “encouragement” and in the following line, “you cannot stop it” 
explains, in turn, “movement.” Thus, “motivation” is part of a cluster of items constituting a ‘motif,’ as 
Gee terms the set themes that correlate and which help to give this narrative its sense of development and 
change. 
5.2.2 They Will Know They Are Not Alone 
The narrative’s close, it’s “coda” (Gee, 1999), is signaled by reprise of the opening words “I 
feel” and the conjunction “so” [Line 7a]. The overall theme of the text is repeated: “the school is a spirit 
and the spirit,” helps the kids go forward but Lines 8a through 10 develop the conception of spirit. “Once 
the children go there” [Line 8a] echoes in structure “Once the children are motivated” [Line 5a]. Here, 
unlike Line 2c, which shares the same subordinate structure, the children, rather than the setting, are in the 
“theme” position, and so dominate the entire clause. Thus, while in Line 2c everything was seen from the 
perspective of the school, in Line 8a and Line 5a everything is seen from the perspective of the children. 
The subordinator, “once,” locates the children in an extensive segment of the present. The rheme clause of 
each of these sentences uses the modal “will” to suggest the inevitability of the outcome. In Lines 8a-c 
children are in a permanent state of “becoming” to “know” there are “many people like them.” These 
sentences are spoken not as specific instances of particular children but as generalizable and timeless 
truths regarding what is appropriate and what is good. “Many people like them” probably refers to other 
Chinese, but, as Lines 12-13 make clear, it also refers broadly to persons committed to the Chinese school 
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project, including Americans who “speak Chinese and want to learn.” In the sacred space of Our Spiritual 
Center, the presence of Others whose faces don’t “look like them,” are nevertheless members of the 
community (or at least honored guests), whose presence validates the importance of a mission 
transcending physical appearance. 
Because Chinese have tended to regard human nature not as what one starts with but what covers 
the trajectory of one’s existence, the Confucian, says Tu (1994), is less likely to ask “Who am I?” than 
“What should I be doing?” The Chinese religious sense holds that spirituality is attained by cultivating a 
network of human relationships according to principles of cosmic order (p. 181). Cultivation is described 
in terms of growing trees and animals, ripening grain, flowing water. Ames (1994) endorses Graham’s 
interpretation of personhood (renxing), a “dynamic thrust” (p. 147). Keeping Tu’s comment in mind, it 
appears consistent with cultural premises that Ong Laoshi grew up with to hear the motif as one of 
development and dynamic energy empowering children to become human in a moral community. 
At this point, it may be possible to venture what Polanyi (1985) describes as an “adequate 
paraphrase” of a narrative, one which takes into consideration cues and clues, as well as premises that I 
suggest allow the text to “make sense”: 
(I) As a spiritual center, the Chinese school is a sacred community. When children hear 
the call they are drawn to the school. In the beginning they come to study something fun 
but this is how cultivation begins; they are actually being drawn powerfully, and 
inexorably, toward fulfilling their humanity. This is something they cannot get this at the 
American school. (II) To the kids, the Chinese school doesn’t appear to be a serious place 
since it doesn’t really force them to study very hard. But studying is not what the school is 
about; it’s about motivating them to learn since commitment to learning itself is the entire 
point. At the school, children learn to be members of the community and it is as persons 
who are committed to society that education matters at all. Here kids have a chance to be 
part of a group that understands what cultivation is about. At the Chinese school, children 
do not simply learn language; they leam to be human. This is why they are not the lonely 
individuals they are at the American school. They discover there are now and have always 
been many people like them, including non-Chinese, though they were not always aware 
of their presence. 
5.2.3 Just Like a Church 
A week after the above conversation, I spoke again with Ong Laoshi. In that discussion, she 
resumed the motif of “spirit.” Here, “spirit” assumes overtly ‘religious’ meanings. Spirit thus represents a 
point of “convergence” (Gee, 1999) among “data [that] help to illuminate other data...data that we hope 
will lead us to similar conclusions” (p. 139). “Spirit” along with related motifs of “family” and “school” 
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constitute a pattern of situated meaning (p. 53) that is part of what I have been referring to as Confucian 
code. Table 4, below, contains a part of that interview. 
Table 4 
Ong Laoshi Interview Segment 
I 
I: Last time you said that the school was the center 
and the spirit 
la Tai zhongyao de. 
lb Tai zhongyao de 
2a Yinwei, zheige dungxi 
2b meiyou ‘school’ de shihou... 
2c Uh, Uh 
2d Zenma chu nali? 
2e Zenma ban ne? 
II 
3 Women you yige ‘center.’ 
4a Just like a church, 
4b you mei you? 
5a Every Sunday you just feel ‘Oh I need to go’. 
5b Time, shijian dao le. 
6 You get yourself ready. 
7 You yige motivation qilai ne. 
8a School zai nabian, 
8b yige spirit, de la. 
III 
9a Cong ge fangmien 
9b yige family lai de. 
10 Xiaohaizi jian xiaohaizi. 
11 Mama baba jian de. 
12 Zaoan! 
IV 
13a Sueiran zheige ‘result’ 
13b is not that (laugh) 
13c keyi kan shu kan le duoshao? 
14 Interaction, social. 
15 Dajia fuxiang guanxin. 
16 Shi yiga ‘community’ 
17 Women yinggai zhei yangzi. 
V 
18a Of course I can teach them at my house 
18b but that’s different. 
19 Let them study with their peers. 
20 That’s very important. 
21 a The kids with the same age 
21b but from different areas 
21c from Weston. 
So important 
So important 
Because, (when) this thing 
Didn’t have any school 
Uh, uh 
Where could we go? 
What could we do? (i.e., we couldn’t do anything 
about it) 
We have a center 
Just like a church 
isn’t it? 
Every Sunday you just feel ‘Oh, I need to go’ 
Time, it’s time to go now 
You get yourself ready 
There’s this motivation to get up 
The school is out there 
a spirit 
From everyplace 
a family comes 
Children meet children 
Moms and dads meet. 
Good morning! 
Even though the result 
is not that (laugh) 
How much can you look at books (i.e., read)? 
Interaction, social 
Everybody caring about each other. 
It’s a community 
That’s the way we ought to be 
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Because it doesn t maintain a past time point of reference, the above narrative is not altogether 
storied. Nevertheless, it does contain such story elements as settings, events, and participants along with 
various evaluations of them. Lines la and lb are an example of repetition, which, as I have noted, is a 
common device to foreground information. Line 2a Yinwei [because] cues the listener that what follows is 
a justification for an evaluation of “spirit” as a crucial concept. Line 2a refers mysteriously to “this thing.” 
The comment seems irrelevant to my question, since in what sense can “this thing” be a response the 
subject of my question having to do with school? In Chinese, as in English, “thing” has pejorative 
connotations implying an absence of “spirit.” Thus, a common Chinese insult, “hi shi shenma dungxi,” 
“what kind of thing are you,” implies that the hearer lacks the basic qualities of a person. It soon becomes 
clear that “thing” refers to the condition of the Chinese community prior to the school. 
The interjection “Uh, uh” [Line 2c] is an “outside” comment about the unacceptability of “this 
thing” being without a school. Ong Laoshi associates the term “spirit” with that of “church” [Line 4a]. 
“Church” neatly folds together the ideas of “center” and “spirit” as physical and spiritual location, fused 
stylistically the week before (Table 3, Lines la-lb). Although the text does not maintain an actual time¬ 
line of events in a real past world, it does establish a mythical past to explain the world before the creation 
of the Chinese School. The next line (2d-2e), “zenma chu nali, zenma ban” [Where to go? What to do?] 
on a Sunday without the Chinese School is an assessment of the emptiness and so “thingness” of a world 
in which one cannot realize community. Line 3, “we have a center” answers the preceding questions. 
Stanza 2 presents a storyworld of activity as the family bustles to get ready for school. This vignette is set 
in the “vivid present tense,” pulling the listener into the middle of events (Brown & Levinson, 1990, p. 
106). It does not recount a single incident or single family but describes a general, ongoing event, moving 
the hearer from a void when there was no place to go to a time of excitement and activity. Ong Laoshi 
narrates these details from rushing out of the house, “OK, it’s time! You get yourself ready,” to families 
greeting one another at the center, “Good morning!” Here, she not only describes events but also 
dramatically assumes the roles of characters in the story world. Thus, the narrative travels from a very 
unsatisfactory world in which there was nothing to do to the achievement of a final, stable order of a 
community “...the way we should be” [Line 17]. The intimacy and fellowship of this occasion are further 
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accented by choice of “mama, baba” which, like “moms and dads” in English, expresses the close-knit 
nature of the community. 
Stanza 2 abstracts and patterns certain Sunday morning events and locates them in a permanent 
space, suggesting their ritual nature. While rituals of various sorts play a crucial role in all societies as 
venues for enactments of personhood and resolving social conflict, ritual is an explicit and highly 
important aspect of Confucian social theory and is seen everywhere in Chinese social life. In a later 
section of this dissertation, I will further discuss the Chinese school as ritual performance. 
Line 7 echoes the importance of “motivation” discussed in the previous extract, but applies it to 
entire families, attracting them from everywhere toward the center. Using the presumably objective 
technical jargon of social science [Line 14] Ong Laoshi suggests that social interaction is what constitutes 
a community. In the next line, she rephrases “interaction social” as “dajia fuxiang guanxin.” The code¬ 
switch indexes a change in mood and meaning. Dajia, literally, “big family” is commonly used to mean 
“all of us here together,” while “fuxiang” means “mutual” and “guanxin,” “caring.” Guanxin is made up 
of the characters for a barred gate, whose verb form means “to close,” and so “to enclose and protect” 
(Wilder & Ingram, 1974, p. 36). Other combinations with guan are related to terms for involvement and 
connection. The second part of the combination is xin [heart], which is physical, psychological, and 
spiritual. In Chinese, “heart” shares with English strong emotional and sentimental connotations but 
includes sensible qualities that English speakers refer to as “mind.” For this reason, Tu (1984) translates 
xin as “heart/mind.” Guanxin is also the term used by the child narrator in the lesson “Thank you. 
Teacher,” quoted previously, to express gratitude for Teacher’s care and protection. The term suggests a 
level of concern and dependence that its English equivalent, “caring,” fails to convey. “Community” is 
thus to be understood as families tied to one another in affection and mutual responsibility. In coming 
together around the matter of language, people enact community essential to becoming a person. Thus, the 
school's community function, as Ong Laoshi readily admits, trumps its language teaching function: “Even 
if our [teaching] results are not that [laugh] but how much can you study!” This echoes the idea, 
expressed a couple weeks before, having to do with the purpose of the Chinese school. 
Unlike English, Chinese does not require a pronoun in the subject position to index a previously 
mentioned item. However, as indicated by my translation of Line 16, the utterance refers back to the view 
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expressed in Line 15. Thus, Lines 15 and 16 can be glossed as “everybody caring about each other 
constitutes a community.” It is “very important” [Line 20] that the community is drawn from “different 
areas” (rather than simply within a single family) because mutual sympathy, while beginning with the 
single family [Lines 2a-2b], must find expression in the wider world. In much the same way that families 
built community around a mutual need for water through the ancient well-field system, families are drawn 
together at the central location of the Chinese school. 
I paraphrase this extract as follows: 
Before the school we had no true community. Without community, there was no true 
purpose. The school creates significance. We are pulled by this, drawn out of our narrow 
self-interest to participate in community, which constitutes the Center. Even though our 
language teaching results are not impressive, this is not actually our purpose. We are 
about community, which is people caring about each other. That’s the way we ought to 
be. If I really wanted language results I could teach my kids at my house, but this would 
not give us community. Through mutual care and concern we constitute a community, 
far-flung people all drawn toward the center. 
In this section I have argued that the Chinese school serves primarily as a moral center, not a 
language school. This morality is based on a cultural code of honor, as codified and elaborated through 
Confucianism. While Confucianism is never mentioned explicitly, its premises are woven into themes and 
motifs of Chinese School Discourse articulating identity. I considered the situated meaning of “fun” in 
light of Gee’s (1999) “tools of inquiry” and suggested that the same term can be heard differently from 
different Discourses. I suggested this complicates the notion of “hybridized” discourse and its implication 
with respect to identity construction. 
5.3 To Value Education: Building Socioculturally Situated Identities 
In the previous section, Ong Laoshi eluded to the “American school” as a place where Chinese 
children “experience study” [Line 2b]. In this section I consider this experience more closely and contrast 
it with experiencing the Chinese public school. I consider relations between school and family in America 
and school and family in Taiwan and China as these are discursively constructed around the key term 
“valuing education.” I ask what “valuing education” reveals about “attitudes, values, ways of feeling, 
ways of knowing and believing, as well as ways of acting and interacting” (Gee, 1999, p. 86). 
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When Ong Laoshi paused at the end of the interview segment in Table 4,1 asked: “So the school 
is families, too?” Ong Laoshi’s response was, “Yes, it’s families. Not the public school but the local 
school.” The second sentence appears to be a nonsequitur; I had neither asked about public school, nor 
was it part of our discussion. Yet, the cluster of family, public school, and local school are a crucial focus 
of identity at the Chinese school. Because the interface between immigrant and host communities is very 
often the public school, it is not surprising that the latter may serve as an axis upon which to locate 
Chinese social identity. In this section I analyze two key terms in the language ideology of the Chinese 
school—“Chinese” and “Americans,” to develop Ong Laoshi’s suggestion that children “experience the 
American school” but cultivate personhood at their spiritual center. Rather than proceed from received 
definitions of what constitutes a particular ethnicity or social type, I follow Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw (p. 
134), who insist that the ethnographer’s stance toward ethnicity and other social phenomena is committed 
to elucidating “experience near” meanings, explanations, and theories. As a “tool of inquiry” 1 keep in 
mind Gee’s (1999) question, “What sorts of cultural models... are used to make value judgments about 
oneself others?” (p. 53; p. 78). 
5.3.1 “A Little Bit Different”: Contrasting American And Chinese Education 
In texts where the setting of the discourse was Our Spiritual Center, membership category 
‘American,’ while signifying ‘difference,’ operated centripetally to draw children toward the center: 
12a especially when they [Chinese children] see the people 
12b their face is not look like them 
13a They American, they speak Chinese 
13b and they want to learn. 
14 That kind of motivation is so strong there. 
In the following two extracts, however, difference operates centrifugally, amplifying division instead of 
“common meanings,” and “unified purpose” (Carbaugh, 1990, p. 5). Solidarities mutate according to the 
locations from which they are spoken; as Gee (1999) says, “sense making is ‘local’ and in the service of 
‘themes’, not necessarily consistent across large stretches of discourse... Meanings are situated in the 
specific contexts we are building here and now in our interactions with others” (p. 134). 
In these texts, one hears the clash of “dueling identities” (Carbaugh, 1996, p. 177) as agons, 
expressed as opposing cultural models, are brought together at a single discursive occasion. These 
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opposing models, I go on to argue, are grounded in codes of honor and codes of dignity. It is also possible 
to interpret them, according to Wong’s (1992) suggestion, as respectively, Confucian and Aristotelian. 
Ong Laoshi invokes a similar East-West distinction. Here, however East and West are part of the language 
ideology of the community because they provide folk explanations for the ways persons orient themselves 
toward language learning. 
Carbaugh (1997) cautions that such communicative action-action that builds positive identities 
for one group while attributing negative ones to others-constitutes “a kind of interactive, self-sealing 
game.” It produces what Young calls “shared subjectivity,” achieving “wholeness, symmetry [and]...a 
single vision of a shared existence” at the cost of “instilling racism and other exclusionary norms” 
(Abowitz, 2000, p. 218). 
While neither of these texts directly establishes the Chinese school as the scene of action, each 
presents ideal images of what it means to be a “Chinese” person and an “American” person and so is 
relevant to ideologies at the Chinese School. Analysis focuses on the research question “How do members 
of the Chinese school define cultural models “Chinese,” “American,” and/or “Chinese-American?” It is 
further concerned with the questions of what sorts of behaviors are morally estimable. 
The first stanza of the following text describes the cooperative relationship between Chinese 
parents and children while the second is a discussion about the importance of discipline in general. The 
third stanza discusses American parents and children. Discipline is thus the dividing line between the two 
descriptions, the need for it being the only thing that Chinese and Americans have in common. 
I 
la And then since the, in...in, urn in Taiwan or in China the kids, I would say, uh parents 
lb all have the uh, the uh concept 
lc that education it’s so important. 
2a They value education alright (?) highly 
2b so it helps teachers too. 
3a So whenever we have to do the job in the in the class 
3b and the leftover, we let the kids bring the work home 
4a And usually parents can help 
4b and can get the work done 
5a And so the kids are disciplined 
5b not only in the school 
5c but also in the family 
6a And family also ask the parents, 
6b also ask the teacher 
6c to discipline the kids. 
II 
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7a All right, I would say almost one hundred percent 
7b if the kids they don’t do well, 
7c they have some discipline problems 
8a and you give the kids a punishment, 
8b parents they come to school 
9 they thank you for giving their kids a discipline 
III 
10a But some case in here, 
10b little bit different. 
1 la Parents they come to the school 
1 lb and argue with the principal 
11c and also argue with the teachers. 
12a They have so strong reason. 
13 They say why their kids got the C got the D instead of A 
14a So sometimes you just have to say something sweet to the kids 
14b but really, are they really good in that, the question. 
Confucianism insists that education is a necessary condition of being human; As Mencius says, 
“Where man goes without education he is indeed close to an animal.” To say that people “value 
education” is to make certain claims with respect to their moral, material, and intellectual situation and so 
the esteem in which they should be held. Even people who are not themselves educated, observes Hu 
(2002), are elevated by knowing that education is of value. Thus, to “value education,” is central to 
defining personhood and, conversely, an inability to value education defines the lack of it. 
A key symbolic behavior linked to valuing education is “discipline.” Discipline, is composed of 
the characters for ‘teach,'jiao, and xun, to ‘instruct,’ ‘admonish,’ and ‘advise.’ As may be inferred from 
Table 4, discipline is an aspect of learning by apprenticeship. If a child follows a master by word and 
deed, she must ting hua, literally, “listen to talk,” an act that precludes agency because it does not admit 
the production of talk. Note that, through the key feature of “respect,” filial piety is extended to teachers. 
Because discipline is linked to communication and filial piety, it is an aspect of //, a central term in 
Chinese thought and social life. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, // consists of learned 
communicative behavior, both spoken and gestural. Li is the set of positive signs of social deference 
toward appropriate models of tradition, as well as toward teachers and parents, who exemplify and convey 
this tradition (Hall & Ames, p. 229). Because // is learned as a set of habits (Neville, 2000), bad habits in 
children can be changed through negative reinforcement, punishment. This may be illustrated by 
considering the Chinese character used for the word ‘education.’ Discussing schools in present-day rural 
Taiwan, Stafford (1995) quotes from Weiger’s classic work on the etymology of Chinese characters: 
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Jiaoyu (education) implies, as does the Latin root of education, raising or nurturing (e.g., 
to yu miao is to cultivate seedlings). Jiao itself means to educate, and is also used for 
religion or doctrine (e.g., in fojiao, Buddhism). Jiao is also used in one of the expressions 
for teacher: jioshi, teaching master. “Shi” is a master, but also, in other contexts, an 
example, pattern or model, an extended definition consistent with Chinese notions of 
learning (in which, e.g., students imitate the calligraphy of masters). The most common 
expression for teacher is laoshi, venerable master. More simply, lao means old and 
experienced. By contrast, the expression for student, xuesheng, means new to learning; 
sheng can also mean to be bom, to be uncooked, unripe, savage, untamed...the left side of 
the character jiao, to educate, at least according to one commentator, is made up of 
strokes showing the influence (of the master) over the disciple (or son). The right side of 
the character shows the master bearing a rod...The strokes in yu (from jiaoyu, education) 
apparently mean to feed a child (or animal), so that it becomes fleshy, strong, fat...The 
rather dramatic explanation given for the strokes in xue, to leam, is both hands of the 
master acting from above the darkness which covers the mind of the disciple... These 
explanations may be historically inaccurate but they are of the sort commonly used by 
students, (p. 7) 
Although Ong Laoshi says that attitudes toward education in America are “in some cases little bit 
different,” from those in Taiwan, her communicative goal is hardly to offer an impartial comparison of 
two educational systems or celebrate diverse educational styles. If taken literally, “In some cases” would 
be a violation of Grice’s maxim of relevance, since Ong Laoshi understood that the interviewer was not 
inquiring into exceptional cases. “Little bit different” is a similar instance of understatement. Through 
obvious violations of Grice’s Quantity maxim (Brown & Levinson, p. 217), speakers are able to soften the 
implication of totalizing statements. In this case, Ong Laoshi is not so much comparing two systems of 
education, as arguing that Americans do not meet established criteria for personhood. 
The focus of this text is on the role of parents. The linking of school and family suggests that 
these two are part of same category. Ho (1994) observes: 
Traditonal parental attitudes and child training, rooted in filial piety, exert a pervasive 
influence on cognitive socialization in the (a) definition of the teacher-student 
relationship, (b) attitudes toward learning, and the (c) cognitive aspects of personality 
functioning, (p. 281) 
Thus, “Given the emphasis on the role of the family in children’s education parental involvement in 
children’s homework would be expected” (pp. 299-300). Ho cites a number of studies demonstrating that 
the amount of time Chinese parents spend helping children with homework considerably exceeds that of 
American parents. 
From a Confucian worldview, all humans possess seeds that can be cultivated; Americans could 
cultivate personhood if American parents did what they should do. It is not lack of human essence (xing) 
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that condemns children to being undisciplined; it is that Americans do not value education. While poor 
school performance is “almost one hundred per cent” the result of “discipline problems” among both 
Chinese and American children, Chinese parents recognize this, and so cooperate with the teacher’s 
interventions. Not only do Chinese parents thank teachers for disciplining children, they cooperate in 
extending treatment to home. Moreover, when parents discipline a child at home, the treatment is 
extended to school [Line 6a]. One can appreciate the significance of such cooperation when one considers 
that many American schools notify parents of disciplinary measures only as a last resort and it is nearly 
unheard of in American culture, I believe, for parents to request teachers to intervene in matters of family 
discipline. 
Ong Laoshi does not express the possibility of disagreement between family and home among 
Chinese and the present research does not address the question of whether such disagreements occur in 
Taiwan. Such tensions do, in fact, arise at the Chinese school and on more than one occasion during my 
tenure as principal, parents have had words with teachers over various matters, including, in one instance, 
over what one parent regarded as the singling out of her child for particularly harsh discipline. Yet 
cultural models, as Gee (1999) points out, are not so much a report of reality but “an idealized, ‘normal,’ 
‘typical,’ reality...that reveals social meaning,” and parent-teacher disagreements do not fit this idealized 
picture of social reality. 
Ong Laoshi suggests, it is lack of discipline, not lack of ability, that results in failure to “do 
well.” This is because, as noted previously, neither the individual nor her attributes, including ‘ability’ are 
immutable. Hsu (1981) says American discourses of individualism encourage the “progressive principle 
of education,” which maintains that children’s variable performance can be attributed to the fact that 
individuals learn at different rates, and that different kinds of individuals have different 
kinds of abilities. To the extent that the Chinese tutor schools of old allowed students to 
proceed at different speeds, one might say that they were partially progressive. But this 
scholastic liberty was matter of practical convenience and not a matter of principle, (pp. 
94-95) 
Hu (2002) agrees that the Chinese view of the person is not that of an organism whose attributes and 
potentials are fixed at birth. Noting Confucius’ maxim that “no distinctions should be made in dispensing 
education” (youjiao wulei) and the sage’s own willingness to teach anyone who wanted to be educated, 
Hu says 
134 
there is a strong belief that everyone is educable and capable of attaining perfection. 
Although differences in intelligence and ability are recognized, they are not viewed as 
determinants of educational achievement. What matters is effort, determination, 
steadfastness of purpose, perseverance, and patience, (p. 98) 
The importance of cultivating such moral qualities encourages, in Hu’s view, an educational culture 
stressing “imitation of socially approved models and collective orientations but discourages individuality, 
fulfillment of personal needs, and self expression” (p. 97). The same notion is implied by the key feature, 
“learning is social,” in Table 4, above. In contrast, the “progressive principle of education” is concerned 
with bringing out the good qualities possessed by each child so that teaching is directed toward addressing 
unique combinations of skills and abilities. If American teachers must be concerned about making 
sufficient allowances for pupils’ individuality, Chinese teachers must worry about how to fulfill the 
responsibility to effectively transmit authoritative knowledge. 
In Ong Laoshi’s narrative, American parents dismiss teachers’ suggestions and challenge their 
authority by going directly to the principal. Such challenges violate the sanctity of the hierarchical system 
as well as the harmonious teacher-pupil relationship and the reverence with which teachers have 
traditionally been regarded (Hu, p. 98). Because Aristotelian rhetoric demands logical explanations for 
things (Wong, 1992), American parents “argue” with teachers and principals alike, challenging teachers’ 
judgments with “strong reason.” Thus, where Chinese parents cooperate with the school, American 
parents, in keeping with the American inclination to bend the social order to meet personal desires, 
exercise authority independent of it. As Hsu (1981) observes, the American child learns to expect “his 
environment to be sensitive to him" whereas the Chinese child “is obliged to be sensitive to his 
environment (p. 88, author’s emphasis). 
Without the tool of discipline at her disposal, the American teacher “just have to say something 
sweet to the kids” [Line 14b]. This is an indirect comment on the American educational insistence on the 
need to encourage self-esteem, which, says Kahane (1996), is “tied closely to our country’s individualistic 
spirit” (p. 13). Recalling lessons from Guo Yu and Hua Yu, “Thank You Teacher” and “My Enemy” 
(Section 5.1 of this dissertation), Hoffman’s (1996) comments about Japanese educational practice 
stressing group virtues desirable to others derive from Confucian tradition and so are, of course, 
applicable to Chinese education: 
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Students, parents and teachers routinely avoid praising themselves and one another; 
instead they focus on the ways in which they fall short of desired goals... it is not self- 
satisfaction or self-celebration that serves as an adequate base for school success but 
capacity for self-critique and discipline. In fact, it may be true that a deeper and more 
genuine sense of self-esteem derives from the challenges inherent in self-cultivation and 
self discipline, rather than from the facile self-flattery and self-celebration encouraged by 
American education discourses (p. 561) 
Table 5 summarizes Ong Laoshi’s description of the difference between American and Chinese 
in educational matters. Following Wong (1992), I categorize these as Aristotelian and Confucian:. 
Table 5 





Value education No Yes 
Helpful to teachers No Yes 
Thankful No Yes 
Critical of school Yes No 
Argumentative (contempt for 
authority) 
Yes No 
Cooperative No Yes 
Demands esteem Yes No 
Extrapolating personal qualities from the specific instance of school, we could rephrase this as a 
series of statements about communicating social identity in terms of “what a person is (and should be), 
can (and should) do, feels (and should) feel, and how that person dwells in nature,” (Carbaugh, 1996), as 
well as what they should not do and how they should not be. 
5.3.2 “A Perfect Person”: Political Building 
Here, I continue to consider identity as it is expressed through an agonistic relationship, though 
instead of being “Chinese and Americans” the first part of the agon becomes “Orientals” or, alternatively, 
“Asians.” While the previous text narrated and compared two cultural scenes (Chinese in China and 
Americans in America) the following text locates incumbents in the same physical space. 
Agonistic identity construction as a contest for the same symbolic and material resources 
provides an instance of “political building,” discourse through which speakers use “cues or clues to 
construct the nature and relevance of various ‘social goods’, such as status and power, and anything else 
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taken as ‘social good’ here and now” (Gee, 1999, p. 86). Like all texts having to do with identity, this text 
has something to say about “what a person is (and should be), can (and should) do, feel (and should) feel, 
and how that person dwells in nature” (Carbaugh, 1997). It does so by making rhetorical appeals to 
certain ways of being in the world. Philipsen (1992) cites Weaver’s framework in which “conservative” 
and modem rhetoric correspond, respectively, to codes of honor and dignity. Philipsen explains that 
arguments intended to move persons to right action through conservative rhetoric constitute an appeal to 
hierarchy (that some things are better than other things), memory (the way to know what is best is by 
examining the past as a repository of wisdom), and status “the idea that each person has a proper place in 
the world and that the most satisfying condition for an individual is to find the place that history assigns 
one and to live one’s life in it” (p. 100). The same action can be formulated in terms of a modem rhetoric, 
but here the appeal is based on equality (that all things, including ways of being, are of equal value), 
presentism (that choices should be based on what is needed here and now), and, process (“each person’s 
proper activity in life is continually to search for and continually to reconstitute one’s identity, continually 
making and remaking one’s person”) (p. 118). 
Ong Laoshi teaches in a predominantly Hispanic and white urban district with a few Cambodian 
and Vietnamese students but no ethnic Chinese. She recognizes the need to promote the program so that 
its presence can be justified to the District. “There is no free lunch,” she says and so ethnic solidarities 
must be constructed and consolidated. Ong Laoshi describes the way in which she “recruits,” to use her 
word, students into the Chinese program. Recruiting is necessary because several language departments 
must compete for the attention of a limited number of students. Students, in other words, are a limited 
resource but languages and identities are plentiful. She collapses cultures into two kinds, “Western” and 
“Oriental,” greatly restricting the number of identity positions available and so enlarging the Chinese 
program candidate pool. 
To convince Americans to join a program competing with the French and Spanish for limited 
resources, she appeals to the code of dignity. “Asians,” on the other hand, need arguments based upon a 
code of honor. While the following passage contains narrative features, events do not occur on a past time 
line but take place in a generalized present. 
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I 
1 Hey, why not come here to experience some Chinese. 
2 Explore your life. 
3 Maybe you can become a unique person. 
4 You have something in Western culture, 
5 Why not have something in Oriental culture? 
6 Then you will be a perfect person. 
II 
7 I tell my Asian kids why they have to study Chinese and not Spanish, not French 
8 Why? 
9a I say when you are in the real world 
9b and people ask you to read something, 
9c they don’t go to people who are not Asian. 
10a They show them Chinese characters 
10b and ask them “please tell me what this is.” 
11 Of course, they will look for somebody who has an Asian face. 
12 Here, you have an Asian face but you don’t know. 
13 It’s a shame. 
14 That’s why you have to learn. 
15a If you learn Spanish or French 
15b when you have a real job 
15c They don’t go to ask you about that. 
16 They go to ask American people who have a Caucasian face. 
17 They don’t ask you if you have an Asian face about your Espanol. 
18 I convince them, they have to learn my Chinese. 
Carbaugh (1999) notes that persons need not be present to be addressed “as if’ present and 
persons can further be conceived on a scale from ‘material’ to ‘immaterial’ or from ‘passive’ to ‘active.’ 
Thus, to use Carbaugh’s example, the utterance “Steve is a superb rock climber” attributes certain 
qualities to a person both “non-present,” and (as opposed to some sort of spiritual essence, e.g., ancestors) 
“material” (p. 145). Ong Laoshi addresses her American storyworld audience with the pronouns “you” 
and “your” [Lines 2-3 & 6]. They are “material” and “non-present” (but “material” only in the sense of 
representing a social type). Although the American kids are non-present, they are addressed as if present, 
a rhetorical device transporting the moment of speaking in the current setting and to the current audience 
to a location, situation, and audience that are elsewhere. The “footing,” in Goffrnan’s terms, links 
“particular moments, places, or personae, including our own self at a different time or with a different 
spirit” (Duranti, 1997, p. 256). Ong Laoshi also projects herself into the drama to address the American 
kids. Here, she assumes the persona of a pitchman for the Chinese program. While the words are directed 
toward American kids, the message is for the benefit of the actually present listener, the interviewer, who 
is permitted to “eavesdrop” (Goffman, 1959) on the conversation. This allows a moment of dramatic irony 
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since the eavesdropper is allowed to get a message that characters ‘onstage’ are unaware of. The 
eavesdropper understands that the pitchman s claims are, to say the least, exaggerated. American kids are 
invited to “explore” who they are, to become “unique” by taking in “something” of Western culture and 
“something” of “Oriental” culture. The argument derives from liberal educational discourse concerning 
the value of foreign language education. It thus stresses language as self-improvement, a component of 
Weaver’s “modem rhetoric.” This appeal is based on “process” (i.e., the call to endlessly make and 
remake one’s self) and a student’s opportunity to become a “perfect-person” is also an opportunity for the 
Chinese program to gain new recruits. 
Although Chinese language is optional for American kids, Asian kids “have to learn” [Line 8], 
Here, the rhetorical appeal is not to “process” and the possibility of becoming a perfect person but to 
“status.” Again, Ong Laoshi is as a persona in this scene and the activity remains recruitment of children 
into the Chinese program. However, this time the hearers are Asian kids. In establishing this situated 
identity, Ong Laoshi shifts keys. Rather than adopting the tone of a pitchman, she is now an advocate for 
students, whom she calls “my Asian kids.” The possessive pronoun indexes psychological solidarity with 
those who must face the realities of the workplace. 
For these kids, Chinese language is not just a symbolic adjunct to personhood but a material 
workplace skill. More than sixty years ago, Tom (1941) had similarly argued that maintaining Chinese 
language was a matter of taking into account economic realities. Such economic realities forced Chinese 
into niche markets like restaurants and laundries, and a similar rationale is provided for Asians to leam a 
niche language. This is part of the Conversation alluded to in the rationale that in the “real world” and on 
the job [Lines 9a-9b] employers see workers’ talents in terms of race and so distribute the capital of the 
workplace unequally. However well an Asian is able to speak Spanish or French, dominant “Caucasians” 
[Line 10] will not recognize this fact. Thus, French and Spanish do not have the same value for Asians as 
they do for non-Asians in the “real world.” French and Spanish, those innocuous chestnuts of the foreign 
language classroom, are here discoursed as ethnic languages with material value for Caucasians, who use 
it on the job and Chinese is a symbolic resource conferring the uniqueness upon those for whom 
uniqueness has cultural value. Conversely, “It’s a shame” [Line 7a] when people with Asian faces waste 
the potential of Chinese as a material resource. For Asian youth, uniqueness is a hindrance to the 
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solidarity that Chinese language is able to confer. This recalls de Bary’s (2000) point, noted earlier, that 
asserting Asian pan-ethnicity denies legitimacy and independence of diverse Asian cultures. For Asians, 
there is no invitation to “explore culture.” The conservative rhetoric dominating this presentation insists 
that persons settle into the position that history has provided for them. Cambodians, whose dark skin and 
round eyes would probably, in other contexts, construct them as phenotypically distinct (see, for example, 
Lin, 2000), were, a little later on in this interview, referred to as “The same. I’m like them. I cannot 
separate them. I can’t.” 
Although the situated identities of Asians and Caucasians have to do with the very immediate 
distribution of material resources at the school and the somewhat more remote distribution of resources in 
the “real world,” one can look farther still into historically grounded economic discourses of Asianess. 
Gee’s observation that “we humans are very often unaware of the history of... Conversations, and thus, in 
a deep sense, not fully aware of what we mean when we act and talk” (p. 18) may be true for most of us 
humans. However, as Fairbank and Reischauer (1973) observe, the rule may not apply to Chinese, who 
“... more than the people of the rest of the world, see themselves in historical perspective. They are 
strongly aware of their heritage. To approach them through their history is to look at them as they see 
themselves.” The baldly hegemonic sentiment that “they have to learn my Chinese” [Line 12] is a strand 
in a long-running Conversation.2 Pan (1990) observes that, since ancient times, Chinese have expected 
peoples in areas surrounding China to acknowledge their pre-eminence with various forms tribute, as 
system that 
grew out of the ancient distinction between the Chinese and Barbarian. This was linked to 
the idea that the Chinese Emperor was the ‘Son of Heaven’, a sovereign who owed his 
position to the Mandate of Heaven. Just as there are not two suns in the sky, Confucius is 
supposed to have said, so there are not two Sons of Heaven on earth. The empire...must 
be universal and coextensive with civilization: they called it All Under Heaven, a term 
which they used (and still use) as a synonym for ‘all the world’ Beyond the frontiers of 
the empire, or the civilized world as the Chinese knew it, were barbarian peoples who 
were only waiting the time when they too would receive the benefits of the Son of 
Heaven’s rule. And when the Emperor conquered the territories bordering the four sides 
of the empire, he was merely assuming control of what, as the ruler of All Under Heaven, 
he could legitimately claim as his. (pp. 4-5) 
Because of China’s dominance, smaller neighbors were either occupied directly or, as in the case 
of Japan, drawn into its cultural influence. Such history helps make the case for “My Chinese,” as an 
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instance of “intertextuality,” which Gee (1999) says occurs when “Any text (oral or written) is infected 
with the meanings (at least, as potential) of all other texts in which the words have comported” (p. 55). 
Potential situated meanings to which Gee here alludes are those that words have “picked up” in history in 
other settings and Discourses. His use of the term “infected” highlights the way in which meanings may 
not be fully activated by speakers and hearers but that these meanings are “like a virus that may remain 
inactive for a long while, but is always there and potentially able to infect people, situations, social 
practices, and Discourses with new situated meanings” (pp. 54-55). 
I earlier cited Barth’s suggestion that ethnic identity occurs at the interstices between cultures. In 
this section I have shown how representations of American educational discourse can serve as a resource 
for the construction of Chinese ethnic identity though an agonistic communicative form. Representations 
were based on the codes of dignity and honor, as well as the Confiician code. In the first scene, the key 
term “value education” was a nexus for evaluations of Chinese as worthy and esteemed. Agonistic use of 
master models figured not only into a display of social goods but also the acquisition of material goods. 
This was demonstrated by a narrative of competition for public resources. 
5.4 “The Very Simple Reason Is Because We Are Chinese” 
Personhood and language were not always a battleground for agonistic clashes of code, of course. 
Chan Laoshi, like Ong Laoshi, teaches Chinese both in public school and Chinese school. Because of their 
comparable situations, I wanted to know whether she, too, felt that Chinese language meant something 
different for Chinese than it did for non-Chinese. Although, as it turned out, she did not teach Asian 
students in her public school, she did talk about language and identity choice among her Chinese students. 
Instead, of using “conservative rhetoric,” Chan Laoshi employs ‘modem rhetoric’ to explain to her 
students why they should be learning Chinese. Here, the rationale has little to do with ethnicity but, 
instead, with learning for its own sake or learning for the practical goal of knowing “a very important 
language.” 
la You see, the point is not learning Chinese. 
lb The point is learning. 
2a It would be very nice to help the kids leam anything, 
2 In Taiwan itself, just whose Chinese is ‘my Chinese’ is a hotly contested issue (Friedman, 2000). 
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2b to learn something when they are young. 
3 So I always said it doesn't matter if you learn Chinese, or Spanish or 
French. 
4 It’s good you learn a lot when you have a chance. 
5a Now, if you are Chinese, 
5b it happens that Chinese is going to become a very important language 
5c and so it’s always better when you learn more and well. 
6 So, would I say the same thing? 
7a Yes, I would say the same thing, 
7b except that the kids in Watertown don't have the option of trying a 
different language, 
7c they can't change and go to Spanish or French. 
8a But in Saturday [Chinese] school 
8b I tell the kids "you can try it and see if you like it or not. 
9a I won't tell you have to come 
9b but just come and see what happens.” 
10 It’s always nice to just try. 
Unlike Ong Laoshi, Chan Laoshi does encourage the Chinese children to establish permanent 
ethnic orbit; Chinese students at her Chinese school are furnished with the same reasons for learning 
Chinese as her non-Chinese students in public school, based upon the ability of free persons to constitute 
their identities as they wish. That “it doesn’t matter if you learn Chinese, Spanish, or French,” [Line 3] 
derives from a rhetorical appeal to “equality,” not “status,” because persons of all kinds are equally 
allowed to participate in languages of equal moral worth. Moreover, the value of Chinese derives from its 
potential as an important world language rather than being a default language for Asians. Thus, the 
argument intended to convince children to learn Chinese is an appeal to “presentism” rather than 
“memory.” Finally, children are encouraged to “just come and see what happens” and so the criterion for 
judgment is with the students themselves. Chinese language does not maintain a monopoly for: “you can 
try and see if you like it or not... It’s always nice to just try” [Lines 9b &10]; within this modem rhetoric, 
“process” and the possibility of self discovery trumps the need to reproduce essential Asianness. 
I have cited Chan Laoshi here, first, to amplify conservative nature of Ong Laoshi’s rhetoric and, 
second, to provide something of a negative case (Silverman, 2001) to help support my claim that language 
ideology at the Chinese school observes a code of honor. A negative case is provided by an informant 
whom some other members of the group regard as atypical. Owing to Chan Laoshi’s somewhat bohemian 
lifestyle and wide circle of non-Chinese friends, more than one member of the school has told me that 
Chan Laoshi does not act very Chinese. While this hardly rises to the standard of “deviance” Silverman 
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says constitutes a negative case, it nevertheless suggests that the arguments Chan Laoshi uses with her 
students might be atypical. 
I earlier noted Ebrey’s comment that being Chinese was a matter of acting Chinese and this 
meant behaving in accordance with Confucius’ theories of society. Fundamental to this theory is the 
importance of the family and so it is hardly surprising that “family” was frequently offered as a rationale 
for children to learn the Chinese language. It will be recalled that, when Lindo Jong tried to explain the 
meaning of “Chinese character,” as “How to obey parents and listen to your mother's mind. How not to 
show your own thoughts,” she, too, invoked linguistic deference to family hierarchy. In the following 
extract, Chen Laoshi, a teacher at the Williamston Chinese School, describes conversations she has had 
with other members of the community. 
1 a I have one parent whose son is only three 
lb but she is thinking when her son is four or five 
lc of going to the Chinese school. 
2a She's concerned because 
2b she doesn't speak English very well 
2c and neither does her husband, 
2d so if the kid doesn't speak Chinese 
2c she won't be able to communicate with him when he grows up. 
3 She believes it's a little bit too late for her to learn English. 
4 At least to learn well enough for her to communicate with her son. 
5 So it is very important for him to learn Chinese. 
6 So that's one of the reasons you can see that parents want their children to learn. 
7 That's one reason that could be. 
8 The other reason is basic. 
9 Just because they are Chinese. 
I Oa Sometimes when you ask them 
10b why they want to learn Chinese, 
10c they will not think about why. 
II The very simple reason is because we are Chinese. 
12 Why do you need to ask that? 
13 Why do you need a reason for? 
Two “reasons” for learning Chinese are offered here. The first, which seems fairly pragmatic, has 
to do with family communication while the second asserts ethnicity. This is consistent with Xing Lu’s 
(2001) study, in which parents answered the question “Why do you send your children to Chinese school 
either pragmatically or in terms of family and culture. Contained in the first rationale are two beliefs about 
language learning: it is difficult for older people to learn English [Line 3] well enough to maintain lines of 
communication within the family, and, without intervention of the Chinese school, language loss is 
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inevitable [Line 2e]. The rationale leaps ahead to when the child becomes a grown-up [Line 2e], 
suggesting that Chinese language is essential, not only for practical matters within the home but also for 
continuity across generations. Of course, it would not be a good thing for non-Chinese Americans to be 
unable to speak to their parents either, but the danger of cutting cross-generational lines of communication 
is a particular danger among Chinese, whose “devotion to parents would be judged neurotic in the West, 
but central to the pattern of Chinese society... [with] the reverencing of parents while they were alive, the 
worship of their spirits when they were dead.” (Pan, p. 10). Note how, in Lines 6-7, Chen Laoshi 
generalizes the experience of this particular family to all Chinese families. 
The second reason (that Chinese language is “basic”) can be understood as an aspect of the 
preceding reason. Traced back sufficiently, all Chinese families, or so it is commonly believed, are 
descended from Huang Di (Huang Ti), the Yellow Emperor. Pan observes: 
Every child who has been through Chinese school will have heard of Huang Ti...and one would 
be an illiterate indeed if one didn’t know that ‘Descendants of the Yellow Emperor’ and ‘Son and 
Grandsons of Huang Ti’ were synonyms for the Chinese race. Greeting an overseas Chinese, no 
matter how removed he may be from his ancestral roots, a native of China will say ‘Ah, but we’re 
all Sons of the Yellow Emperor,’ rather as one might say ‘We’re all brothers and sisters under 
the skin.’ (p. 11) 
Thus, Chinese language is a material symbol that connects, through a chain of association, the practical 
business of communication within the individual family to fundamental aspects of personhood and ethnic 
identity. In Line 11, the pronoun switches from “they” [Lines 10a, 10b, 10c] to “we,” thus including the 
speaker herself in the community she reports on. Chen Laoshi suggests that the connection between being 
Chinese and speaking Chinese is so common sense that members of the community would interpret an 
interviewer’s question as non-sense. 
In a discussion 1 had with three other parents, Mrs. Tu, Mrs. Mao, and Mrs. Sun, these two 
reasons, “family” and “being,” were also offered. While in Chen Laoshi’s account the Chinese School 
appears to be the only force able to stanch language loss, respondents in the following discussion assumed 
that language maintenance depends upon support at home. 
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Table 6 
Responses to “Is Chinese School Important to You?” 
la. B: Hen Zhongyao. 
lb Feichang, feichang, zhongyao, wo juede 
2 I: Wei Shemma 
3a B: Um, women shi zhongguo ren, 
4 Ranhou je shi women di yi zhong muyu, 
5a Dangran zai jeibien 
5b tamen shi j iang zhongwen, 
5c jiang yingwen. 
6a Keshi wo juede 
6b jiang da yihou 
6c tamen yow yong zhongwen de... 
7a ye shi xiuyow yong zhongwen de... 
8 Suoyi wo juede zhongwen feichang 
Mrs. Mao: Very important. 
Extremely, extremely important, I feel 
I: Why? 
B: Because we are Chinese. 
Also, it’s our first mother language. 
Of course here 
they speak Chinese, 
and speak English. 
But I feel 
after they grow up, 
they’ll want to use Chinese. 
Also, they’ll need to use Chinese 
So I feel Chinese is extremely important 
zhongyao 
Mrs. Mao offers the same rationale for Chinese language as Chen Laoshi~“Because we are Chinese” 
[Line 3a]. That Chinese is “our first mother language” is literally true, because it is the first language 
children learn in the home. Lines 5b and 5c assume that the children who are raised in Chinese families 
will be bilingual but that this ability will continue to serve the children when they grow up, a time when 
they’ll both “want” and “need” to use Chinese [Line 7a]. 
I asked Mrs. Tu if she felt the same way. Mrs. Tu, like Chan Laoshi, provides a “family” account 
of language and the necessity of maintaining this first and most important circle of relationships. This also 
agrees with Lu’s (2001) findings that an “overwhelming reason” for parents to send children to Chinese 
school is “to be able to communicate with grandparents and relativesback in China” (p. 210). Unlike most 
members of this Williamston Chinese school community, Mrs. Tu is a Mainlander who speaks a Southern 
variety of Chinese at home that would be incomprehensible to other members of this community. 
However, Mandarin-on Taiwan called “national language,” guoyu, and in China “the common speech,” 
putonghua—is the official language of both Taiwan and China and so the lingua franca that unites them. 
Despite the apparently unproblematic nature of Mandarin as a symbol of shared culture and ethnic 
identity, language policy, as noted earlier, is a charged issue in Taiwan itself, where local dialects and 
languages were for many years forcibly repressed (Friedman, 2000). Thus, while the “mother language” 
[Line 5] is a unifying symbol at the Chinese school, it can, in other scenes, be an occasion of discord. All 
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parents take seriously the charge of maintaining the home language, but Chinese school is only an adjunct 
to this effort. Mrs. Tu and Mrs. Mao are able to realistically appraise the sorts of efforts that will be 
required to ensure that their children remain able to use Chinese and enhance their chances for success. 
This contrasts with findings from a survey conducted at the Chinese School of Delaware, where parents 
express the belief that Chinese school education should provide the “basic Chinese” skills to “speak 
Chinese with any native speaker, understand Chinese movies or TV news, and read Chinese newspapers 
or magazines” (Wang, 1996, p. 64). In Line 19, Mrs. Mao agrees with Mrs. Tu’s “family” rationale, 
although she had not raised the point in her earlier discussion. Table 7, below, continues the discussion 
begun in Table 6. 
Table 7 
Additional Responses 
38 I: Ni xiaohai xian zai yong zhongwen bijiao 
liuli huo yong yingwen bijiao liuli 
I Are your children more fluent in English or 
Chinese? 
39 B: Wo bu xiaode qita liangwei... I don’t know about the other two [mothers] 
40a Wode xiaohai dao muqien weizhi I have always 
40b zai jiali dou shi jiang zhongwen spoken Chinese at home 
42 yi zhongwen weizu Chinese is first 
43 ta xianzai shang xue Now they’ve started school 
44 yihou tade yingwen chengdu later, their level of English 
45 shi yi tien tien yue lai yue hao. will get better day by day 
46 Na, wo xiangxin jiu shi yihou Now, 1 believe that later 
47 wo zai jia li haishi yi zhong wen weizu. at home I’ll continue to use Chinese first. 
48a Na dangran zai xuexiao Now, of course at school 
48b xuede shi yingwen. what they’ll study is English. 
49a Hui lai de shihou When they get back 
49b gen women jiang yingwen. they’ll speak English to us. 
49c Na zuo fumu yingwen hui jiang de hua If those parents can speak English 
49d huo xu hui yong yingwen hui da maybe they will answer in English 
49e keshi wo zai dutsu wo ziji but as for me, I’ll force myself 
49f yong zhongwen huida... to use Chinese to answer 
50 Rang ta jiu xiang ta shuo de Like she said [referring to Q’s comment, above] 
51 ta jiu shi bu hui xie, bu hui kan [even if] she can’t write, and can’t read 
52 dan ta nenggou shuo, nenggou ting but she can still speak and still listen 
53 jei yang wo jiu juede hen chiang de. like that I’ll feel that would be a great success. 
Here, Mrs. Mao contrasts her own plans with those of thoughtless parents who might use English to 
answer children’s English questions [Line 49e]. By invoking unworthy behavior among imaginary others, 
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Mrs. Mao constructs a frame through which to interpret her own actions as moral. Maintaining language, 
and so identity, takes conscious effort, ‘I 11 force myself to use Chinese to answer” [Line 49fj. In doing 
so, she will prevent the conditions that Lieberson (1981), cited earlier, says are necessary for language 
shift to occur, i.e., (1) immigrant parents learning English as a second languagel and (2) using English 
with American-born children. 
Both Mrs. Mao and Mrs. Tu somewhat unaccountably downplay the importance of reading and 
writing, an area that the Chinese School particularly emphasizes. Yet, given that these parents have been 
coming to the Chinese school each week for several years (Mrs. Mao must drive for an hour to get to the 
Chinese school), the school likely maintains a level of importance that is not revealed by these data. 
In this section teachers spoke of the need to maintain the home language and the role of parents 
in ensuring that this occurs. In the background of each of these stories, and also the stories preceding 
them, is the idea of the American school as the place where Chinese children are socialized into alien 
ways and alien language. In the next section I explore the American school as a cultural symbol in 
Chinese School Discourse. 
5.5 “Trying to Be an American”: Three Stories 
Given the great amount of time Chinese children spend in American school and the very limited 
time they are at Chinese school, the danger of Chinese children turning into American children looms 
large as a worry among members of the Chinese school. Louis (1932) had identified this as a concern 70 
years ago and Wong (1992) observes that today 
After having been exposed to American culture, some of the Chinese-American pupils 
have acquired another set of cultural values. Their attitude towards schooling and the 
elders may not yet be accepted by parents. At school Chinese pupils’ maintenance of 
Chineseness or traditional cultural values may be laughed at by their peers, (p. Ill) 
Informants in Belden’s (1997) study, too, 
express a concern that their children retain the value of family and good // above all else; 
and that, in the extreme, is underlain by the fears of embracing Western ‘values’ of highly 
individualized expressing without seeming to be consequential or referential to the family 
structure, (p. 149). 
Parents at Williamston Chinese School also worry about what happens to Chinese children when, as one 
of the following narratives that follow expresses it, they “try to be American.” These three ACS teacher 
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stories may be understood as cautionary tales of what may happen when children stray too far from what 
one of the teachers refers to as “roots.” 
Like non-narrative texts, the following stories occur in a world in which human behavior is 
predictable and moral. Unlike them, however, narrative texts describe events that happened in the past and 
are used to illustrate general truths about life (Polanyi, 1985). Gee says “[T]he basic function of narrative 
is the way we make deep sense of problems that bother us” (p. 113). Gee (1999) suggests that stories 
contain a setting (establishing the time, space, and characters contained within the frame); a catalyst 
(establishing the problem); a crisis (building the problem to a point at which it must be resolved); a 
resolution (solving the problem); and a coda (closing the story) (p. 110). 
Stories are set off from the rest of the conversation by signals for a request for an uninterrupted 
turn at speaking and are identifiable, in part, by their past time line (Psathas, 1995). Each of the following 
stories is framed as the story of a story, placing it in a narrative tradition of hearsay. In extract three, the 
story is announced with the device “I told this story to my daughter.” Extract two is signaled by “This I 
heard from my friend” and extract one by “I’ll tell you a funny thing.” These devices alert hearers that the 
speaker is about to deliver a verbal performance. They function, in part, as a request for hearers to 
withhold interruptions until the performance is complete. 
Told by different teachers on different occasions, the narratives bear a remarkable similarity, 
converging on both theme and means of expression. Each narrative of cross-cultural encounter recounts a 
personal experience, or, as in the case of the second narrative, the experience of an experience of how 
deviations from expected norms lead violators to grief. Means include some of the devices already 
considered, including taking the parts of Chinese children and their “American” interlocutors, and 
stepping outside the action to offer commentary. I apply Gee’s (1999) analytical framework for speech 
situations to the storyworld of the text. I focus particularly on the “activity aspect” (the particular activities 
in which participants are engaged); material aspect (“the place, time, bodies and objects present during the 
interaction”); sociocultural aspect (“the personal, social, and cultural knowledge, feelings, values, 
identities and relationships relevant in the interaction”); and the semiotic aspect (“the ‘sign systems,’ such 
as language, gestures, images, or other symbolic systems”) active in the stories (pp. 82-83). 
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1 I told this story to my daughter. 
2 It’s a real story that happened in Williamston. 
II 
3 So this girl, she is a professor’s daughter. 
4 When she went to Harvard, 
5 she didn’t want to study any Chinese at all. 
6 So when she got to the University, wow, what a mess! 
7 It was such a big place and everybody there had their own identity; 
8 They had roots. 
9a So people would come up and ask “have you heard about this Chinese 
story? 
9b Tell me about it.” 
III 
10a But, you know, when she was small 
10b she looked down on her culture. 
11 Sometimes children look down on their own culture. 
12 They want to be the same as American kids because of peer pressure. 
13 They are embarrassed because they don’t want to be different. 
14 They don’t want to show their identity. 
15 They don’t want to wear their Chinese jacket. 
16 I know that. 
17 They don’t want to bring Chinese food to school, like rice balls. 
18 They feel embarrassed because they want to be the same as American kids. 
IV 
19 All right. So this girl, she had this experience. 
20 When she was at Harvard she didn’t know how to translate; 
21 She didn’t know how to say things in Chinese. 
V 
22 When they are small they don’t want to study because it’s a burden. 
23 “I hate Chinese school,” some of them say. 
24 But when they get older they want to study. 
25 Identity. 
26 They look for their roots. 
27 When they were young they may not have had a good environment; 
28 their parents did not insist. 
29 Parents are so important; 
30a If the children tell them they don’t want to go, 
30b the parents tell them “OK, don’t go, just stay at home. 
30c Give up. Forget it. That’s it.” 
A nearly identical story is related by another teacher: 
1 This I heard from my friend. 
2 OK, Chinese friend. 
3a Her two kids they went to college 
3b and then they studied. 
4a And then, you know, their friend asked them 
4b “Do you know how to read this?” 
5 and he said “No, I don’t know how to read.” 
6a Sometimes people said 
6b “Oh, you’re Chinese 
6c but you can’t read Chinese.” 
7 They have to admit it. 
8 They just say “yeah” 
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9 and they regret they didn’t learn earlier. 
10 Sometimes people ask 
11a “Oh, can you read this word to me? 
1 lb What does it mean?” 
12 and they don’t understand, you know. 
A third teacher tells this story: 
I I’ll tell you a very funny thing. 
2a I have a couple of students in my classroom 
2b whose parents have been here for over thirty years. 
3 a And so I asked them 
3b why they didn’t want to study Chinese. 
4 “Because we’re American,” they say. 
5a But I told them “you’re American Chinese 
5b because your face still looks Chinese. 
5c You know, you cannot say you are American. 
6a Yes, you are bom in America 
6b but your parents are Chinese . your face. 
7a When you say 
7b I don’t like Chinese,” 
7c you should feel ashamed, 
7d ashamed if you don’t speak Chinese. 
8 They say they like to learn French or German 
9 French is better than Chinese. 
10 I say you are wrong. 
II If you can learn more language, good for you. 
12 But Chinese is basic, basic! 
13 You have to understand Chinese 
14 because wherever you go your face is still Chinese. 
15 You cannot say you are white people. 
16 You are still Chinese, you know. 
The first story suggests a pragmatic rationale for children to learn Chinese, one that attempts to 
reconcile its significance with the recognition that persons living in the United States do not normally 
need to use Chinese for purposes of communication. In this tale, the professor’s daughter follows the 
family’s social trajectory ending up in Harvard, a setting that amplifies the issue at stake. In the Harvard 
described here, students carefully preserve ethnic boundaries: “everybody there had their own identity; 
they had roots!” Harvard is “such a big place,” Ong Laoshi suggests, that it could hardly function without 
people knowing to which group they belonged. As the reference to “roots” suggests, having one’s “own” 
identity does not refer to individual but to group identity as the natural order of things. When individuals 
get separated from their group, as in the case of the professor’s daughter, “What a mess!” Shorter (1993) 
says that “being someone is a rhetorical achievement” (p. 7). To be someone at Harvard, one must be 
able to tell stories with the voice of one’s own group. The daughter’s humiliation over not being able to 
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answer the Americans’ question “have you heard about this Chinese story? Tell me about it” is thus a 
matter of considerable significance. To have roots is to have an invitation to tell stories; stories are a ticket 
to the social life of Harvard. Thus boundary maintenance need not separate people but can, instead, serve 
as invitation to conversation. Belden’s ethnography similarly notes how her teenage informant described 
the “secret language” of Chinese as a “trans-ethnic bond with ‘white’ students who asked their Chinese 
friends how to curse in Mandarin in front of their teachers” (p. 92). The irony of this story is that the 
unfilial daughter had not learned Chinese so that she would be able to fit into American society. This 
inference can be drawn from the third stanza. 
The third stanza departs from the time line established in the previous stanza to make some 
generalizations about what a piece of the world, the American school, is like. Here, as will be recalled 
from the narrative segment in 5.2, children feel alone. This story within a story, which Gee refers to as a 
“sub-story,” is signaled by a shift in pronouns from the daughter as a specific “real person,” to a class of 
persons indexed by the pronoun “they.” Unlike at Harvard, where to be “one of us” is to possess one’s 
own “roots,” children in public school are stigmatized for displaying such ethnic symbols as “rice balls” 
and “Chinese jacket.” Although Chinese children “want to be the same as American kids because of peer 
pressure,” they neither can be nor should be the same. To dwell appropriately in nature is to dwell as a 
Chinese, not as an American. 
Hsu (1981) concurs with the storyteller’s view that language loss is a combination of peer 
pressure and the culture in which peer pressure is rooted: “Many American children shun foreign 
languages regardless of their ancestral background, because their linguistic prowess is derided by their 
playmates... The American has to flout parental wishes because of his fear of rejection by his own peers” 
(p. 112). Among Chinese children, on the other hand, “peer pressure” does not trump familial authority 
since children never shed the family to join a new generation. Family relations are 
immutable, and so are not subject to individual acceptance or rejection. Secure in the 
shadow of their ancestors, Chinese youngsters of school age have no great psychological 
urge to seek any alliance outside the kin group...For Chinese children, therefore, the call 
of their own age group possesses none of the dictatorial compulsion that it has for their 
American brethren. Chinese boys and girls are able to get along with their play groups 
without having to part with the things their parents represent, (p. 116) 
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To return to the story of the unfilial daughter at Harvard, the consequence of having ignored her 
parents’ wishes is that she must now endure humiliation in the eyes of the very people on whose behalf 
she had repudiated the ancestral language. Ong Laoshi suggested in the above narrative that by the time 
Chinese reach college age they are ready to embrace ethnicity. In an American context, the reason, 
ironically, may be that they are by this age able to participate in discourses explicitly devaluing symbols 
of conformity to shared standards, preferring, instead, meanings of “independence, uniqueness and 
expressiveness” (Lindo Jong’s ‘fashion’) that ethnic difference can provide (Carbaugh, 1989a, pp. 91-92). 
The second extract also demonstrates the cost of not taking steps to maintain culture early on in 
life. Again, American Chinese college students are expected by their non-Chinese peers to contribute 
ethnic knowledge. Here, Americans openly express their surprise over Chinese not acting like Chinese: 
“Oh, you’re Chinese but you can’t read Chinese.” The remark is intended, of course, neither to inform the 
Chinese college students that they are Chinese nor that they do not speak Chinese. It is heard, instead, as 
an indirect criticism for not having lived up to the expectation-agreed to by Americans and Chinese alike, 
that Chinese can and should read Chinese. The “regret” is not that Chinese are not given an opportunity to 
be American, but that the have mismanaged a treasure of being Chinese. 
At this point, it may be instructive, to consider Nakayama’s (1994) suggestion that non-Asian 
Americans are responsible for “the socially learned expectation that Asians are not American, and can 
never become Americans.” Because he can no longer see himself as “Oriental,” Nakayama (1994) suffers 
what he wryly calls “dis/orientation”: 
The first part [of the process]... comprises the historical experiences of Asian Americans 
living in the U.S. The second part, that of non-Asian Americans, is the socially learned 
expectation that Asians are not American, and can never become Americans. The 
combination of these processes invariably constructs identity positions that rarely 
correspond to where we, Asian Americans, think we are; hence we are left dis/oriented. 
(P- 14) 
Yet the point of the above three tales can hardly be that non-Chinese ought to treat each person 
as an individual so that she or he can dwell equally as American, nor that Chinese identity is ascribed by 
Americans against the wishes of Chinese. On the contrary, in each of these tales Americans are invoked to 
remind Chinese that their natural duty is taking care of their roots. Both Chinese and Americans agree, in 
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other words, that Chinese neither can be nor should be Americans. Thus “dis/orientation” is not the result 
of a socially learned expectation but consequence of abandoning one’s familial obligation. 
In the third story, children perform face-threatening acts of a kind that Brown and Levinson 
identify as “bald on-record” (p. 94): “I don’t like Chinese.” The boys offer as their reason for not wanting 
to learn Chinese: “because we’re American.” The boys speak through a code of dignity when they insist 
upon their rights to learn the language of their choice, and so to establish identity on their own terms. As 
Scollon and Scollon (1996) observe, Americans maintain a "long tradition of emphasizing the separation 
of the individual from any other social commitments” (p. 131). This long tradition challenges a 
considerably longer Chinese tradition that children’s first responsibility is to parents and ancestors and so 
the boys’ rhetoric does not impress their interlocutor. Unlike their American classmates, these children are 
not free to choose any language that suits them but, bound by the code of honor, must choose Chinese, 
since this is “basic.” The boys insistence about their individual rights is quickly overwhelmed by the 
irrefutable logic that being bom in America does not constitute being American. Consanguinity—“your 
parents are Chinese,” is what counts, not where you are bom. This recalls the argument made both by 
Chen Laoshi in previous section and the pages of HuaJYu, insisting “we are all Chinese,” regardless of 
where we are bom. Similarly, Belden identifies what she found to be the 
...unbridgeable distinction made by Chinese between being Chinese and being American. 
For the younger ones, especially, their culture-as well as ethnic-identity, supersedes a 
sense of physical origins. It incorporates belonging to a social structure with certain 
norms of conduct. And that differs from the Western (American) individual so 
disconnected by plethora of simultaneous relationships which privilege the competition of 
self vs. another, (p. 85) 
It is possible to hear “your face is still Chinese” [Line 14] as a comment on the exclusionary 
practices of dominant Americans but this would imply that if your face didn’t look Chinese, you could be 
American; this is clearly not what the speaker wants to suggest. While Americans are not present as 
characters in this narrative, they are nevertheless evoked as persons who will eventually judge Chinese by 
their faces and so are, in a sense, recognized as partners in maintaining Chineseness. 
The reference to “face” is also metaphorical and invokes a complex system that DeGlopper 
(1995) says “may... be seen to be congruent with the Confucian stress on the importance of public 
opinion and mutual influence, with the Confucian definition of man as essentially social and existing in a 
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social context” (p. 34). Face, “is defined by a particular set of others” (p. 33), so that one behaves in 
anticipation of what others would say if they found out about one’s transgressions. “Shame,” is an aspect 
of face and figures prominently in the three passages. Philipsen (1992) describes a sense of shame as, “the 
inner feelings a person has in the presence of an audience that matters” (p. 56), and places shame among 
the crucial honor-linked values since it emanates from the failure to fulfill one’s social responsibilities. It 
is “a ruthless use of shame,” says Pye, (1992) that awaits the child who refuses to acknowledge his 
mistakes: “The child is made to feel the humiliation of his errors and to believe that whenever he fails in 
meeting the appropriate standards of behavior others will look down on him” (p. 95). In Extract 11, 
Americans expressed their disappointment with the Chinese daughter for not being able to explain a 
Chinese story and, as a consequence, the daughter feels shame. In Extract 12, Americans expect that 
Chinese will be able to read something to them and to explain what Chinese words mean. Again, not being 
able to meet these expectations brings shame. In Extract 13 [Line 7c-d], the speaker argues that a Chinese 
should feel shame if she or he doesn’t learn to speak Chinese. 
In this section, I looked at discourses of cross-cultural relations between Chinese and Americans 
and found evidence to support the idea that some discourses of Chinese personhood depict Chinese as 
essentially different in kind from Americans but that difference is maintained cooperatively, rather than 
agonistically. The following section will consider how some culturally “American” children at the Chinese 
school are able to negotiate what it means to be Chinese. 
5.6 “Are You Mad at Me?”: Resistance and Harmony in a Scene of Cross-Cultural Communication 
Actions in Wong Laoshi’s class, along with models of personhood they suggest, contrast with 
much of what has been said so far about the cultural code of honor that obtains (or so one might suppose) 
in Chinese schools. This contrast serves as the focus of inquiry for this section. I follow Gee’s (1999) 
suggestion that the analyst keep on the look out for “...differences...between the cultural models that are 
affecting espoused beliefs and those that are affecting actions and practices,” as well as the “consistency” 
of “...relevant cultural models and whether there are competing cultural models at play in particular 
scene.” 
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A tension is clearly present between the Confucian idea of the classroom, with its emphasis on 
group orientation and deference to tradition, and American classrooms, where individual agency and 
rejection of tradition are prized. In Chinese classrooms, children are not expected to have a say in the 
shape of their learning communities, while in American classrooms, agency is, to be sure, regulated, 
opportunities to exercise a measure of autonomy are nevertheless encouraged (Hall, 2002). 
To illustrate the clash between American and Chinese educational discourses, I turn to a scene of 
conflict in Lawrence Yep’s (1977) novel for young people, Child of the Owl. As Chan (1994) observes, 
“ethnic American literature provides us with valuable knowledge and insights into culture and 
communication from the point of view of those who have lived the experience” (p. 3). Yep relives his 
experiences in Chinese school through the eyes of twelve-year-old Casey, who recalls that “The worst 
thing was Chinese school. I still get nightmares about it sometimes” (p. 40). During the calligraphy lesson, 
for example, the teacher “slapped my wrist with a ruler for holding the brush wrong” (p. 112). 
This plain-faced lady whose pancake make-up peeled in little patches so it looked like she 
had some kind of skin disease.. .wore a sleeveless silk dress that hugged her body all the 
way down to her knees except for the slit that showed one leg. (p. 112) 
Because Chinese characters provide only rudimentary clues to pronunciation, Casey scribbles an 
alphabetic approximation alongside the page to help her when it comes her turn to recite from the 
textbook. Mrs. Yang does not appreciate Casey’s innovation: “That no good. You...you think too much 
‘Merican. Not think Chinese. Never learn. You erase.” 
The ruler, the silk dress, the peeling make-up are items-Gee (1999) would refer to them as 
“props”~that help the reader construct a scene in which the old, crumbling Confucian regime rules by 
force over children who do not share its cultural premises. To be successful in Mrs. Yang’s class requires 
submission to ways of doing things in China; as Ho (1994) observes “The Chinese school [i.e., the school 
in China] environment is orderly and authoritarian; strict discipline is emphasized. In line with the 
Confucian ideal of filial piety, teachers are authority figures who are not to be questioned or challenged” 
(p. 298). Mrs. Yang’s ruler symbolizes both the normative power of Chinese writing as well as the 
consequences of departing from these norms. Casey’s actions, on the other hand, are accountable in terms 
of “presentism,” which has little regard for tradition. Thus Casey is caught between two cultural codes 
one code represented as valuing creativity, invention, and freedom while the other stands for tradition, 
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submission, and discipline. The following scene demonstrates the impossibility of communicating across 
this cultural divide: 
The whole class had stopped whatever they were doing, turning to watch us. But she knew 
that if she did it in Chinese, I wouldn’t understand her, so it would be wasted. And yet her 
English wasn’t good enough or she was just too mad to think. All she could say was “You 
too dumb. You copy book..” Then she clicked her pen point out and stabbed my test 
paper and scrawled out a big F across the surface. After that I just gave up trying, (p. 43) 
By scrawling ‘F’ across Casey’s paper, Mrs. Yang preempts any possibility of finding common ground 
between American and Chinese domains; by giving up trying, Casey responds with the only form of 
redress available to the truly powerless. 
In pairing the two codes, Yep creates what Carbaugh describes as a scene of “dueling identities.” 
In Dewey’s terms, the mode of communication is “interaction,” which “refers to the state in which a thing 
is balanced against another thing in causal interconnection.” Interaction occurs when communication is 
oppositional, when “two cultures collide and like two marbles, fly off into opposing directions” (Abowitz, 
2000, p. 882). Missing from Mrs. Yang’s class is the sort of communicative possibility that Louis (1932), 
as discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, argued was necessary to reach across the “clash of cultures” 
(p. 251). To work out seemingly irreconcilable differences, he advised “the process of accommodation” 
and its practical component, “stopping to find the virtues.” The mode of communication required for 
stopping to find the virtues is Dewey’s “transaction.” When people engage in this mode of communication 
they 
are taking the first steps toward the creation of a shared social enterprise... these first steps 
of opposition signal the interruption of old meanings—meanings that occupied primary 
position in the shared enterprise, whether through domination, historical acceptance, or a 
combination of factors—to signal that new meanings are in the making. 
Opposition...presents a problem; it presents a change in conditions that further demands 
inquiry, reflection, discussion and action. (Abowitz, p. 899) 
Thus “opposition” and “shared social enterprise” are not incompatible. Rather, they are in a state of 
dynamic tension, which makes alternative forms of action possible. The consequence of transaction is not 
to “give up trying” but to try something different. 
Among the communicative means at persons’ disposal for both transaction and interaction is 
code switching. Duranti says, “the choice of a particular language over another may index one’s ethnicity 
or a particular political stance toward the relations between language and ethnicity” (Duranti, 1997, p.18). 
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Jo (2001) analyzed code switching among Korean-American heritage language students at a university 
program. There, she found students engaged in “the process of deconstructing rules, crossing language 
boundaries, and mixing different codes...which signifies Korean-American lived experiences and 
identities, not dissolved into the Korean native nor assimilated into the American identity” (p. 27). 
Following Gee (1999) and Gee and Green (1998). I examine a transcript of classroom interaction for 
traces of what Gee calls “competing or conflicting models of valued social actions” and consider how 
these are accomplished through instances of code switching. 
5.6.1 Wong Laoshi’s Class 
Casey would probably have been happier in Wong Laoshi’s class. Wong Laoshi could hardly be 
more different from Mrs. Yang. She wears blue jeans and sweatshirt, not a silk dress with a slit up the 
side. Her English is fluent, and contains few grammatical or phonetic patterns of her first language. When 
she is not teaching at the Chinese School, Wong Laoshi is a research scientist at one of the universities. 
Apart from the annual training sessions at OCAC, Wong Laoshi has no formal training as a teacher but, 
like most of the teachers in this community, is a stakeholder who hopes to ensure that these children 
maintain a sense of connection to their heritage. Her own children no longer attend the Chinese school but 
sometimes perform at the annual New Year celebration. 
This is not the autocratic classroom that Casey had to endure, nor is it the “disciplined” 
classroom Ong Laoshi appears to suggest distinguishes Chinese from American classrooms. The five 
children are seated around a table in a tiny partitioned space, used at the middle school during the week 
for special pullouts and as the after-school program office. Three of the children are what group members 
would describe as “mixed blood” (fewcue). Louise’s father is Chinese and her mother is of European 
ancestry, while, for the other two children, Michael and Elsie, it is the reverse. Of the two remaining 
children, one has parents from Taiwan and another from mainland China. A sizable minority of the 
children at the Chinese school have only one Chinese parent. Even the teller of the final story in Section 
5.5, who had insisted 
5c You know, you cannot say you are American. 
6a Yes, you are bom in America 
6b but your parents are Chinese .your face. 
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is the mother of a “mixed-blood” child. Whether the mother or father is Chinese, a child is equally fenxue 
at the Chinese school. Although the term “mixed-blood” orients toward a biological idiom of identity, my 
data do not suggest that the situated meaning attached to this term indexes a person as, in some sense, less 
Chinese or more American than a child whose parents are both Chinese. None of my data suggest that 
such a distinction is active at Williamston Chinese School. Hsu (1981) helps to confirm the generality of 
this observation: 
Perhaps the best clue to the Chinese attitude is found in the fact that if a non-Chinese 
spouse or the offspring of a mixed union can speak Chinese and behave like a Chinese, 
other Chinese, including close relatives and friends of the Chinese member of the union, 
are usually eager to accept the newcomer... Intermarriage is simply not a Chinese public 
issue, (p. 356) 
This also matches the experience among friends and relatives in my family and suggests, again, that acting 
Chinese is, at least in some sense, being Chinese. 
Students have been placed in this level according to age and, while the range of ages represents 
an actual cohort by neither Chinese nor American standards, such approximation is but one example of the 
kinds of accommodations that a school with only 50 students must make. The practice of placing children 
with age cohorts, rather than proficiency, is enshrined in the school code and reflects the importance of 
age-based relationships in a hierarchical system based on the code of honor. Such a system implies that 
development of self is a long-range project that will bear fruit eventually (Weiming, Hejtmanek, & 
Watchman, 1992, pp. 53-54). The pedagogical consequence of placing children according to age rather 
than proficiency, however, is that the textbooks often miss the mark, both in terms of content and degree 
of difficulty. Thus a considerable degree of flexibility over use of the texts is often necessary. This 
pedagogical use of translation would, in some measure, account for the high level of code switching that 
occurs in this class. 
5.6.2 Speaking and Listening 
The lesson is divided into two segments. The first and relatively brief segment focuses on 
understanding and producing speech while the second concerns reading and writing. The lesson begins 
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with children turning in their homework. When Wong Laoshi notices that the papers are not dated, she 




























Women di yige libai de shihou {during the first week we} 
dou jiaoguo nimen, {you were taught} 
jiang xingqi yi, xingqi er. {how to say Monday, Tuesday...} 
Wangjile huh, {forget, right?} 
Xingqi san, xingqi si, {Wednesday, Thursday} 
You mei you? {Right?} 
Xingqi wu, xingqi, {Friday, Saturday} 
Ranhou xingqi tian {after that Sunday} 
I mean, remember? 
At first we were talking about months, 
talking about days . 
You mei you .{Right?} 
Wangjile {Forgot}. 
Xingqi yi, {Monday] 
You mei you {Right?} 
Ranhou xingchi er.{after that Tuesday} 
Same thing. 
Xingqi san, xingqi si.{Wednesday, Thursday} 
Jide bujide.{Remember or not?} 
Ershiba ri.{the twenty-eighth day} 
Ye keyi ershiba hao, ershi ba ri. {or also you can say number 28 or 
day 28} 
Dou xing. {They are both ok} 
Ranhou ne, hmm? {after that...} [3 second pause] 
Hen congming. {Really clever} 
Ranhou ne women lai jiang guo shenma? {after that what did 
we talk about?} 
Women lai jiang ji dian, {we talked about the time} 
ji fen, you mei you, yi dian {how many seconds, right? One 
o’clock} 
Speaking Chinese, Wong Laoshi reminds the children that they should all by now know the days of the 
week, since it was taught the very first week of class [Lines 1-2]. As in many American classrooms, she 
chooses “we” (women) instead of “I” to indicate that past experience is relevant to what is occurring at 
present. This pronoun therefore co-occurs with recaps of information from a previous lesson (Mercer, 
1995). It also signals that the class is to behave as a cooperative unit. As will be described shortly, the 
classroom unit is regulated by means of the Initiation, Response, Feedback pattern of classroom 
participation. Moreover, the choice of language itself may function to express solidarity as Chinese 
(Gumperz, 1982 a). 
While the segment is framed as a review session, it will have been heard by the students as a 
reprimand for not having written the dates on their papers. The frequent interject ions-yow mei you 
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(Right?), jide bujide (Don’t you remember?) and wangjile (forgot?)—are interjections, rather than actual 
requests for information, because no space is allowed for the children to reply. Nor does the review of the 
days of the week serve as a reformulation of previously learned material, since it proceeds much too 
quickly. In Line 25, Wong Laoshi may appear to be asking students to reconstruct what they had learned; 
however, she provides no opportunity for them to do so. The single chance children have to respond was 
the three-second pause in Line 23. That they failed to do so may owe to contusion over what is being 
asked, since in Line 20 the questioning switched, unannounced, from days of the week to months of the 
year. The teacher responded to this failure with the comment, “really clever” [Line 24]. This would likely 
have been understood by all but, perhaps, the weaker Louise as sarcasm. Similarly, the code-switch [Lines 
9-11] from Chinese to English may metaphorically position the children as persons who are not clever 
enough to understand simple tasks they are being asked to perform. If the purpose of this segment, then, is 
neither to review information nor evaluate what students learned previously, what is its communicative 
goal? I suggest that its purpose is to express displeasure with the children for not having put the dates on 
their papers and so, by means of negative reinforcement, exert control over future behavior. 
Wong Laoshi switches codes so frequently that it is difficult to say whether the language of the 
classroom is Chinese with switches into English or English with code switches into Chinese. In terms of 
input and output, this class hardly provides an optimal language learning environment but, as Willett 
points out, language classrooms are places that “learners acquire more than linguistic rules. They also 
appropriate identities, social relations and ideologies” (Willett, 1995, p. 477). Jo’s (2001) work, cited 
earlier, suggests that, in heritage language classrooms, in particular, language as a formal code and 
language as a resource for communicating social identity weave together in complex ways. I therefore 
consider language use in Wong Laoshi’s class not as a location for language input and output (e.g., 
Chaudron, 1988; van Lier, 1988), but, using Gumperz’ (1982a) typology of code-switching, as one for 
transacting identity. 
Among the functions of code-switching, according to Gumperz (1982a), is to restate a message 
to qualify or emphasize it. This occurs in Line 31. In a language teaching situation, however, it is difficult 
to disentangle social from pedagogical functions. Below, Elsie protests that she had written the date on her 




Elsie Hey, I wrote the date 






Also, we talked about the ‘crock’ 
Elsie What? 
T Clock [correcting herself]. 
What time, zheige shi... {this is...} [pointing to a clock on the wall] 
Perhaps as a sign of disapproval of her speaking out of turn, Wong Laoshi has chosen to ignore Elsie’s 
rebuke at having been falsely accused. It is difficult to account for the teacher’s using the English lexical 
item “clock,” whose Chinese equivalent these children would have known, in an otherwise Chinese 
sentence [Line 30]. However, Elsie responds to it by signaling not improved understanding but 
incomprehension. I suggest that the pragmatic function of Elsie’s “what” [Line 32] is not to request 
clarification but to draw attention to an error in English. In this community, substituting /r/ for N is 
common (indeed, Elsie’s mother often does so) and so this variant is hardly one the child has heard for the 
first time. Moreover, the context would have easily allowed the children to infer Wong Laoshi’s intended 
meaning. Much like Mrs. Yang’s transfer of Chinese grammatical structure into the English clauses “You 
too dumb” and “You copy book,” replacement of l\l with /r/ “gives off’ (to use Goffrnan’s term) a 
specifically Chinese Othereness. At ten years old, Elsie would have been aware of this stereotype, and she 
leverages it as pay-back for the unresolved issue in Line 28. That Wong Laoshi quickly repairs this single 
word, rather than repeating the entire utterance, suggests that Elsie has made her point. In a traditional 
Chinese classroom, where face considerations are such that students don’t ask questions out of concern 
that the teacher might lose face (Jin & Cortazzi, 1998), Elsie’s interruption would have had grave 
consequences. Yet, this is not a traditional Chinese classroom any more than it is a traditional American 
one. Unlike Mrs. Yang’s classroom, it is a site that allows revision of Chinese culture and identity through 
contest and compromise. 
The above exchange is but one instance (many more will occur) in which a child interrupts the 
teacher and the monologic structure of the class. Van Leir (1988) identifies talk initiated by students and 
deviating from the teacher’s agenda as “schismic talk.” The schismic utterance, above, momentarily alters 
the topic of conversation from “time” to “teacher’s flawed English pronunciation.” If, in this tangle of 
codes, we consider Elsie’s language choice (the Chinese term for “what” would have been a readily 
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available option for Elsie), the schism may also have served to communicate Elsie’s lack of involvement 
in the conduct lesson, this being among the functions of code-switching identified by Gumperz (p. 81). 
r 
With few exceptions, children respond in English, even when turns are initiated in Chinese. In 
the following segment, Wong Laoshi provides English feedback when a child responds to an inquiry 
delivered in Chinese. 
37 T Yinian you jigeyue {a year has how many months?} 
38 Child (?) Twelve? 
39 T Twelve, right. 
Like many traditional Chinese classrooms, Wong Laoshi’s class is “code” oriented, and so the 
focus is on producing and understanding correct forms. Because teachers in China and Taiwan are held 
accountable for displaying comprehensive knowledge of the code and transmitting this knowledge to their 
students (Jin & Cortazzi, 1998), the actual communicative consequences, as will be discussed shortly, are 
deemed of far less importance than the formal elements of language. In the above passage, Wong Laoshi’s 
choice of language corresponds to whether her words are used to present the code or to express 
information about the code. Allen, Frohlich, and Spada (1984) note that it is common for this sort of 
classroom discourse to initiate an exchange with a pseudo-request for information but provide meaningful 
feedback with “new,” and therefore meaningful information. Thus “A year has how many months?” [Line 
37] is not a genuine request for information. However, the feedback “Twelve, right” [Line 39] is a 
meaningful (in the sense of containing new information), albeit minimal, comment on the child’s ability to 
understand the utterance. 
This pattern of communication is referred to as IRF, Initiation, Response, Evaluation, Feedback 
(Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975). Allen, Frohlich, and Spada surmise that this “teacher-centered lock-step 
approach to instruction” is not likely to lead to improved levels of fluency because it imposes restrictions 
on opportunities for student production (opportunities are even more restricted when, as above, 
production is not in the target language). A number of scholars have also noted the way in which the IRF 
participation pattern establishes the teacher as classroom authority while simultaneously depriving 
students of agency because it creates a communicative situation in which knowledge gets to count only 
with teacher’s approval. In Line 39, above, the tentativeness of the child’s response results from the need 
for the teacher to confirm knowledge (with respect to the code, of course, and not the number of months 
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in a year) as acceptable. IRF is thus the locus of research that seeks to show the way in which classroom 
interaction encourages teacher domination at the expense of children’s agency. 
While this participation structure is today viewed as undemocratic and overly regulatory, 
requiring children to be “cheerfully complicit in their own relative lack of agency” (Hall, 2002, p. 181), 
Macbeth reminds us that “questioning the class” (of which IRF is a specific case) is a relatively recent 
pedagogical innovation. The idea of “the class” as “a single interactional party, commonly addressed, 
questioned and taught,” (p. 28) developed out of the need to accommodate increasingly heterogeneous 
numbers of children focused on the same task. It also accorded with the belief that the “moral sympathy of 
numbers” worked to prevent the loss of the individual child from the flock, since classmates might serve 
as positive examples for others. At its base, questioning the class rests on the view that “group 
instruction... was the natural order of group life.” 
Questioning the class was likely not practiced in ancient China and may not be common even 
today, since emphasis remains on the “four R’s and four M’s”: reception, repetition, review, reproduction, 
meticulosity, memorization, mental activeness, and mastery (Hu, 2002, pp. 100-101). Yet, as a technology 
of learning, IRF is compatible with Chinese educational goals. The audiolingual approach to second 
language instruction, which depends entirely on IRF, has long been abandoned in the United States but 
remains popular in China (Hu, 2002). Audiolingualism is compatible with the Chinese view that 
knowledge precedes the individual and so, by submitting to its traditions, the learner will eventually gain 
the skill to use it. Hu contrasts this “learn to use” idea of knowledge with “learn by using,” popular in the 
West. Learn by using provides high-inference, “authentic” tasks so that students can construct new, 
personally meaningful knowledge. While learn by using is consistent with the code of dignity, ‘learn to 
use’ is consistent with the code of honor principle that “the way to judge what is best is to interpret the 
lessons of history to discover what has been effectively put in place and what has produced right conduct 
in the past” (Philipsen, 1992, p. 109). To the charge that IRF as an imposition upon a child’s autonomy 
and an artifice having little relevance to the high-inference world beyond the classroom, a Chinese teacher 
might reply that there is no inconsistency between social relationships in the classroom and idealized ways 
of being in the real world. 
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The drill continues, with Wong Laoshi eliciting the English equivalent of a Chinese month. 
Except for the name of the month, the entire drill is conducted in English, though even the weakest learner 
would have been able to tolerate the demands of this task if it had been conducted in Chinese. In the 
following segment, we again see how the teacher manages information by ensuring that she is the sole 
conduit for what is acceptable by eliciting and evaluating student responses: 
41 T What’s yiyue, in English? 
42 Child [inaudible] 
43 T No, yiyue in English. 
44 Michael January 
45 T Good. Xiao Li? Eryue, in English 
46 Li February? 
47 T February! Very good. 
Through nearly the entire lesson, the students address all comments to the teacher, not to one another. Yet, 
if this classroom resembles a classroom that the teacher would have known from her own childhood, it 
also resembles, in certain respects, the classrooms that the children are familiar with. 
As we saw in the exchange having to do with “clock, “above, children do manage to work in 
their agendas. This is possible because, while the class generally observes hierarchically oriented patterns 
of classroom participation when the focus is on Chinese language, it maintains, at the same time, a cultural 
ethos based on a code of dignity. Brown and Levinson (1990) use the term “cultural ethos” as “a label for 
the quality of interaction characterizing groups or social categories of persons, in a particular society” (p. 
243). Cultures, suggest Brown and Levinson, can be ranked relative to their emphasis on status 
differentiation. In relatively egalitarian cultures, status differentiation is relatively low and so the weight 
of power that actors can exercise in public without redress is limited. In more hierarchical cultures, where 
statuses are more clearly defined, attending to the face of persons lower on the social scale is relatively 
less obligatory. The cultural ethos of Wong Laoshi’s classroom tends to be relatively egalitarian in terms 
of who can speak and when. As the next extract shows, matters of face are addressed at all levels, with the 
result that children are even invited to offer meta-commentary on pedagogical procedures. Thus, on one 
level, at least, Wong Laoshi’s class does not so much “bring them into the culture” of the Chinese 
classroom (in the fashion of Mrs. Yang) but provide a transactional space that allows children to “take up, 
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resist, transform and reconstruct the social practices afforded them in and through the events of everyday 
life” (Gee & Green, 1998, p. 48). 
After several minutes, the drill changes from converting Chinese to English to converting English 
to Chinese: 
75a T Now I’m going to go... 
75b now I’m going to say in English you’re going to tell me 
75c in Chinese. 
76 Elsie No I’m not. 
77 T Is that harder? 
78 Elsie Yes 
79 T Is it? 
80 Yi Ling Chinese is easier 
81 T You think Chinese is easier? 
82 Right. Ok. Elsie. Wu yue {May} 
83 No, I’m sorry. May [laughing] 
84 Elsie Wu yue {May} 
85 OK, Xiao Li. June [14 second pause] 
86 Xiao Li [inaudible response] 
87 T Liu yue {sixth month} ok? 
88 Xiao Li [inaudible] 
89 Cong yingwen dao zhongwen bijiao kunnan {it’s a little 
harder to go from Chinese to English} 
When Wong Laoshi presents the activity [Line 75a], Elsie promptly rejects the plan [Line 76] (I 
assume a cognitive, not social or psychological explanation for children having more difficulty translating 
from English to Chinese than they do the other way around). In Taiwan, Elsie’s status would hardly allow 
her to dispute appropriate pedagogy and so Elsie’s bald-on-record (Brown & Levinson 1990, p. 67) 
opposition would have been a serious offense. But, rather than meet the challenge head on and so demand 
some form of redress (as Mrs. Yang would undoubtedly have done), Wong Laoshi acknowledges that 
resistance was rational, and even provides Elsie with a plausible explanation for it, i.e., that it might be 
harder to go from English to Chinese, a rationale to which Elsie readily assents [Line 77]. Line 79 is 
delivered as an open question, and Yi Ling, a fluent Chinese speaker who has been placed in this class 
only because of her age, takes it up, providing an alternative view. Wong Laoshi repeats Y i Ling’s 
opposing answer, again as question, leaving open the plausibility of both opinions [Line 81]. “Right” 
[Line 82] should not be taken as an evaluative comment on Yi Ling’s response. Instead, it signals that the 
inquiry has ended and it is time to move on to the language lesson. A Chinese critique of this move would 
probably fault Wong Laoshi for not only failing to provide an answer with respect to which child was 
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correct but for allowing the situation to occur in the first place; it is the teacher, not the student, who is 
the expert on learning. 
As in the previous example, this communication-focused line of questioning is conducted in 
English, not Chinese. Elsie’s challenge and her teacher’s response to it assumes a level of social equality 
that would not likely be found in Taiwan. In a Chinese classrooms “emphasis is on maintaining a 
hierarchical but harmonious relation between teacher and student. Students are expected to respect and 
not to challenge their teachers” (Hu, 2002, p. 98). At first, Wong Laoshi even seems to take up Elsie’s 
advice [Line 82] but quickly corrects herself and proceeds with the original plan, nominating the 
outspoken student-perhaps pointedly, to answer the very kind question she had objected to. Elsie gets it 
right, though this is hardly a test of knowledge since only moments ago Wong Laoshi had supplied wuyu 
as the correct answer. The teacher next asks Xiao Li to supply the Chinese word for ‘June’ [Line 84]. 
Unlike in the beginning exercise [Lines 1-27], Wong Laoshi now waits patiently for an answer. Although 
Xiao Li’s answer is inaudible (Xiao Li speaks very quietly), Wong Laoshi’s response appears to be an 
indirect rejection. This accounts for her reformulating the question in Line 87. This time, however, she 
takes up Elsie’s advice using the “easier” version to which the answer has already been provided [Line 
85]. 
Elsie was unsuccessful in her bid to alter the teacher’s plans on her own behalf, but her resistance 
did manage to open an inquiry space. Wong Laoshi’s monologic drill included moments of discussion in 
which she considered the activity from the point of view of her students: “Is that harder?” [Line 77]; 
“You think Chinese is easier?” [Line 81] and “it’s a little harder to go from Chinese to English” [Line 87] 
express empathy with Elsie’s refusal. They therefore constitute instances of Louis’ “stopping to find the 
virtues.” It may even have led to an understanding that provided Xiao Li with a better chance for success. 
While it is unclear whether Xiao Li did get the right answer, the feedback of Line 89 suggests 
confirmation, since it reprises the interaction with Elsie as a face-saving rationale for not having got it 
right the first time. As Brown and Levinson note, saving the face of persons lower in status is not 
obligatory in hierarchical cultures, and so Wong Laoshi’s attempt to rescue her student’s face is another 
sign that the class is oriented toward a code of dignity. 
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I should note that Line 89 is delivered in Chinese and so, contrary to my earlier suggestion that 
Chinese tends not to be used for communicative purposes, the utterance does address an actual classroom 
concern. However, it is here somewhat problematic. It could not have been directed toward Xiao Li, or 
even to the class as a whole because, as Wong Laoshi would have been aware, its structural and lexical 
complexity made it incomprehensible to all but Yi Ling. Gumperz (p. 77) notes that code-shifts can select 
certain individuals as recipients of a message. It is possible that Yi Ling (who had maintained that it was 
easier to go from English to Chinese) is the intended to understand this message. It settles the issue the 
that had been left open in Lines 77-81 in a way that does not cause Yi Ling to be proved wrong in front of 
the others. Thus, while Chinese does convey meaning here, its use represents a special circumstance. 
The two exercises that Wong Laoshi has devised, i.e., translating from English to Chinese and 
from Chinese to English, seem symbolic of the flexible identity positions demonstrated by teacher and 
students alike. The lesson continues in this way for some 20 minutes with a similar ratio of English to 
Chinese usage as in the above passages. 
5.6.3 Reading and Writing 
Street (1994) observes that 
the uses and meanings of literacy in different societies are similar to the uses and 
meanings of the concept of person... what it is to be a person, to be moral and to be 
human in specific cultural contexts is frequently signified by the kind of literacy practices 
in which a person is engaged, (p. 141). 
Among Chinese, literacy is responsible for the maintenance of sense of continuous, historical identity. The 
uniqueness of Chinese writing serves as a powerful symbol distinguishing China from other literate 
societies and so can function as a symbol of ethnic solidarity (Pan, 1990). Moreover, characters used in 
today’s Taiwan are, to a great extent, identical to those used by ancestors two thousand years ago. This 
means that the foundational texts of Chinese civilization remain, to a certain extent, intelligible to the 
average person. While Chinese characters were not the first writing system to be used in Taiwan/ 
characters are referred to as guozi “national characters,” thus linking the ability to read and write to 
3 “Sinkang” was a system devised by the Dutch, who occupied Taiwan from the sixteenth to the nineteenth 
century. Sinkang employed the Roman alphabet to represent a language of one of Taiwan’s non-Chinese 
indigenous peoples (Chiung, 2000) 
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national identity. Further still, characters unify, under a single code, numerous and often mutually 
unintelligible spoken languages used in China. Most importantly, as Ho (1994) observes, in China, “the 
written word is sacred and comes to be identified with the truth” (p. 287) and Hsu (1981) reports how, in 
his lifetime, the sacred quality of text rendered discarding paper with characters on it inappropriate 
behavior. 
Notwithstanding the views of Mrs. Tu and Mrs. Mao, who, as noted earlier, downplayed the 
importance of reading and writing, the social standing of literacy in Chinese culture may account for the 
relatively little serious attention the speaking and listening segment of the lesson receives in Wong 
Laoshi’s class. Moreover, as we have seen, parents report systematic efforts to ensure that Chinese is the 
language of communication at home, making redundant focus on listening and speaking in school. 
Following the oral drill, Wong Laoshi passes out sheets of paper marked off into squares. This 
copy-paper is of the kind that children use in Taiwan use. Writing from top to bottom and properly sizing 
characters to entirely fill the boxes on the page is a traditional school literacy practice. 
Speaking Chinese, Wong Laoshi asks children to write their names at the top of the page. She 
then begins the dictation of a poem the children have been studying. The children have their handouts 
the poem open in front of them and so can copy, if they wish. 
125 T xianzai, mingzi xie hao le mei you (Now...did you write your 
names?} 
126 Wo nian, hao, ni xie {I’ll read, ok, and you write} 
127a I’m just going to read this 
127b and you know pretty much of it 
129 “xiaohe...” {“Little river...”} [reading] 
[Pause as children write] 
130a If you don’t know the character 
130b write zhuyinfuhao 
131 Sound it out! Sound it out! [to a child having difficulty] 
132 Elsie Are you mad at me? 
133 T Oh, no, no, no 
134 I don’t get mad at you 
135 I was just making you frightened a couple of times 
136 Elsie Oh, no, no, no 
137: T but try to remember, ok? [laughing] 
138: Elsie No, no. OK 
139 T “Xiao he...” {“Little river...”} 
140 Yi Ling Wait! Do you just write? 
141 T Yes, everything I say, you just write. 
142 Xiao Li [recognizing a girl who has raised her hand] 
143 Xiao Li Up and down? 
144 T Yes, up and down. 
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145 Yes, right, ok, that’s good. 
146 “Xiao he...” {little river} 
147 Ok. I’m going to read two times, ok? 
148 Louise [inaudible] 
149a T If you can, you can. 
149b If you don’t, it’s ok. 
150c As long as you know the character 
[45-second silence as children write] 
151 Elsie What is the tone, urn, for “he?” {river} 
152a T If you don’t know, look at here 
152b “He, he, he, he, he”. 
152c Di er sheng. OK, yi, er, san, one, two, three, si {four} .it’s right there 
{“river, river, river, river, river second tone. OK, one, two, 
three... four} 
When Wong Laoshi encourages a child to “sound it out” [Line 131] she refers back to the 
previous order to write in zhuyinfuhao [130b], Zhuyinfuhao fills a lexical gap that in English might 
loosely be called “spelling.” Because it represents linguistic borrowing from Chinese into the English 
t 
variety of this speech community, Zhuyinfuhao is, arguably, not a full- fledged instance of code switching 
(Romaine, 1989, p. 137). A syllable-based system that children in Taiwan learn before they begin to study 
characters, zhuyinfuhao allows children to “sound out” words. Soon, however, characters begin to 
accompany zhuyinfuhao and children are encouraged to become less dependent on the system. Eventually 
they disappear from basal readers used in Taiwan but remain through all twelve volumes of HuaYu. In 
Taiwan, zhuyinfuhao continues service as a pronunciation key in adult dictionaries as well as other 
occasional print venues where adults may encounter unfamiliar characters. Zhuyinfuhao also has a 
political dimension. Because of this system, children are able to remember the sounds of words without 
having to resort to what Mrs. Yang calls “’Merican.” As a native Chinese invention based upon phonetic 
elements of Chinese characters, it is distinguished from Romanized pinyin, preferred on the Mainland 
(some early Revolutionary language planners hoped pinyin might someday erase unwieldy characters, 
along with other vestiges of China’s Confucian past). Pinyin is thus associated with Taiwan’s arch 
political adversary. 
Elsie [Line 132] helps transform her teacher’s exhortations to sound out words in zhuyinfuhao 
into a moment of engagement and dialogue. Wong Laoshi deals with the unplanned problem of hurt 
feelings by explaining her pedagogical decisions in terms Elsie will understand. She explains her apparent 
anger as a pedagogical strategy, not real feelings. While in Taiwan a show of anger is expected from 
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caring teachers, this must be reconceptualized here as being based on shared wants and needs. Positive 
politeness, whose principle Brown and Levinson articulate as “I want what you want” (p. 101) (even if it 
doesn’t always look that way), is expressed within a cultural ethos that values informality and social 
equality, while honor linked cultures tend to have a negative politeness orientation. In providing an 
alternative situated meaning for anger, Wong Laoshi has helped change resistance to cooperation. In Line 
136 and again in Line 138, Elsie mocks her teacher for choosing to frighten her. Mercer (1995) cites 
Jayalakshmi’s research in an Indian secondary school, in which altered classroom participation patterns 
similarly created a local ethos in which children were allowed to “feel more confident in their own 
answers and abilities and so children can challenge the teacher as well as tease him” (p. 56). Mrs. Yang 
would certainly not have tolerated this sort of classroom interaction, nor would she have seen fit to turn a 
moment of cultural misunderstanding and into an occasion of cultural rapprochement. 
Although zhuyinfuhao is a native and so preferred means of transcribing the sounds of 
characters, Wong Laoshi does not insist upon its use. Below, she suggests no fewer than three times that if 
a child can write neither characters nor zhuyinfuhao, pinyin (the method that Mrs. Yang had disparaged as 
“’Merican”) is an acceptable third choice. I should note that when Wong Laoshi asks the child to write 
pinyin she does not necessarily mean the formal system of Romanization used on the Mainland and in this 
dissertation, but simply an approximation using the Roman alphabet. Until very recently (and after I 
stopped collecting data for this dissertation), pinyin was not taught at the Chinese school and is currently 
used only with children adopted from China. 
While the overall structure of the lesson is teacher-centered, Wong Laoshi encourages flexibility 
with respect to what counts as Chinese, encouraging diverse possibilities of participating in the 
community: 
157 T [Laughs] Tai nan le, shi bu shi? {Too hard, isn’t it?} 
158 “Xiao he, xiao he” {“Little river, Little river”} 
158 Comma. 
159 Elsie Wo wangji {I forgot} 
160 Yi Ling Luanqibazao {This is so messed up!} 
161 T Xie bu chu lai ma? {Can’t you write it?} 
162 Yong zhuyininfuhao, {Use zhuyinfuhao} 
163 Child (?) Comma? 
164 T Comma, right. Ok, next. “Ni yao chu nali?” {“Where are 
you going?”} 
166 Question mark. Tai nan le? {Is this too hard?} 
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167 Zhuyinfuhao, dou keyi xie neige me, {Zhuyinfuhao you can write that 
too, you know} [directed toward a child who seems lost] 
168 Keyi xie .Hui bu hui pinyin? {you can write...can you Romanize?} 
169 Hui bu hui? {can you?} 
170 Zhuyinfuhao or the other are both ok here to write that. 
Wong Laoshi uses Chinese communicatively as she repeatedly inquires whether the task is difficult, 
procedural advice is delivered in English [Line 170]. Elsie declines the easy way out, however. Instead, of 
using pinyin or juyinfuhao she chooses to tell what she does know: 
171 Elsie I know what... I know what... 
172 well, I kinda remember the first part 
173 but I don’t know the rest of it. 
174 T This? Do you remember this one? [writing on board] 
[brief pause] 
175 And then there’s a [writing the rest of the character on the board] 
Owing to the nature of written Chinese, it is possible to discuss words and parts of words in 
English in a way that would not be possible if this were a discussion in Chinese about English words. This 
may help account, at least in part, for the extensive use of English in many classes at the Chinese school. 
Wong Laoshi writes the first part of the character on the board, asks the child whether this is what she 
knows, and then completes the character. There are two points to be made here. The first concerns Wong 
Laoshi’s loose interpretation of what counts as “knowing” a character. To “know” a Chinese character is 
not the zero-sum game in Wong Laoshi’s class that it would be in a class in China or Taiwan. Thus, the 
implicit rule to “Avoid making mistakes and thereby being ridiculed...the safest strategy is to keep silent” 
(Ho, 1994, p. 298) is not in force in this classroom. 
The ability to recognize and reproduce characters is, like other kinds of visual recall, two 
different processes. Thus, it is possible to “know” a character but not be able to demonstrate this 
knowledge. While there is no way of being certain how closely Elsie’s memory matched what Wong 
Laoshi wrote on the board, the structure of the intervention itself validates the sort of knowledge Elsie 
lays claim to. This “kinda” knowledge claimed by the child is validated as Wong Laoshi provides a visual 
check on the part of the character that Elsie claims to have partially remembered. My data do not record if 
Elsie affirmed whether the character on the board coincided with the part of the character she had kind of 
remembered but the point isn’t that this was a well-coordinated exchange to scaffold the child’s 
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knowledge of characters. Rather, the gesture itself was one of accommodation since it allowed Elsie to 
participate in the lesson. 
The second point concerns the premise of this classroom that children can be holders of 
significant knowledge, and so not, as in traditional Chinese classrooms, empty vessels to be filled by the 
teacher (Hu, 2002; Ho, 1994). In the next segment, Wong Laoshi inquires about the English word for 
‘semicolon’. Here, Wong Laoshi positions the children as experts of English. 
210 T Er, yi, er, san, si, wu, er .di er ke deyi ke, \ 
textbook] 
ok? {two, one, two, three, four, five, two, 
211 And then after the er, 
212 What do you call this thing in English? 
213 It’s not a comma, it’s not a period, this is a 
[writing on the board] 
214 What is that called? 
215 You have that in English? 
216 No? 
217a OK, now if you have in English like, uh 
217b and here’s something here... 
218 What do you call it? 
219 You call it period too? 
220a Elsie Yeah, we call it a period. 
220b But if it was an abbreviation . 
221a T You call it a period. OK. 
221b But this one a little different than a period. 
222 Louise That’s a comma. 
223 T No, a comma is like this. 
224a I’m not sure how you say that in English 
224b but anyway go like this. 
226 Elsie Can I put it right here? 
227 T Yep, you put it right there. 
228 OK, now keep going. 
Wong Laoshi defers to the children’s (presumed) greater knowledge of the language when she 
requests English word for “semicolon.” The questions “What do you call this thing in English”; “What is 
that called?”; “You have that in English?” are genuine requests for knowledge and part of an extended 
pattern of inquiry, not a check-up on what students should know. Mercier (1995) identifies “role-reversal” 
as a deliberate pedagogical strategy. Behaving as a “non-expert” undermines the teacher’s position as the 
sole authoritative source of knowledge, allowing the ground rules of ordinary conversation to obtain. 
Citing a study of a British classroom, Mercer observes that the strategy may have: 
allowed the children to feel that they were guiding the construction of her [i.e., the 
teacher’s] knowledge. This new questioning strategy...encouraged the children to 
express their knowledge and understanding in such a way that it would be useful to 
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someone else...this kind of opportunity may well have helped the pupil’s understanding 
(p. 57) 
Based on a code of dignity, this departure from established IRF assumes that various forms of knowledge 
are of equal value and that persons who hold such knowledge (Philipsen, 1992, p. 118) are of equal 
standing. Such role reversal, while perhaps unusual in most British and American classrooms, is a radical 
departure from Confucian educational practice. As Hu (2002) observes, “it is difficult for Chinese 
teachers and students to accept any pedagogical practice that tends to put teachers on a par with their 
students and detracts from teacher authority” (p. 99). Ambiguity with respect to ‘knower’ and ‘knowledge 
receiver’ would result not only in a loss of face for the teacher, but also place her students in the 
uncomfortable position of having to “show off’ their knowledge (Jin & Cortazzi, 1998). A Chinese 
observer would find this segment at once culturally inappropriate and irrelevant, since the English word 
for ‘semicolon’ has little to do with understood educational outcomes. Yet Wong Laoshi has seized upon 
it as a moment to validate the children as knowers in their own right. Their ways of talk are accepted as 
legitamate practice in a Chinese classroom. 
Yet, an element of this role reversal may require that children be situated as, in some sense, 
tentatively American. Pronouns, as noted earlier, locate people by indexing them as belonging to certain 
categories of person. Because of the reflexive property of language in general and the indexical properties 
of pronouns in particular, pronouns do not so much symbolize preexisting categories of person as 
instantiate them. The indexical property of terms of address has been widely regarded as a window on the 
means by which groups construct various categories of membership. Brown and Ford (1964) have 
considered the degree of intimacy, including such communal values as kinship, occupation, and 
nationality, while Brown and Gilman (1960) focus on the use of pronouns as an indicator of power and 
solidarity. Carbaugh (1996), too, analyzes terms of address as indexical devices. While the question 
“What do Americans call this?” would have elicited the same information, Wong Laoshi’s pronoun use 
here offers children positions as American and so seemingly different from herself (though she, too, has 
an American passport): 
What do you call this in English? 
You have that in English? 
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What do you call it? 
You call it a period, too? 
However, as the lesson in Hua Yu suggested, being American does not preclude being Chinese. The 
Discourse of Overseas Chinese allows children to comfortably maintain overlapping identity positions 
because it is informed by what Hall and Ames (1995) refer to as a “correlative” mode of thought. 
Correlative thinking, as will be discussed later in this chapter, is indifferent to imperatives of causality and 
so there is no logical necessity for these children to be either American or Chinese or some hyphenated 
compound of these. Jin and Cortazzi (1998), Table 1, also note the Chinese tendency to think analogically 
and in non-binary terms. This would account for Belden’s observation that one of her informants “would 
often switch in conversation from a reference to the kids as Chinese to a reference to them as American. 
Living here and raising children here was not a contradiction to her cultural sensibilities” (p. 140). It 
would also, of course, help us to understand Wong Laoshi’s reference to her students as “Americans.” 
To return to the above segment of classroom interaction, Elsie (uninfluenced of the Confucian 
aversion to showing off knowledge) confidently takes up the identity position offered by their teacher: 
“Yeah, we call it a period” [Line 220]. She interprets the inquiry as an invitation to hold forth on the 
subtleties of this punctuation, but the teacher, uneasy with the reply, and still under the educational 
manager’s obligation to control the accuracy, if not the source, of knowledge in her classroom, cuts Elsie 
off [Line 222]. Wong Laoshi is a scientist and this shows in the way she dismantles Elsie’s explanation. 
The semicolons that appear in the children’s textbook are a feature recently (in historical terms) imported 
into Chinese text and so, along with other sorts of punctuation marks, are a heteroglossic feature in a 
language that otherwise allows relatively few foreign borrowings. The interrogation proceeds to dismantle 
the authority with which the child had only moments ago been credited. “You call it a period. Ok.” [Line 
221]. But if one allows the premise that Americans call this mark a “period,” then what is the name of the 
lower half? A child confidently responds: “That’s a comma” [Line 224]. Wong Laoshi realizes that it is 
futile to pursue the point; correlative thinking notwithstanding, an adult’s logic tells her that an item 
cannot be alternatively known by the name of its separate parts. Wong Laoshi does not supply the children 
with the Chinese term, perhaps because this stretch of the lesson was not focused on Chinese code. 
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Instead, she simply writes the mark on the board: “I m not sure how you say that in English but anyway go 
like this” [Line 226]. 
Elsie proved to be an unreliable cultural informant, but her American aspect was validated as a 
component of the classroom culture. Although this moment of interaction appears to have lacked the 
conscious pedagogical intention of the “non-expert” strategy identified by Mercer, it shows the same 
structural characteristics and instantiates the same values. Rather than being an example of “borderland 
Discourse” (Gee, p. 22), where boundaries shift continually (a metaphor that describes identity as a 
battlefield), it seems more useful to say that, for this group, boundaries were continually harmonized. 
I have so far described only one occasion in which children speak Chinese in Wong Laoshi’s 
class—the controlled translation drill. However, Chinese is spoken in several other, albeit limited, 
contexts as well. In the following extract, Wong Laoshi asks if Xiao Li (who wears thick glasses), can see 
a character written on the board from where she is sitting. 
435 T Xiao Li? Kan de dao ma? {Xiao Li? Can you see?} 
436 Xiao Li Bai yun {white cloud} 
Another instance occurs during a dictation, below. Note that while the child repeats what the teacher has 
said in Chinese, her use of “what,” in English, implies an orientation toward English as the language of 
communication and Chinese as the language of formal exercise. 
437 T bai yun, bai, bai de bai yun bai bai de... {white cloud, white, white 
cloud, white, white...} 
438 Xiao Li Bai, bai de bai, bai de {white, white...white, white}what? 
A rare, spontaneous use of Chinese for communicative purpose between children occurred in a previously 
analyzed passage. In that segment, children were struggling with writing the character for “river,” he: 
159 Elsie Wo wangji {I forgot} 
160 Yi Ling Luanqibazao {This is so messed up!} 
Such interjections are a common feature of code-switching (Gumperz, 1982a). In the following segment, 
the only Chinese [Line 196] is sandwiched between two English translations of a very common term that 
children are likely already familiar with [Lines 195 & 197]. 
188 Yi Ling How many more do we have to do? 
189 T One more. 
190 Ok, now kong yige, kong yihang. {blank box, blank column} 
191 Here you are, you are. 
192 Oh I said that’s ok. 
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193 You’ll probably need another piece of paper then. 
194 I was going to ask you to continue on the same line. 
195 But that’s ok. 
196 Meiyou guanxi. (its ok} 
197 Its ok, its fine. 
199 Just kong, kongyi hang (blank, blank column} starting from here. 
200 Kongyi hang (blank column} starting from there. 
201 Elsie Why? 
202 T So you can continue. 
203 Child (?) You write right here? 
204 T Yes, starting from there. 
Kongyige and kongyi hang, like zhuyinfuhao and piny in, are Chinese lexical items that have made their 
way into the English dialect of this community. Because these terms have no ready English equivalents, 
they are necessary to carry on the business of Chinese literacy. Kongyige and kongyi hang tell the 
student she must skip a box and write her character in the next one or skip an entire column of boxes. 
This literacy practice is a trace of what has for centuries occurred in Chinese classrooms. This 
lesson is immediately recognizable as a Chinese lesson, evoking if not entirely reproducing, to use 
Belden’s distinction, traditional practice. Belden (1997) argues that to separate out elements that are 
“Chinese” from elements that are American is fruitless. Instead, she points to how the Chinese in her study 
maintained practices that could be thought of as “reconceptualizing and reappraising their identity in a 
perspective which we can consider as blurring their boundaries between the past and the present” (p. 90) 
She applies Gadamer’s theory of “fusion of horizons” to 
[PJropose that we approach an interpretation of (Chinese) identity with a forestructure of 
understanding. The “horizon of understanding,” Gadamer wrote, continuously changes 
over the coarse of history; as one encounters new (textual) material, his current horizons 
of understanding extend to a “fusion of horizons” which psychologist Kenneth Gergen 
says does not so much represent an understanding of the text itself as it is “a dialogically 
derived amalgam of text and forestructure, (pp. 90-91) 
What is true of texts is also true of ritual practice, //, in which they are produced. Li need not be 
thought of as highly structured and conventionalized ceremonies. Rather, says Tu, the term “points to a 
concrete way whereby one enters into communion with others” (Neville, p. 92). This parallels Katriel’s 
(1990) definition of ritual as “patterned symbolic action whose function it is to re-affirm the relationship 
of members to a culturally sanctioned sacred object” (p. 100)-the sacred object being, in this case, 
Chinese writing. Katriel further cites Firth, that symbolic actions of this kind are “communicative, but the 
information they convey refers to the control and regularization of a social situation rather than to some 
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descriptive fact (p. 100). Since the performance constitutes what it communicates (consider, as 
Confucius did, music and dance), the activity does not symbolize something different from what it is. 
Because “The Chinese language is the bearer of tradition, and tradition, made available through ritualistic 
evocation, is the primary context of linguistic behavior” (Hall & Ames, p. 229), the writing lesson 
provides a way of acting Chinese through a ritual restructuring the past to meet current horizons of 
understanding. 
In the following extract, it is possible to hear the way in which members enter into 
communication with each other over the sacred object of “literacy” and how cultural tradition works to 
constrain and shape the nature of interaction that occurs. 
400 T You meiyou jiao guo? {Did I teach you this?} 
401 Meiyou jiao guo?{I didn’t?} 
402 OK, yun. {Ok, ‘cloud’} 
403 Wo gaosu ni. {I’ll tell you} 
404 Zheige ze you meiyou kan guo. {Have you seen this character?} 
405 Everybody knows this one; you’ve seen that, right? 
406 Elsie I’ve seen that. 
407 T Without that, yes, its rain, ok? [writes on board] Yu {rain}. 
408 Ok. On the bottom you can add a lot of things and becomes different 
word, ok. 
409 So if you add .remember this wor .remember this character? 
410 you remember...shenma dongxi {what’s this} 
411 you add this thing it becomes...jide bu jide? {do youremember?] 
412 xiaxue {snow}. 
413 Women...women di ji ke jiao de {What lesson did we teach this?} 
414 Di san ke de shihou jiao de {It the third lesson.} 
415 Yi hang, you yi hang {a horizontal line and another horizontal line} 
416 Yi pie you yi hang {A slanted-left line and another horizontal line} 
417 Ranhou ni ruguo jia zheige ne, {After that if you add this}... 
418 Jia jeige ze de hua {if you add this} 
419 Zheige shi shenma?{What word is this} 
420 Do you remember (?) rain...we...what lesson was that? 
421 Yi Ling I don’t know 
423 Elsie Fish! 
424 T Oooh, fish is not like that. 
425 Zheige jiu shi wo gang, gang xie de, yun {This is the word we just 
wrote, ‘cloud’} 
426 OK. So “bai, bai de yun”. { “white, white cloud...”} 
427 Xiao Li Like that? [Child points to word she has written on her paper] 
428 T Yes [pause] bai, bai de yun, cloud ok?[Children copy in their books] 
429 OK, next line. It’s a [?] routine now. 
430 If you know...if you already say “bai, bai de yun”... 
431 I you already know how to write it...next line. 
432 Louise Next line? 
433 T Yes, next line and then after that going down continue. 
434 “Bai yun,” comma...see, you already write that...’’bai, bai de yun.” 
435 [several children] Stop! 
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Walter Ong (1982) argues that writing and reading separate people in space and time, connecting 
them only by marks on a page, making them “solitary activities that throw the psyche back on itself’ (p. 
69). These marks constitute the reified word-as-a-thing,” whose rules of interaction are entirely different 
from oral communication. The spoken word,” however “proceeds from the human interior and manifests 
human beings to one another as conscious interiors, as persons, the spoken word forms human beings into 
close knit groups” (p. 74). The spoken word is thus “word-as-event.” In the extract above, the word-as-a- 
thing is the engine for heteroglossic conversational interaction and bodily gestures with respect to the 
length and direction of strokes that make it, at the same time, the word-as-event. Such weaving together of 
act and image at once challenges Ong’s distinction and clarifies the means by which act, word, and image 
are occasionally unified (Digges & Rappaport, 1993, p. 151). 
The ritual gestures that create character strokes have been inscribed over the ages, such that each 
stroke has a name, a direction, and an order. Thus, it is significant that Wong Laoshi recognizes that 
“word” [Line 409] is not a suitable translation for “character,” and so quickly repairs the mistake; the 
strokes that constitute Roman letters do not have names and their order is generally of little consequence. 
While being able to write on the line and creating letters of consistently the same size and shape may be a 
valued extra in American classrooms, it is hardly the essential practice that staying within the boxes is in 
Chinese classrooms. The ordered, ritual nature of producing Chinese characters is part of the sacred 
aspect of text. My general point is that these students and this teacher are engaged in a ritual that has been 
occurring in Chinese classrooms for hundreds of years. Through watching, listening, and copying, 
children in Wong Laoshi’s class connected to ancient cultural traditions at once recognizably Chinese-- 
and this is Belden’s point—but shaped in an American context. The ritual is shot through with Discourses 
that would not be recognizable in Chinese classrooms: a teacher constructs knowledge with her students, a 
child shouts out to the teacher to stop, another child is unembarrassed about not knowing the answer to 
her teacher’s question, still another child is bold enough to ask, unbidden, for clarification of the teacher’s 
comment. However, the entire performance restructures and “evokes,” as Belden argues, a tradition 
connecting Chinese children to their cultural inheritance. 
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The degree to which this mix of languages and Discourses works to connect children to their 
cultural heritage is particularly evident when contrasted with Mrs.Yang’s dysfunctional class. There, 
negotiation was not allowed and Casey’s strategy to be part of the community in her own way was 
dismissed as “’Merican.” Wong Laoshi’s class, in contrast, provides an instance of what I earlier called 
jianshu-the skill (or art) of allowing different things to happen at the same time, so that various agendas 
don’t lead to dispute. Through the ritual action of writing, conflict is harmoniously transformed to 
common purpose. 
In this section, I considered an instance in which Chinese and fenxue (mixed blood) children 
were positioned by their teacher as relatively American, as evidenced by assumed cultural knowledge and 
indexical pronoun use. This is not to suggest that Chinese and “mixed blood” children are always not 
Chinese. As Carbaugh (1999) observes. 
Who am I? Depends partly on...where I am, with whom I am, and what I can ably do 
there, in that scene, with those people, given the (material and symbolic) resources that 
are available to the people there, (p. 24) 
Situated identities were constructed within the context of a ritual instantiating Chineseness. While the 
modes of interaction resembled those of a traditional Chinese classroom in certain respects, in other 
significant ways they did not. Children assumed far more agency than they would have been allowed in a 
traditional Chinese classroom, so that this classroom became one in which, to repeat Kramsch’s (1994) 
characterization of the foreign language classroom 
The dominance of any established 'culture' is alternately adopted and contested, adapted 
and ironicized by the emergence of new meanings. In the creation of spoken and written 
texts, individuals manipulate and shape imposed contexts to fit their own individual needs 
and bring to the fore their own meanings, (p. 67) 
However, rather than allow the “clash of cultures,” in Louis’ (1932) terms, to bring about the sort of 
outcome that Casey experienced in Mrs. Yang’s class, Wong Laoshi’s pursued the “process of 
accommodation.” By “stopping to find the virtues” in these children’s cultural ways, Wong Laoshi allows 
children to participate in Chinese cultural practice. Jin and Cortazzi (1998) observe that among Chinese, 
“the chief aim of communication is to bring harmonious relationships rather than mainly to share 
information functionally.” By creating participation structures that validated the children’s “American” 
cultures, the classroom encouraged “reconceptualizing and reappraising [Chinese] identity in a 
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perspective which we can consider as blurring their boundaries between the past and the present” (Belden, 
1997, p. 90). Thus, 
identity among the Chinese immigrants...those who maintain an active participation in 
traditional cultural standards and revisionist thinking concerning their national and 
political boundaries... is not the subject of a mirror but is rather a restructuring of 
connectedness to their cultural inheritance, (p. 85) 
Ethnicity, it must be remembered, is a subjective phenomenon and the symbols and traditions that 
communicate it are open to change and negotiation. Confucianism itself encourages such revisionist 
thinking. Although it regards tradition as a repository of essential truths, these are aspects of the non- 
cosmogenic cosmos, and so in an eternal state of dynamic flux. This structure of mind yields a “Confiician 
model of self [which] is aesthetic, free of any definite and specified goals,” a condition which “...gives it 
its flexibility and creative range” (Ames, 1994, p. 201). 
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5.7 Two Festivals 
“Communication rituals,” says Carbaugh (1986) align participants’ performances to accomplish 
moments of shared identity around a “sacred object” (p. 94). Rituals are direct enactments of nature, such 
that their performance constitutes their meaning. In the section above, I argued that rituals performed 
around the sacred object of literacy constituted a moment of shared identity that “meant” being Chinese 
because it enacted being Chinese. In the following sections, 1 describe two scenes of public action having 
to do with ethnic process and performance, also over sacred objects. The first occurs in narrative and is 
seen through the eyes of Mrs. Huang, a parent at the Chinese school. The second is viewed through my 
participant observer’s eyes. I analyze each of these scenes according to Gee’s framework for interpreting 
discourse: the “material aspect” (i.e., Hymes’ “setting”), which consists of “place, time, bodies and 
objects present during interaction”; “sociocultural aspect,” including “personal, social, and cultural 
knowledge, feelings, values, identities and relationships relevant in the interaction”; and “genre,” in this 
case, a narrative tale. I also refer to Hymes’ framework for interpreting social interaction, including 
participants, events, setting, purpose and key. Although in an American context, the Chinese New Year 
Festival also transforms into a celebration of ethnic identity, this festival is layered with other meanings 
affirming Confucian values. In the description of the Chinese New Year festival, I also consider Hymes’ 
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“act-sequence” to describe the phases according to which the celebration unfolds. A somewhat parallel 
unfolding occurs in Mrs. Huang’s description of the multicultural festival, but here, the scenes shift 
according to the attention the speaker gives to them, rather than phases of the celebration itself. 
5.7.1 “Not Like Us”: A Multicultural Festival 
The multicultural festival is an annual event at the school attended by Ong Laoshi’s children. 
Similar events are repeated in other schools in the district and, it seems fair to suppose, schools across the 
country. The multicultural festival enacts liberal Discourses of American personhood and, for many 
residents of this community, uncontroversially affirms the sacred notion of “cultural diversity.” The 
culture tables Ong Laoshi will describe might be thought of as an iteration of the portraits and flags on the 
cafeteria wall celebrating the American mosaic. While it may seem counterintuitive that Americans should 
choose “diversity” as a theme around which to enact shared identity, Varenne (1998) points out that 
diversity constitutes a cultural category helping Americans construe a coherent national identity. It is a 
sentiment that responds to the individualist sympathy for “displacement over belonging” and so allows 
communion and sociality over symbols of separateness. 
Polanyi (1985) points out that stories are about “deviations from expected norms, although they 
also function to confirm the correctness of preconceived ideas about the way the world is” (p. 77). As a 
practical observer of the American scene, Ong Laoshi reflects on her own expectations about the world 
and how people ought to dwell in it and how the behavior of Americans interrupts these expectations. This 
provides a window on both American and Chinese cultural norms. In the following segment (Table 8), 
Ong Laoshi tells of her astonishment at seeing an American woman represent Indian culture at the 
multicultural fair held at her son’s school. For many Americans listening from the code of dignity, this 
would be an ordinary school event. For Ong Laoshi, however, it was a strange occurrence requiring 
cultural interpretation. Why did this event leave such a lasting impression on Ong Laoshi? What does this 
say about the way people are and how they are different from on another? Also present was Guo Laoshi, 
who contributes to the conversation. 
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Table 8 
Conversation between Ong Laoshi and Guo Laoshi segment 
I 
la 0 I was very touched. 
lb Green Hill Farm School. 
2 That was March 10 today 17, right? 
3 Last Wednesday I come home early. 
4a Tamen you yige multicultural activities, 
4b wo erzi de xuexiao. (?) 
5 You yi zhang zhuozi. 
6 Zhongguo de dungxi bai zai nabien. 
7 Ranhou, parents, kids lai le, 
8 jiang gei tamen ting... 
II 
9 Na wo hen gandung, 
10 I was so touched by the next booth. 
•11 Neige shi Meiguo ren, hunh, 
12 Ta bai Indu ren de tan wei 
13 G (?) 
14 0 Bu shi, ta meiguo ren, bushi Yindu ren. 
15 Yinwei ta keneng you shang guo 
16 Indu ke haishi zenmayang. 
17 Na dui Indu de zheige wenhua hen yangmu, 
18 Feichang de jinpei. 
19 Suoyi ta just set up the table, 
20a Ba ta du guo de shu, huabao, 
20b shenma dou zai nabien 
21 Ta ziji toushang bian yige hei, hei de 
22 G (laughs) 
III 
23 0 Erque geng hao you ge Indu ren de jiazhang 
lai canguang 
24 yinwei tamen haizi... 
25 Ranhou tamen you sign up chu biaoyan 
26 Jishizai.. .jishizai biaoyan de shihou 
27 you wu dao ne 
28 Parents, they only were parents (?) 
29 Participants, did not sign up for the display 
They had a multicultural activities 
my son’s school. (?) 
There was a table 
Chinese stuff was set up on it. 
Then, parents, and kids came 
and they told them about it. 
I was really touched, 
There was an American, right 
and she had set up an Indian display. 
W: (?) 
H: No, she was an American, not Indian. 
Maybe because she had been to an Indian 
class or something like that. 
Anyway, she was really interested in Indian 
culture, respected it greatly. 
So she just set up the table 
put books she studied, newspapers, 
magazines, all kinds of stuff there 
Even the top of her head changed black. 
H: Moreover, just then an Indian family came 
to look around 
because their kids went to school. 
Anyway, they had to sign up for presentations 
During the...during the presentations 
there was dancing 
Continued, next page 
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Table 8, continued 
IV 
30 But American (laughter)... 
31 Wo hen gandung 
32 Meiguo ren xue Indu wenhua . 
33 Wo hen gandung, ne 
34 Shi bu shi? 
35a G Waiguo ren tamen jiu bijiao neige, 
35b bu xiang women 
36 O Haixiu 
37a G Dui, dui, dui. 
37b Tamen bij iao kaihua, 
37c kaifang yidian. 
38 O Dui ah, wo hao gandung ah. 
41 Na yi tian, jiu Puerto Rico de la. 
42 Oh, hai you neiga Sweden. Swedish. 
I was really moved 
Americans learning about Indian culture. 
I was just so moved, you know. 
Right? 
W: Foreigners are kind of that way, 
not like us. 
H: Shy 
W: Right, right, right. 
They are relatively developed 
a little more open. 
H: Right, I was just so moved. 
That day there was Puerto Rico 
and also Swede. Swedish 
The “place of the interaction” was the school attended by Ong Laoshi’s children and the “event,” of 
course, is the multicultural festival. The key “activity” at the event, from the reporter’s perspective, was 
conducting the cultural display. The “bodies present” in the storyworld belonged to Chinese, who 
presided over the Chinese culture table and parents who came to see it [Lines 6-9], Another body was that 
of an American woman hosting the Indian culture table [Lines 11-22]. The was focal event of the 
narrative. A “real” Indian family also makes an appearance in the storyworld [Line 23-24]. As participant- 
observer, Ong Laoshi does not appear in the story but, like most ethnographers, provides her commentary 
from outside the field. Actors in her tale are given voice, if not by their words, by the actions and the 
“props” Ong Laoshi provides for them. These actions and props constitute “cues and clues” (Gee, 1999) 
revealing values, identities, and cultural knowledge of both the actors and, indirectly, their interpreter. 
Present during my interview with Ong Laoshi was Guo Laoshi, who was also an interlocutor and whose 
comments are included in this analysis. 
From her present time location, Ong Laoshi is able to look back upon her feelings in the past. 
Comments on those feelings are heard not simply as the temporary feelings of an actor on the scene at the 
time but as general truths about the kind of world we live in and the people we share it with. These 
comments are not neutral in intent but offer proposals for how people are and how people ought to be. 
While Ong Laoshi does not describe how she knew the woman at the Indian culture table was 
American, the listener can infer that the color of her hair revealed her nationality. In the same way that 
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Chinese and American are mutually exclusive categories, so persons who belong to one membership set 
cannot belong to the other. The American woman’s depth of knowledge about Indian culture, the listener 
may infer, is not particularly deep: “maybe she had been to an Indian class or something.” Yet, shallow 
understanding did not dim the American woman’s enthusiasm, as she was “really interested” and “greatly 
respected” Indian culture. Indeed, such was her respect that even the woman’s hair had become black. The 
remark is intended as humor, of course, and Guo Laoshi’s response (a laugh) shows that it was received 
this way. But the joke trades on the indivisibility of culture and race. The implication is that the woman is 
no more capable of representing Indian culture than she is of changing her biology. The humor here may 
also pertain to a feature that Ong Laoshi has noticed about Americans, their readiness to remake 
themselves as something else. 
Ong Laoshi’s surprise at the American woman’s breach of expected roles arises from her own 
honor-bound societal code, wherein “a good society is one in which each person knows and enacts their 
assigned role” (Philipsen, 1992, p. 58). In many American settings, however, personal identity trumps 
group identity (Scollon & Scollon, 1996, p. 134). Thus, the American woman will not be seen by all 
members of the school community in the way that Ong Laoshi sees her, i.e., as a member of their people 
representing the member of another people. To these other Americans, her actions will appear entirely 
normal and uncontroversial. Guided by a code of dignity, Americans are urged to “continually... search 
for and continually to reconstitute...identity, continually making and remaking one’s person” (Philipsen, 
1992, p. 118). American selves are experienced as asocial, independent, and uninfluenced by 
environment, context or social situation (Carbaugh, 1989, p. 71). Under such conditions, standing in for 
Indians will appear natural and innocent. In the code of honor, on the other hand, a good society “is one in 
which each person knows and enacts their assigned role.” This further presupposes that “...the society has 
a metaphysical and moral priority over the individual. Ideal persons in such a world discover their proper 
place, locate their persona within it, and act so as to reinforce this scheme, materially and ceremonially” 
(Philipsen, 1992, p. 58). The Indian family shows up in the story as a foil for the American woman’s 
appropriation of Indian identity. Although the Indians are at once more obliged and in a better position to 
represent Indian culture than the American woman, they had not “signed up” for a culture table but have 
merely come to the festival to “look around.” The Indian family’s relative passivity toward the goings-on 
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at the festival underscores the boldness of the American woman’s boundary crossing, since it is natural for 
a person to behave in a way that others of her group behave. 
I interpret Ong Laoshi’s orientation toward the events at the festival as amused and patronizing. 
She may be touched and “moved, but her remarks do not express admiration. The American woman’s 
violation was a well-intentioned gesture of cross-cultural understanding and so touching, despite betraying 
a fundamentally flawed understanding of what the world is really like. Ong Laoshi’s interlocutor, Guo 
Laoshi, appreciates that this is a cultural tale and so for her comments to be relevant they must address the 
way the world is and the way it ought be. To the extent that “like us” [Line 37] is the natural way to be, 
Guo Laoshi affirms Ong Laoshi’s contention that the American woman’s behavior was unnatural: 
“Foreigners are kind of that way.” “Foreigners,” as noted previously, is an everyday term referring to 
white Americans and indexing the central premise of Overseas Chinese Discourse that China is co¬ 
present with all locations where there are Chinese people. 
Ong Laoshi takes “not like us” as a conversational opening. She accepts Guo Laoshi’s premise 
that foreigners are “not like us” and proposes “shy” [Line 38] as a situated meaning to contrast with the 
foreigner’s way of dwelling in the world. It is difficult to account for shyness as a cultural trait of the 
Chinese people. However, “shyness” covers a somewhat wider lexical field than its English equivalent 
and, as any student of Chinese soon learns, Chinese terms are more evocative than definitive. Dictionaries 
contain a complicated and often-contradictory array definitions. Through chains of association, they tend 
to multiply, rather than circumscribe, lexical possibilities. As Hall and Ames (1995) state with respect to 
translating classical texts: “Our interpretation of Chinese language and culture as ‘productively vague’ 
forces us to stress that the appearance of any given term in a text introduces... a vast, seamless range of 
meanings” (p. 226). With spoken language, where interlocutors have to negotiate meanings ad hoc, this is 
likely even more the case. 
This associative mode of thought is also evident in the way Guo Laoshi builds on Ong Laoshi’s 
adjective “shy” to develop further possibilities. Guo Laoshi agrees that Chinese are shy [Line 39] but 
contrasts this quality with the American traits of kaihua and kaifang, which mean, respectively, “open to 
new cultures” (or, alternatively, “civilized”) and “open to development” During a member check some 
tome later, Guo Laoshi confirmed that,while China has an older and superior culture, America’s catholic 
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sentiments encouraged innovations that China, still tied to its past, could not absorb. Given Ong Laoshi’s 
patronizing assessment of the American woman’s efforts, Guo Laoshi’s comment might be construed as 
an indirect critique of her conversation partner’s insularity. Yet the general “goal” of the interaction was 
to cooperatively achieve a situated meaning of what people are like. While it is possible to hear Guo 
Laoshi’s critique as hybridized, Diasporic Discourse, it is also “reasonable,” “from the point of view of 
the Discourse in which these words were uttered” (Gee, 1999, p. 53), to attributed it to Confucianism’s 
universalist motif. This strand of Confucian thought presents the exemplary person (junzi) as one who 
rejects “parochialism, ethnocentrism, and chauvinistic nationalism...all varying degrees of human 
insensitivity” in favor of an inclusive humanity (Tu, 1994, p.181). 
The above scene suggests the way talk organizes itself through transaction, i.e., it is “locally 
produced, in situ, in and on the occasions in which they [speakers] interact” (Psathas, 1995, p. 38) yet is 
regulated by Discourses helping interlocutors arrive at tentative understandings of what people are like 
and how they ought to be. 
5.7.2 Chinese New Year Celebration 
The Chinese New Year Celebration is, in its own way, something of a multicultural event, and 
one that expresses what it means to be what Guo Laoshi, above, called “like us.” It thus represents a 
contrast to the Discourses of diversity celebrated at the multicultural festival. Unlike the celebration at the 
public school, which arrays its activities around the sacred symbol of “diversity,” the Chinese School 
allows different kinds of people to participate symbolically in the sacred symbol of Chineseness. The 
distinction between the two celebrations points to an important difference in conceptions of Chinese and 
American notions of community. Ames (1997) notes that the Western liberal commitment to multivocal 
communities provides for all members the “right to think.” The Chinese commitment, on the other hand, is 
to “right thinking” as this promotes the “communitarian consensus for the social good” (p. 151). 
The following analysis employs Hymes’ SPEAKING formulation but considers, in addition, act- 
sequence, which, as Philipsen (1992) explains, places “constraints on the way the episodic sequence 
labeled the communication ritual can precede” (p. 78). As in all formal rituals, the sequence occurs in 
several explicit phases. 
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The principal and other school administrators arrive early to unfold the long tables and push 
them to one side of the cafeteria. This will serve as the pot-luck table. Various symbols make this event 
recognizable as a Chinese New Year celebration. Calligraphic New Year’s greetings, provided by OCAC 
are hung up around the room. Always, the character of “spring” is hung upside-down as a pun on the word 
“daomeaning at once “upside-down” and “arrive,” thus symbolizing hope for the early arrival of spring. 
Chinese New Year music plays from a boom box in the comer. Later, there will be the traditional lion 
dance, feasting and “red envelopes.” Yet other elements are adaptations to American circumstances. Like 
Thanksgiving in America, New Year in Taiwan is a family event, though unlike Thanksgiving “the real 
significance is the reunion, not only among living members of the family, but also between the living and 
the dead” (Stafford, 1995, p. 251). At the Chinese School, the dead get short-changed, for while families 
in Taiwan offer food and incense to their ancestors, multi-family events discourage participation of spirits. 
As decorations are hung on the walls, people start to arrive. In addition to present school 
members, former students arrive with their families. Grandparents and spouses, who rarely come to 
Chinese school at other times, show up for New Year. In addition, there are honored guests: children’s 
American school teachers, friends, former principals, neighbors, and good acquaintances. 
As guests familiar with Chinese School traditions arrive, they place their contributions of food on 
the row of tables. Chan (1990/1991) quotes Chinese scholar, Lin Yutang, that “if there is anything that the 
Chinese are serious about, it is neither religion or learning but food” (p. 115). As a form of sharing among 
non-kin members of the community, pot-luck seems antithetical to Chinese notions of occasion. Potluck 
symbolizes individuals coming together to create community, with each person providing an equal token 
of food to symbolize agreement to the social contract. In contrast, the Chinese sense of occasion helps to 
reaffirm the importance of the family and the place of individuals within its hierarchy. 
The presence of all these people, some of whom, at least, are relative strangers, contributes to the 
renao, literally the “hot and noisy,” boisterous ambiance valued on big occasions. As Chan describes this 
ambiance: “For the hosts, there is nothing more satisfying than seeing the guests continuously eating, 
drinking, talking, laughing, enjoying, and praising the food” (p. 121). It is difficult for the “host” of a 
potluck, who had no say in the venue and little say in the selection of food, to take similar personal 
satisfaction in the establishment of a successful ambiance. Nevertheless, the community’s collective 
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face is still at stake and so, to make sure that there is enough food, the principal orders additional dishes 
from local restaurants. Non-Chinese members of the community may bring lasagna, potato kugel, salad, 
bread, or apple pie, and nearly every year someone expresses the view that the foreigners do not bring as 
much or as high a quality of food as the Chinese, whose standards are, indeed, hard to match. Yet the 
presence of these foods, especially as they appear in the symbolic space of the potluck, establishes a scene 
of diversity-in-action in many ways more striking than the self-conscious display at the multicultural 
festival. 
When it appears that enough people have arrived, the principal takes up a microphone at the 
front of the room to give a short speech, thanking everyone for coming and furnishing an agenda for the 
proceedings. This constitutes the first formal phase of the celebration. The Principal also recognizes 
honored guests. At last, the principal announces it is time to eat. People make their ways to the table 
slowly, lest they appear greedy. The long, patient queue slowly assembling behind diners picking and 
choosing from among the offerings on the table is in great contrast to Taiwan where the serving of food, 
both at home and when dining out, facilitates interaction between host and guests. At the annual Teacher’s 
Day Banquet (to which OCAC invites teachers from around the state), for example, diners sit around large 
round tables. Instead of food being served on individual plates, guests reach for large platters at the center 
of the table. The same custom is followed in Chinese homes. Chan (1990/1991) observes that differing 
Chinese and American eating customs result in differing patterns of communication at the table. In 
Chinese homes and restaurants “[T]he interaction often focuses on the expectation that everyone has some 
responsibility or obligation (instead of mere choice) to try out different courses of foods on the table” (p. 
115). 
In contrast to what occurs in Taiwan, the potluck queue tends to discourage interaction. A person 
standing in line is able to conveniently address only the back of someone standing directly in front. It is 
likely that this person is a stranger and means of introduction is absent. Because the cook may be standing 
directly behind, a diner must be careful not only about what she has to say about the food but also what 
she chooses not to put on her plate. Further, the perils of piling food onto floppy paper plates requires a 
measure of concentration that discourages social interaction. 
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The next phase of the celebration could be described as the “talent show,” though it is not called 
such at the Chinese School and has no official name. The talent show is signaled by the entry of the lion 
dancers and the beating of gongs. When William Butler Yeats asks “How can we know the dancer from 
the dance?” he expresses the way in which ritual enactments merge the subject and object of a 
performance. The lion costume used at the Chinese school was purchased in Taiwan some years ago, and 
accommodates two or three persons (some lion costumes cover considerably more people). Another 
dancer, carrying a fan and wearing the traditional head-mask of a smiling child, leads the lion from table 
to table, where it stops to bob its head. In Taiwan, the lion would receive a hong bao, an envelope of cash, 
for its efforts but here, the payoff is an opportunity to evoke tradition. The lion dance, which symbolizes 
good luck and prosperity, is an essential fixture at New Year’s in Taiwan and Chinese communities 
around the world. Non-Chinese members of the community are allowed, indeed encouraged, to assume the 
lion costume. The lion is strongly associated with dragon at New Year and larger celebrations will include 
both kinds of dancers. Recalling Tu’s (1997) suggestion that the dragon, as sign of potency and 
transformation, symbolically recognizes the ethnic complexity of the Chinese, it may not be too much of a 
stretch to argue that the lion (who serves double-duty at the Chinese School), may ritually transform 
diverse members of the community into a common identity. Unlike the American woman at the Indian 
culture table, Americans dancing in the lion do not merely represent Chineseness, they assume it. 
Talent shows are not, to my knowledge, part of the New Year ritual in Chinese homes. However, 
it might be argued that performances at the Chinese school reenact the television specials that serve as the 
New Year soundtrack in Taiwanese homes. School performances, like many of the television ones, take 
up self-consciously “Chinese” themes. Old, and so somehow more authentic China is constantly invoked 
in these television New Year specials, though with a sense of irony and humor. Television, movie, and 
recording personalities might, for example, appear in Qing Dynasty outfits to perform music and comedy 
skits suitable for the occasion. Hill (1998) says that such “nostalgia” discourse legitimates practices by 
associating them with various positive qualities of tradition. In much the same way, children and then- 
teachers at the Chinese School perform songs, skits, and plays affirming the authenticity of their practice 
as “Chinese.” 
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Following class performances, individual children and, often, parents showcase their talent. 
These performances do not predictably have explicitly Chinese themes. At one recent performance, a 
former student (whose mother still teaches at the school) danced to hip-hop music with a friend from her 
dance class. Yet, like much else that happens in Chinese society, displays have less to do with 
demonstrating individual ability than with affirming the structure of the entire group. 
The final official phase of the celebration consists of passing out hongbao, small, decorative red 
envelopes of cash that parents and relatives hand to children at New Year. Unlike the items arranged on 
the American woman’s table at the multicultural festival and displayed as museum pieces, the red 
envelopes are potent symbols at the Chinese School New Year celebration. In Taiwan, passing out 
hongbao sometimes takes place formally after dinner. In large families, children line up and the envelopes 
are distributed in order of the children’s age. Children jokingly demand their money through the rhyme 
gongxi facai, hongbao na lai, “Prosperous New Year, now turn over the red envelope.” This little joke 
helps relieve the latent conflict between accepting an envelope and refusing one. As Stafford (1995) 
points out, refusing an envelope would be a sign of respect toward one’s parents, since refusal could be 
interpreted as not wanting to take advantage of parental generosity. On the other hand, it could be seen as 
refusal to accept future obligations that go along with taking the money (p. 84). 
Hongbao are thus associated with the pressure of being part of a web of familial obligations and 
so are “a symbolic manifestation of a very complex and long-term economic relationship which continues 
well beyond the boundaries of childhood” (Stafford 1995, p. 85-86). At the Chinese School, parents are 
asked beforehand to bring hongbao with them. The school also keeps on hand extra red envelopes for 
parents who have forgot theirs and for foreigners unfamiliar with the custom. The principal announces that 
it is time to distribute hongbao and, for the benefit of non-Chinese guests, provides a lesson in how to 
give and receive the envelopes. American families will likely miss the social function of hongbao. Nor do 
they have parallel rituals to affirm the complex system of obligations regulated by the Confucianism in the 
notion of filial piety. Instead, the American ritual of the weekly allowance encourages self-reliance, 
private property, and a sense of personal responsibility toward one’s income (Hsu, 1981, p. 108). 
The hongbao ceremony marks the official end of the celebration, though parents continue to 
socialize and children play supervised games in a comer of the cafeteria. Often these games have a 
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Chinese theme and pedagogical goal, e.g., picking up candy with chopsticks; playing “concentration” with 
Chinese characters. 
It is through such special celebrations as New Year, as well as through the weekly ritual of 
Sunday afternoon classes that people are able to survive as Chinese in American circumstances. The New 
Year festival ceremoniously balances unlike things but revises them as Chinese. Like the construction of 
the “Overseas Chinese” at the end of the Qing Dynasty, the New Year celebration reconfigures what 
counts as Chinese and so allows otherwise American children to celebrate it. While interviews with 
children are not included in my data, my research leads me to concur with Belden that children at 
Williamston Chinese School 
...had no sense of loss of their culture. In fact, they have a deep sense of belonging to 
their culture, and their identity stems from that of belonging. Although the landscape of 
their parents’ and these kids’ earlier lives is different, a chance of maintaining an identity 
through language and through association with other Chinese are imputei to keeping intact 
a sense of themselves as different from non-Chinese in Houston, (p. 91) 
The New Year festival is not the sort of celebration one would find in China or Taiwan but, to the extent 
that it is appropriate to American circumstances, it is meaningfully Chinese. Indeed, as Hall and Ames 
point out, the term ‘y? equally suggests ‘appropriateness’ and ‘meaningfulness’: “This combination of 
meanings underscores the place of correlative modalities of thinking within this tradition by suggesting 
that meaningfulness is the consequence of efficacious dispostioning which juxtaposes things in a mutually 
enhancing and fruitful manner” (p. 226). By “correlative modalities of thinking” Hall and Ames allude to 
a mode of thought 
not based upon natural kinds, part-whole relations, an implicit or explicit theory of types, 
or upon causal implications of anything like the sort one finds in Aristotelian or modem 
Western logics... The relative indifference of correlative thinking to logical analysis 
means that ambiguity, vagueness and incoherence associable with images and metaphors 
are carried over into the more formal elements of thought, (p. 124) 
As will be further discussed in the next section, this mode of thought does not insist that .rituals and 
practices mirror those of China. Rather, it encourages aesthetic evocations that can accommodate children 
who have grown up in American circumstances. It allows non-ironic recitation, of Lesson 1, Book 2 of 
Hua Yu: 
I am Chinese. I am an Overseas Chinese. I love China. I also love the country where I am 
from. We are all Chinese. We are all Overseas Chinese. We all love the country we are 
from. We also all love China. 
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Chinese communication builds knowledge and identities in such a way that “opposites may be part of a 
larger truth, so there is a tendency to think ‘both —and’ rather than ‘either—or’ as in binary thinking” (Jin 
& Cortazzi, 1998). It is, to again cite Belden: 
This sense of belonging to something else while fashioning for themselves here a new life 
is not only non-contradictory for the Chinese Tve studied; rather, it is part of the portrait 
design of these immigrants to remain eclectic in their pursuit of balance and harmony (p. 
152) 
In this section, I considered two festivals, one ‘storied’ and the other an ethnographic 
representation. As a communicative form, ritual at once creates and explains ways of being in the world. 
The ordinariness of a public school multicultural festival was a strange event when seen through the eyes 
of a member of the Chinese school. This revealed cultural information about both the observer and the 
setting she observed. Owing to the participation of both non-Chinese and non-community members, the 
Chinese New Year celebration was also something of a multicultural event. This celebration, however, 
rather than celebrating diversity within the community, tended to ratify tradition through rituals of 
Chineseness, in which the entire community, as well as outsiders, could participate. 
Different as these events and the representations of these events were, they had in common the 
need to construct and to deal with diversity. Whether one ritualizes diversity through forms based on a 
code of dignity or a code of honor, diversity is never, as Varenne (1998) points out, “the simple end 
product of substances living together in some geographical space... Always, human beings converse with 
their neighbors and, soon, produce a historical particularity, a ‘culture’ that frames them both” (p. 28). 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY, FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, AND IMPLICATIONS 
6.1 Summary 
The overarching question I sought to answer in this dissertation was: 
What “good reasons” do some people at the Chinese school give for talking, reading, 
writing, acting, interacting, valuing, believing, and feeling about language practices and 
what is the pattern and structure, or “deep sense” uniting these good reasons? How are 
good reasons and deep sense negotiated to produce and transform cultural identities in 
positive ways? 
Keeping in mind Ebrey’s (1995) suggestion that “[W]hat makes people Chinese is acting 
Chinese” (p. 34), the “deep sense” uniting a number of “good reasons” for attending the Chinese School 
is expressed by the term “our spiritual center.” While not specifically “religious,” our spiritual center 
provides the community with a sense of moral coherence based on Confucian principles. In this 
community, members are able to conduct rituals surrounding the sacred object of Chinese language, 
enacting what it is to be Chinese. The school provides classrooms, books, and ceremonies-the “props,” 
as Gee calls them-that go along with Discourses of Chineseness and, crucially, a social group that 
provides meaning to acting Chinese. Data suggested that lessons tended to be “code” oriented, and so 
were an aspect of traditional Chinese educational practice. This fact may account for the extensive use of 
English in class. Yet English and Chinese served as the languages of identity construction and 
participants negotiated ways of integrating these identities. 
With respect to the second part of the above question, “positive identities” are spoken of as 
being achieved not simply through affirmation of self as a positive ethnic type, but by behavior consistent 
with Confucian view of society. However, as the creation of the subject position huaqiao (i.e., Overseas 
Chinese) suggests, what is meant by acting Chinese is based upon pragmatic assessments of context. 
Speaking English in Chinese class constituted recognition of what was “appropriate” to a situation where 
“Chinese” and “American” identities were co-extensive. I considered an instance in which Chinese and 
fenxue (mixed blood) children were positioned by their teacher as relatively American, both because of 
assumed cultural knowledge and through indexical pronoun use. Yet this positioning occurred within the 
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overall context of studying Chinese. Studying Chinese, I argued, was ritual behavior and the terms of this 
behavior were continually negotiated and revised to accommodate cultural difference. 
Narratives of what it meant to be Chinese insisted upon the importance of Chinese language for 
boundary maintenance. While some communicative forms established Chineseness agonistically (i.e., in 
contrast to Americanness), at other times Americans were invoked as partners in maintaining 
Chineseness. 
6.2 Findings 
In this section, I review my findings concerning the three functions of identity at the Chinese school and 
considered in light of language ideology. 
1. How do members of the Chinese school define identities “Chinese,” “American,” and/or 
Chinese-American”? 
- What Discourses are invoked to explain various characteristics of these identities? 
What “master models” do speakers draw upon to invoke identities at the Chinese school 
and how do these help define Chinese people? 
What sorts of texts, media, experiences, and interactions influence these models? 
- “How are identities signaled by members and/or constructed in the interactions among 
members. (Gee & Green, 1998, p. 141) 
It is appropriate that a school should serve as the site of identity construction for this group. Given the 
powerful associations between Chinese cultural notions of formal education and development of 
personhood, attending “our spiritual center” constitutes a symbolic activity affirming what it means to act 
Chinese. Many of the “props” (Gee, 1999) or symbols (basal readers, supplementary materials, teacher’s 
day banquet, and teacher training sessions) are provided by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, 
which links the Chinese school and its members to a hierarchical chain of obligation as Overseas Chinese. 
This role is reinforced by textbooks encouraging children to see themselves as connected to Taiwan. The 
basal series, Hua Yu, for example, established identity positions for overseas Chinese as occupying a 
space unambiguously attached to China. Children pledge allegiance to Chinese personhood, though there 
is no conflict between Chineseness and loving one’s country of origin. Neither official texts nor spoken 
narratives offered a place for hyphenated identities or hybridized identities. That is, while Chinese 
families were represented as enjoying American pastimes and holidays, they did so in a space eerily 
devoid of cross-cultural contact situations. The membership category “Chinese-American” (e.g., Zhong- 
Mei xiaohai) occurred in no text generated at the Chinese school or used by the Chinese school. However, 
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as noted above, I noticed the way in which a teacher discursively constructed her students as “American” 
and how the children took up this positioning. The membership category “mixed blood” (fenxue) does 
represent a concept in the discourse of the Chinese School. Perhaps because many children are members 
of this category and because many teachers are their parents, it would be contrary to the goal of 
maintaining boundaries between mutually exclusive categories of “Chinese” and “American” to assign 
mixed-blood children to the latter group. 
Chinese were sometimes constructed agonistically with Americans. Contrasting models of 
personhood were implied over the matter of “valuing education. Americans were represented as, among 
other things, individualistic, independent, and self-centered, while Chinese were cooperative and family- 
oriented. Political concerns, as these were active in particular scenes, shaped who is discoursed as insider 
or outsider. I noted how “Americans” were discoursed as insiders at the Chinese school drawing children 
centripetally toward the center, but as outsiders in the public school. In the public school, they were 
agonistically spoken of as outsiders, with characteristics opposite those of Chinese. American 
characteristics aligned with those valued by a code of dignity while Chinese characteristics were part of a 
code of honor. Thus, for example, Americans were spoken of as valuing being “unique” while Chinese 
(along with other Asians) were “cooperative.” 
The dichotomy between “Chinese” and “American” is made problematic by the Chinese school 
being part of American community. Obligations with Taiwan through dependence upon the Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Commission were matched by dependence upon the town of Williamston. Matters with 
respect to who belongs and who does not belong were complex. 
Some of the problems of “own” and “other” were acted out in two cultural festivals, one 
storyworld and one ethnographically “real.” In both, matters of boundary crossing constituted significant 
themes. The storyworld argued that boundary crossing was impossible, albeit in some ways, 
commendable. The Chinese ethnic festival, on the other hand, symbolically encouraged boundary 
crossing among members of the community. I suggested the Multicultural Festival and the Chinese New 
Year Festival operate from different cultural premises with respect to the nature of the personhood. 
Texts also played a role in positioning of selves and others. Textbooks, in particular, were an 
important source of information about identity because they reproduced the category of Overseas Chinese 
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and so the notion that one is fully Chinese, regardless of where one is from. The texts also have a part in 
establishing the qualities of a Chinese person, as will be discussed shortly. 
2. How do these identities, so defined, work to guide various behaviors and actions? 
- What are the terms people use to discuss language and language learning and how does 
this organize particular actions? 
- Whose interests are the cultural models representing? 
- How do group members’ expressed attitudes toward language differ from discursively 
organized language practices (i.e., what is the “gap” between language expressed 
attitudes and behaviors)? 
- “What norms and expectations, roles and relationships, and rights and obligations are 
constructed by, and/or signaled by members relevant members to guide participation 
and activity among participants in the event” (Gee & Green, 1998, p. 140) 
- “How are identities transformed in and through the actions, responses, and collective 
activity in the situation?” (Gee & Green, p. 141). 
- How is talk about who belongs and who does not belong shaped by political concerns? 
Chinese language was described as basic to being Chinese. First, it was described in practical 
terms. Specifically it allowed children to communicate with parents and provided workplace 
opportunities that would otherwise be closed to “Asians.” The membership category “Asians” was 
described as a more or less homogenous group, bound by the common experience of being treated as such 
by “Caucasians.” As noted above, however, this construction served political ends of the speaker and, as I 
argued, is embedded in wider historical and social texts having to do with China’s relation to its 
neighbors. 
Chinese language also served an important boundary maintenance function. That Chinese should 
speak Chinese was a rationale offered alike by Chinese and storyworld Americans. This expectation is 
spoken from a code of honor, wherein groups have assigned positions within the social order. Because 
the Chinese traditional view of the world is part of this code of honor, it also figures into Confucian ideas 
of society as an arrangement of connected “kinds.” I noted that this view was different from both 
“mosaic” and “melting pot” notions of community, which are derived from a code of dignity. 
The final way in which language organizes actions is in the building of community. Language 
study was cited as a means of establishing and maintaining relationships among families, the core of 
society as this is understood within the Confucian world view. Family and society are the foundation of 
the moral order. The term “Our Spiritual Center” captures the sense in which the school was more than a 
venue for language learning but the heart of a moral project. I noted the way in which language teaching 
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was spoken of as being linked to Chinese national and international interests. Thus, language linked, in 
widening circles, families, nations, and the world. Ong Laoshi spoke of how this linkage was a matter of 
obligation, further suggesting Confucian oriented values. “Center” as a metaphor for language and 
language learning was also repeated by an official government website, which similarly spoke of the idea 
of a “hub” with interests radiating out from the center. 
I observed that, despite the stated importance of Chinese, English was the predominant language 
of communication, even at fairly advanced levels. Avowed importance of Chinese against the extensive 
use of English appeared to represent a gap between attitudes and behavior. However, because of the 
unique nature of Chinese writing and the preeminence of reading and writing in Chinese culture, this 
focus on spoken English does not necessarily preclude literacy activity, as it might in a phonetic 
language. As noted above, use of Chinese tended to be restricted to code-focused learning activities while 
most communicative activity took place in English. I suggested that use of English is an accommodation 
to the America cultural and linguistic identities of these children. Literacy activity was extensive at all 
levels. In lower levels and for young children, literacy took the form of learning zhuyinfuhao, a Chinese 
syllabic alphabet. I argued that writing constituted a ritual enactment evoking Chinese cultural traditions. 
I noted that the vocabulary of this group of learners helped organize gestures instantiating dimensions of 
personhood. 
Although ritual actions evoked traditional Chinese practice, power relations were modulated so 
that the ethos of the classroom did not resemble that of traditional Chinese classrooms. Instead, the 
classroom served as a crucible to reconfigure what counts as “Chinese.” Such rethinking remains a 
possibility in this culture because the desire to harmonize competing agendas encourages a preference for 
transaction to negotiate identities. 
3. What social actions at the Chinese school are valued and worthy of esteem and what social 
actions are ignoble and so worthy of censure? 
- What models of person are regarded as estimable (i.e., how do estimable people 
behave?) and how does the Chinese school encourage model behaviors? 
— What sorts of cultural models, if any, are being used here to make value judgments 
about selves or others? Are there competing or conflicting models of valued social 
actions? 
- What sorts of actions deserve some form of redress? 
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Foremost among valued actions is, not surprisingly, studying Chinese. Estimable people are ones 
who uphold their Chinese heritage. The narrative about the girl who refused to learn to speak Chinese and 
of the boy who offered his being American as an excuse not to learn Chinese demonstrated instances of 
poor behavior. Shame is the consequence of poor behavior and is issued by Chinese and non-Chinese 
alike. 
Speaking Chinese was linked to the construct of “valuing education.” Valuing education, in turn, 
is tied to the idea of filial piety as expressed in narratives having to do with families and school. Learning 
Chinese was also filial behavior because it was cited as an aid to communication within the family and it 
helps establish one’s identity as a family member. An estimable person is one who overcomes individual 
shortcomings so that she can proceed on the path to personhood. The Chinese school, I argued, was 
spoken of as a venue for personal change and growth. 
Much of the discourse used in this study constructed the notion of the Chinese against the agon 
of “American.” “American” was used as a negative cultural category against which to construct worthy 
Chinese selves. Thus, for example, where Americans are said not to value education, Chinese do value 
education; where Chinese are disciplined, Americans are undisciplined; where Chinese are cooperative, 
Americans are uncooperative; where Chinese are deferential, Americans are disrespectful; where 
Americans achieve for and by themselves, Chinese achieve for and with the help of others. 
Confucian educational discourses insist that becoming a person occurs in a social context. 
Chinese children and their parents understood the need to constrain children’s behavior while Americans 
were spoken of as being blind to this need. Most fundamentally, such behavior is selfish and a chapter in 
a textbook used at the Chinese School, “My Enemy,” explicitly warns against selfish behavior. Other 
estimable behaviors in this text include cleanliness, modesty, and the ability to hold one’s tongue. In one 
of Ong Laoshi’s narratives, model behavior is achieved through means of “punishment,” and, perhaps for 
the older audience of “My Enemy” through self-criticism. In other narratives “shame” was a means of 
producing model behavior. 
I noted a tendency to harmonize competing values through the broader value of jianshu, bringing 
unlike things artfully together. I described attempts in Wong Laoshi’s class to balance competing ways 
acting (i.e., expected ways of being Chinese in school and expected ways of being American in school) 
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into a whole. Even the agonistic pair of Chinese/American, as narrated by Ong Laoshi can be regarded as 
an attempt at discursive harmony, rather than conflict, since Americans are instrumental, indeed, they 
cooperate in helping Chinese maintain their identity. 
6.3 Discussion and Implications 
A still-life with apples and a vase of flowers hangs over Chung Laoshi’s dining room table. She 
bought this print, a modem work in the style of the French Impressionists, because it was “peaceful,” 
peaceful because since apples, pingguo, and the vase, huaping, contain homonyms for the Chinese word 
for peace, ping. This painting is not an intentionally hybridized cultural object (say, an oil painting of 
sampans), but it earns its place on the wall for both the artistic merit Chung Laoshi sees in it and its 
message as interpreted through a Chinese tradition of visual puns. The painting is a helpful metaphor for 
how some people at the Chinese school find in America neither “mosaic” (e.g., a painting with discreet 
Chinese and Western elements) nor “melting pot” (a painting in which Chinese elements are 
unrecognizable), but a fusion of horizons. The painting becomes “peaceful” in a way that extends 
meaning beyond the tradition in which it was painted and adapts it to present circumstances. While 
drawing upon two traditions (and these traditions, in turn, have drawn upon others), Chung Laoshi 
appreciates and preserves each, yet revisions them as part of a wider cultural ethos. David Ingram (1984) 
explains such fusion of horizons as a process through which 
interpreter and tradition are elevated to participation in a higher universality. This fusion 
is at once the cancellation of both the parochial prejudices of the interpreter which 
impede access to the unique message of the tradition and the dead anachronisms implicit 
in the latter as well as the preservation and extension of what is common in both of them. 
The moment of cancellation results in a dual negation whereby both the being of the 
interpreter and the being of the tradition are altered (p. 3). 
The metaphor of fusion of horizons helps me, as it helped Belden, conceptualize rationalizations 
not as a remedy to conceal failed attempts to preserve language and tradition from assimilation but as a 
practical means of coming to terms with present circumstances. Recalling Bourdieu’s “active aspect of 
knowledge,” members of the Chinese school do not react mechanically to presumed threats against their 
culture but creatively “respond to the invitations or threats of a world whose meaning they have helped to 
produce” (Mertz, p. 115). 
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The lesson in Hua Yu, where collective traditions (communicated through the symbol of the 
pagoda in the rural landscape) share a horizon with some anonymous foreign city; the communication 
practices in Wong Laoshi s class, in which outspoken children learn to write in way of their ancestors; the 
New Years Festival with its melange of food and styles met to create something recognizably Chinese but 
also something different-these are best understood as instances of a melting of horizons. The horizon 
metaphor captures the conditional, expansive, and shifting quality of inquiry. Horizons, as Crusius (1991) 
describes them, are “emergent, imminent, dynamic... projective, unfolding ahead of us... altering as our 
location alters, rather than being static like the metaphor of a framework” (p. 33). Compare, for example, 
another metaphor, the metaphor of “framework,” which Fischer (1986) uses to describe the search for 
Chinese-American identity: 
...what is discovered and reinvented in the new works about ethnicity is, perhaps, 
something new: to be Chinese-American is not the same thing as being Chinese in 
America. In this sense, there is no role model for becoming Chinese-American. It is a 
matter of finding a voice or a style that does not violate ones several components of 
identity. In part, such a process of assuming an ethnic identity is an insistence on a 
pluralist, multidimensional, or multifaceted concept of self: one that can be many 
different things, and this personal sense can be a crucible for a wider social ethos of 
pluralism. (Fischer, 1986, p. 196) 
With the metaphor of horizons in mind, one can agree that “to be Chinese-American is 
not the same thing as being Chinese in America,” yet disagree with the implication that Chinese 
bom in America require a role model from outside Chinese tradition, since it is part of Chinese 
tradition that selves are many different things. The willingness of Chinese, even during periods 
of discrimination, to pursue “partial assimilation” (Leung, 1975) and to establish what Belden 
calls “paracommunities,” at once Chinese and American (but not Chinese-American), suggests a 
trait of Chinese migrants to be multidimensional while not losing the source of their identity. As 
the earliest Chinese heritage schools regarded themselves not as an alternative to American 
education, but as a means to harmonize Chinese life with the present circumstances, Williamston 
Chinese School works to engage the community beyond it while ensuring that children remain in 
but not of the mainstream. 
The Doctrine of the Mean states that the “superior person situated among barbarous 
tribes...does what is proper to a situation among barbarous tribes” (Legge 1983, p. 395), but 
what is “proper to a situation” will change as one’s horizons change. One might pair advice in 
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the Doctrine of the Mean with a lesson from the Analects, where Confucius observes, “The 
exemplary person in making his way in the world, is neither bent on nor against anything; rather 
he accords with what is appropriate” (Ames, 1997, p. 150). Ames points out that while 
appropriate, yi, is often translated as ‘right,” an interpretation that would suggest compliance 
with some external standard, Confucius is more productively understood as conceiving of 
morality as “the effort to get the most out of one’s circumstances, where one’s own interests and 
those of one’s natural, social and cultural environments must all be considered. Yi... [is] 
resolutely situational and pragmatic...” (p. 150). 
I pointed to Wang Gengwu’s (2000) research demonstrating the way in which Qing 
Dynasty officials, more or less overnight, transformed hundreds of years of tradition of 
marginalizing contemptible vagabonds into heroic huaqiao, “Overseas Chinese.” In a “non- 
cosmogenic cosmos,” a cosmos in which “it is entirely reasonable to conclude that most acorns 
become squirrels” (Ames, 1994, p. 201), identities are contingent and pragmatic. The question to 
be asked within this cosmos is not “Who am 1?” or “Where do I come from?” but 
who and what are our historical antecedents that have given us our present definition? 
What are their achievements that we can appropriate to acculturate ourselves?...The 
thinker’s role in the non-cosmogenic tradition...will not be as much to discover answers 
as to create a model of humanity that is persuasive and that evokes emulation. (Ames, p. 
149). 
To create persuasive models of humanity that evoke emulation (and so the ground on which to 
build positive identity) is always to re-create through the process, as Belden says, of “taking possession of 
the past, not merely inheriting it but claiming it as one’s own” (p. 91). She goes on to cite Ricouer that 
taking possession means to “possess anew, in an even sharper way, the question of the past in the present, 
without which there would be...no reason to speak of re-enacting, rethinking, or recreating” (p. 91). 
In considering how children in her Chinese school research could be membered as “Chinese,” 
despite being so different from their parents, Belden drew on the work of neo-pragmatist philosopher, 
Richard Rorty. Like other philosophers in his tradition—James, Peirce, Dewey, and Meade—Rorty’s 
views have an affinity with traditional Chinese thought with respect to communication and personhood 
1 Legge, (1983) for example: “The superior man...does not set his mind either for anything, or against 
anything; what is right he will follow” (p. 168). When yi is translated as “right” Confhcius’ words appear 
at once trivial and contradictory. 
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(Hall & Ames, 1995, Neville, 2000). Belden (1997) uses a correlative mode of thought, the metaphor, to 
explain how a reflection visible in a pool or in the chrome of a car bumper is like identity at her research 
site. The reflection would no more be “a case of the subject becoming identical with the object anymore 
than...to view a Chinese living in America and call him American.” 
1 suggested that Chinese school gave children an opportunity to act Chinese by engaging in ritual 
conduct in the classroom and the Chinese New Year Festival. Because children bring with them 
American modes of thought and being, acting Chinese in the classroom is problematic. The dilemma is 
resolved through ongoing restructuring of the classroom so that it is appropriate to American 
circumstances. While there are areas of overlap in Chinese and American classrooms, not all American 
practices in American classrooms would be recognized as having pedagogical intent. Similarly, in Ming 
Laoshi’s class, language-focused activities followed classroom participation patterns consonant with the 
Chinese culture of learning but these were disrupted by children seeking a more dialogic instructional 
style. This yielded a mix of participation structures, with teacher-dominated portions of the lesson 
focused on the language code, while other segments were dialogical. 
6.3.1 Implications for a Multicultural Society 
One goal of this research was to provide mainstream educators with knowledge about the value 
systems of Chinese students and their families. While the implication was that such knowledge might 
inform decisions made on behalf of Chinese children and their families, I have also suggested at points 
throughout this research that mainstream education might also be a beneficiary of Chinese thought and 
culture. Thus, Tu Wei Ming (1997) argues that Confucianism 
seems to have special relevance for contemporary professionals in the academy, 
government, mass media, business and civic organizations who are anxious about the 
affairs of the world, involved in social praxis, and dedicated to the efficacy of mediating 
cultural institutions. In this sense, the Confucian scholar, in both the spiritual self- 
definition and social function, can be a source of inspiration for the modern 
intellectual... given the need for a global ethic to address the crisis of the human 
community in dealing with ecological degradation, social disintegration, and the lack of 
distributive justice, Confucian inclusive humanism seems more compatible with the spirit 
of our time than does the anthropocentric secular humanism of the Enlightenment, (p. 23) 
The idea that Confucianism has something to offer Western education is seconded by Neville, who says 
Confucian notions of propriety and harmony speak to the problem of fragmentation and divisiveness that 
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he finds in Boston and so, of course, the American scene generally. Although a “sense of diverse groups 
belonging together and needing to work for the good of all is one of the great achievements of Western 
culture” (p. 16), says Neville, America lacks the “subhabits” of social deference, li, necessary to bring 
this sense to life. Neville offers the following example: 
To be a friend, for instance, is not to have a particular attitude about someone but to 
engage in activities with and for that person that constitute friendship, for instance 
talking, sharing experiences, rendering support... Each of these activities is a tendency or 
habitual behavior shaped by its own signs. But together they add up to friendship because 
the abstract signs defining friendly behavior as such give each of the components a place 
and due proportion. A good culture has all the signs needed, signs that can be learned 
through ordinary experiences...A deficient, barbarian culture is one that lacks the signs 
that can shape habits constituting the higher levels of civilized life. (p. 181) 
Neville goes on to critique American society as placing emphasis on child rearing (to return to an 
example early in this dissertation) but lacking 
the crucial habits of the details of love, nurture, and education; American society is self- 
deceived about parenting, and so are many individual Americans. Western societies 
generally place great stock in democratic government, but often are inattentive to or 
ineffective in promoting the educational and economic conditions necessary for persons 
to participate in a large democratic system. Therefore, democracies are often self- 
deceived about how democratic they really are when certain groups, by their history, 
possess the subhabits necessary for democracy and others do not, thereby being 
disenfranchised, (p. 182) 
The above critique of American society resonates with Sennett’s view, described earlier, that Western 
societies, while maintaining a rich vocabulary and set of rituals for describing and enacting the self and 
its entitlements, have but modest means to respond within the shared space of civil life such that “In 
modem social life adults must act narcissistically to act in accordance with society’s norms” (Carbaugh 
1996, p. 40). Americans have become “actors without an art” because, as Carbaugh explains Sennett’s 
premise, “Western interaction” is 
...a repertoire of intimate skills that render civil relations problematic. Through 
Sennett’s lens, one sees Western public interaction as ill-fitting residuals of private 
scenes. The consequences are a lack of coordinated public activity, a loss of protection 
for the cultural participants, and a cultivated inability to perform civilly with people on a 
nonpersonal level. Authenticity reigns over civility. 
By “loss of protection for the cultural participants” Carbaugh refers to Sennett’s definition of civility as 
an “activity that protects people from each other and yet allows them to enjoy each other’s company (p. 
58). This definition comes close to Cua’s definition of //, or ritual practice, as “schemes of mutual 
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accommodation of differences in attitudes, belief, and values in social intercourse” (Hall & Ames, 1995, 
p. 209). 
Carbaugh disagrees with the particulars of Sennett’s appraisal of American life, pointing to 
basketball games as a scene in public life allowing 
communal and integrative performance, constituting ways people can identify with each 
other by being part of the scene. The common meanings in being such a person [i.e., a 
basketball fan] provide a means of collective identification, rather than a scene or 
scenario for secluded isolates, (pp. 58-59) 
In Neville’s terms, the basketball game, as a public ritual, contains the signs, leamable through ordinary 
experience of participation, to establish the “subhabits” necessary to be a “fan.” 
Carbaugh also relates public performance to the weightier idea of what it means to be an 
American in a diverse society. Here, however, Sennetfs judgment does seem to penetrate. Describing 
what he calls the “hollow community,” Carbaugh (1996) explains how Americans are often encouraged 
to “think globally.” Yet, the effect of such slogans is 
to turn our eyes and ears (and mouths) elsewhere to identify those elsewhere as proof we 
are abiding by this dictate, and thus ably show our concern for this everywhere-else. 
Identity, as a result of this relevance to the global everywhere, ends up being displaced, 
because it is being located in a nowhere-in-particular. (pp. 195-196) 
At the other pole of this Discourse, we are 
encouraged through a kind of identity politics to champion a cause, and thus to affiliate 
with an enclave, to become part of a particular political faction that is concerned for 
example with the environment, crime, of the poor. Identity, as a result, because it selects 
one or some set interest over and above the others, ends up being affiliated with that one 
group and its interests, and thus adopts a tunnel vision of this one, and loses sight of the 
many with whom it lives together in the community or society... Each of these bids for 
identity creates singular forces that are at odds with the creation of strong communities. 
(p. 196) 
Whether people turn their attention globally or, conversely, toward their own interest group, they listen to 
the same “horn of individualism” (Carbaugh 1996, p. 196) whose call shatters communities into various 
isolated solidarities. Carbaugh also proposes a solution: 
taking the group together, and situating them all in some particular communal scene, it 
seems to me, can offer something by way of a corrective, with each providing a partial 
remedy to the excesses of the others, each becoming more cognizant of the specific 
community scenes in which lives are being lived, (p. 197, Carbaugh’s emphasis). 
As in a basketball game, ritual is a communicative means through which people can be situated 
in a particular communal scene. This idea is captured by the overused term, “celebrate diversity.” Ritual, 
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among Carbaugh s (1996) forms of cultural communication” (p. 204), can provide the gestures 
constituting civilizing propriety. As Neville argues, “in principle, commitment to cultural diversity 
requires concrete positive social habits of deference to the diverse cultures.” This demands that we 
“invent rituals for everyday life and government that foster inclusive cultural diversity, for without that 
the respect required for humanness cannot be expressed or exercised” (p. 16). Sticking with Sennett’s 
definition of civility as “activity which protects people from each other and yet allows them to enjoy each 
other’s company,” good rituals provide the signs that allow people to discriminate situations with more 
nuance and sensitivity, leading to more adaptive and satisfactory ways of forming communal 
relationships. 
“Difference,” by itself, can hardly be a virtue and so consideration of the rituals of 
everyday life that construct and celebrate it provides a clue to the adequacy with which it is 
expressed. The portraits on the middle school cafeteria wall provide an instance of a celebration 
of diversity, since it constructs different kinds of people and symbolically locates them in the 
same scene. Yet the space between the portraits, the dynamic area within which “difference” 
occurs, is only dead, symbolically empty wall space. One might point to the multicultural 
festival as another such a ritual, but again, at least in Mrs. Huang’s telling of it, each culture 
happens on its separate table, with visitors passing from one table to the next. 
These two celebrations of difference retell what might be regarded as the Disney 
version of culture, a “small world” of mechanical Others, dancing and singing in kimonos, 
wooden shoes, and grass skirts. What, one might ask, would the Small World have looked like if 
it had been designed not by Disney but by Dewey? I say Dewey because his “own theory of the 
social construction of culture as part of human nature, is remarkably similar to many ancient 
Confucian themes,” (Neville, 2000, p. 38) and because Dewey, of course, is closer to the 
concerns of our own time. I have already suggested that Dewey’s view with respect to conflict is 
similar to Xunzi’s “the art of accommodation” to the extent that both regarded it as a productive 
and ultimately cooperative exercise to improve upon current social arrangements. 
One might also consider Dewey’s insistence on the organic connectedness of humans. Dewey’s 
position with respect to being-in-the-world-with-others parallels the Confucian conception of personhood, 
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which locates humans and society as constituents of the natural order, “a system of regularities and 
principles that defines human relations and the ethical conduct that should inform them.” According to 
Dewey 
The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that 
each had to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to 
give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers 
of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of 
their activity. (Boisvert, p. 55) 
In contrast to the images on the middle school cafeteria wall, Dewey insists that identities and activities 
must be referred to those of others so that persons can perceive their “full import.” Rituals should thus 
affirm not the individual qualities but the harmonies among them. 
Similarly, “Becoming a Confucian person,” says Ames (1997) “involves benefiting and being 
benefited by membership in a world of reciprocal loyalties and obligations which surround and stimulate 
one, and which define one’s own worth” (p. 153). A conventional insult among Chinese, “jciaoren” 
“small person,” describes a person motivated by self gain and who maintains a corresponding narrowness 
of human sympathy. Ming Dynasty Neo-Confucian scholar Wang Yangming, in his “Inquiry on the Great 
Learning” calls for the cultivation of “clear character”: 
The great man regards Heaven and Earth and the myriad things as one body. He regards 
the world as one family and the country as one person. As to those who make a cleavage 
between objects and distinguish between self and others, they are small men. That the 
great man can regard Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one body is not because he 
deliberately wants to do so, but because it is natural to the humane nature of his 
mind...Thus learning to be the great man consists in getting rid of the obscuration of 
selfish desires by his own efforts to make manifest his clear character, so as to restore the 
condition of forming one body with Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things, a condition 
that is originally so...(Chan, 1969, pp. 659-670) 
In cultivating human sensitivity, says Wang, the junzi, the cultivated person, attempts to extend 
sympathies in circles radiating out from the center with all forms of being so that insensitivity to the 
suffering and destruction of any living thing, including animals, plants, and even stones, is an example of 
selfishness that diminish human possibility. Tu (1994) charts this example of correlative thinking as “The 
Broadening Process of the Self,” beginning with self at the center of a series of nested ellipses extending 
to “Family,” “Community,” “Country,” “World,” and “Beyond” (p. 182). Commenting on Yang’s 
method, Tu (1997) says: “Learning to be human, in this sense, is to extend from what we care about most 
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(our children, parents, and spouse) to all realms of existence that we do not even imagine we are 
intellectually connected to” (p. 21). 
Consideration of Wang Yangming and Dewey leads me back to Our Spiritual Center as a place 
where children learn to become persons. Ultimately, becoming a person is not a matter of retreating to an 
ethnic enclave but cultivating // to engage others in political and moral action. Although members drew 
clear distinctions between what was Chinese and what was American and insisted on the importance of 
the Chinese school to maintain that distinction, practices nevertheless encouraged a complex and 
inclusive way of being Chinese, one that transcended boundaries of race and, in the end, difference. 
207 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abowitz, K. K. (2000). A pragmatist revisioning of resistance theory. American Educational Research 
Journal 37(41 877-907. 
Agar, M. (1996). The professional stranger: An informal introduction to ethnography 12nd editionV San 
Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Alba, R. D. (1990). Ethnic identity: The transformation of White America. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
Allen, J., Frohlich, M. and Spada, N. (1984). The communicative orientation of language teaching: An 
observation scheme. In J. Handscombe, R. Orem and B. Taylor (Eds.). On TESOL ’83: The 
Oueston of Control. Washington, D.C.: TESOL 
Ames, R. T. (1994). The focus-field self in classical Confucianism. In R.T. Ames (Ed.), Self as person 
in Asian theory and practice. Albany, NY: SUNY Press 
Ames, R.T. (1997). The Chinese conception of selfhood. In E. Deutsch & R. Bontekoe (Eds.), A 
companion to world philosophies (pp 148-154). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers. 
Anderson, (1983). The architecture of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
Anton, C. (1999). Beyond the constitutive-representational dichotomy: The phenomenological notion of 
intentionality. Communication Theory. 9(1). 26-57. 
Baker, C. (1996). Foundations of bilingual education and bilingualism (2nd edition). Clevedon, 
Philadelphia, and Adelaide: Multilingual Matters. 
Bakhtin, M. (1981). The dialogic imagination: Four essays. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Barth, F. (1969). Introduction. In F. Barth (Ed.). Ethnic groups and boundaries: The social organization 
of culture difference. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 
Beebe, L. M. (1988). Five sociolinguistics approaches to second language acquisition. In L.M. Beebe 
(Ed.), Issues in second language acquisition (pp. 43-77). New York, NY: Newbury House. 
Belden, E. L. W. (1997). Claiming Chinese identity. New York and London: Garland Publishing 
Company. 
Blacker, D. (nd). Education as the normative dimension of philosophical hermeneutics. Retrieved July 
12, 2002 from http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-yearbook/93_docs/BLACKER.HTM 
Bogdan, R. C., & Bilken, S. K. (1992). Qualitative research for education. An introduction to theory and 
methods (2nd edition). Boston, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: Allyn and Bacon. 
Brecht, R. D., & Ingold, C. W. (1998). Tapping a national resource: Heritage languages in the United 
States. ERIC Digest. Washington DC: ERIC Clearinghouse on Languages and Linguistics. 
Brown, M. (1995). On becoming Chinese. In M.J. Brown (Ed.l Negotiating ethnicities in China and 
Taiwan (pp. 37-74). Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies. 
Brown, P., & Levinson, S. C. (1990). Politeness: Some universals in language usage. Cambridge, New 
York, Port Chester, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press. 
Campbell, R.N. (2001). Heritage Language Education: Needed Research. In J.K. Peyton, D.A. Ranard 
& S. McGinnis (Eds.), Heritage Languages in America: Preserving a national resource, (pp. 255- 
303). McHenry IL: Center for Applied Linguistics and Delta Systems. 
208 
Carbaugh, D. (1988). Comments on culture in communication inquiry. Communication Reports. 38-41. 
Carbaugh, D. (1989a). Talking American: Cultural discourses on DONAHUE. Norwood, NJ: Ablex 
Carbaugh, D. (1989b). Fifty terms for talk: A cross-cultural study. International and Intercultural 
Communication Annual. 13. 93-120. 
Carbaugh, D. (1990). Toward a perspective on cultural communication and intercultural contact. 
Semiotica. 80. 15-35. 
Carbaugh, D. (1993). Personhood, positioning, and cultural pragmatics: American dignity in cross- 
cultural perspective. In Communication Yearbook. 17. 159-186. 
Carbaugh, D. (1995). The ethnographic communication theory of Philipsen and associates. In Cushman 
& B. Koucacic (Eds.), Watershed research traditions in human communication theory (pp. 269- 
297). Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Carbaugh, D. (1996). Situating selves: The communication of social identities in American scenes. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Carbaugh, D., Gibson, T. A., & Milbum, T. (1997). A view of communication and culture: Scenes in an 
ethnic cultural center and a private college. In B. Kovacic (Ed.), Emerging theories of human 
communication (pp. 1-24). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Cary, J. (1975). A cultural approach to communication. Communication. 2. 1-22 
Cashmore, E. (1996). Dictionary of race and ethnic relations. Fourth Edition . London and New York: 
Routledge. 
Chan, W-T. (1963). A source book in Chinese philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Chao, T. H. (1996). Overview. In X. Wang (Ed.), A view from within: A case study of Chinese heritage 
community language schools in the United States (pp. 7-14). Washington, DC: National 
Foreign Language Center. 
Chao, T. H. (1997). Chinese heritage community language schools in the United States. Eric Digest. 
Charon, J. M. (1985). Symbolic interactionism: An introduction, an interpretation, integration. Second 
edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Chen, V. (1990/1991). Mien Tze at the Chinese dinner table: A study of interactional accomplishment of 
face. Research on Language and Social Interaction , 24, 109-140 
Chen, V. (1994). (De)hyphenated identity: The double voice in The Woman Warrior. In A. Gonzalez, 
M. Houston, & V. Chen (Eds.), Our voices: Essays in culture, ethnicity and communication. An 
intercultural anthology. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Co. 
Chiung, W-V. (2000). Peh-oe-ii, a childish writing? Paper presented at the Sixth Annual Conference of 
the North American Taiwan Studies Association June 16-19, 2000. Harvard University, 
Massachusetts. 
Chow, K-W . (1997). Imagining boundaries of blood: Zhang Binglin and the invention of the Han race 
in modem China. In F. Dikotter (Ed.), The construction of racial identities in China and Japan: 
Historical and contemporary perspectives (pp. 34-52). Honolulu HA: University of Hawaii 
Press. 
Chow, R. (1993). Writing Diaspora: Tactics of intervention in contemporary cultural studies. 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 
209 
Chu, H., & Lu, T-C. (1967). Reflections on things at hand: The Neo-Confucian anthology compiled bv 
Chu Hsi and Lu Tsu Ch’ien. New York: Colnmhia I Tnivprsjty press. ~ ~ 
Chun-Hoon, L. (1973). Jade Snow Wong and the fate of Chinese-American identity. In S. Sue & N. 
Wagner (Eds.), Asian-Americans: Psychological perspectives (pp. 125-135). Palo Alto: Science 
and Behavior Book. 
Clifford, J. (1986). Introduction. In J. Clifford & G.E. Marcus (Eds.), Writing culture: The poetics and 
politics of ethnography (pp. 1-26). Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California 
Press. 
Collier, M. J. (2000). Constituting cultural difference through discourse: Current research themes of 
politics, perspectives, and problematics. In M. Collier (Ed.), Constituting cultural difference 
through discourse. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Cook, G. (1992). Discourse. Oxford,UK: Oxford University Press. 
Coolidge, M. R. (1909). Chinese immigration. New York, NY: Henry Holt & Company 
Coulon, A. (1995). Ethnomethodology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Cronen, V. E., Pearce, W. B., & Harris, L. M. (1982). The coordinated management of meaning: A 
theory of communication. In E.X. Dance (Ed.), Human communication theory: Comparative 
essays. New York: Harper & Row Publishers. 
Crusius, T. W. (1991). A teacher’s introduction to philosophical hermeneutics. Urbana, IL: National 
Council of Teachers Press. 
Crystal, D. (1987). The Cambridge encyclopedia of language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cummins, J. (1995). Heritage language teaching in Canadian schools. In O. Garcia & C. Baker (Eds.), 
Policy and practice in bilingual education (pp. 134-138). Clevedon, Avon (UK) and Briston, 
PA: Multilingual Matters. 
Dawson, D. (1983). Ethnic mother tongues as languages in the Canadian classroom. Integrated 
Education. 21. 229-234. 
De Barry, W. T. (1998). Asian values and human rights: A Confucian communitarian perspective. 
Cambridge, MA, & London: Cambridge University Press. 
DeGlopper, D. R. (1995). Lukang: Commerce and community in a Chinese city. Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press. 
Dewey, J. (1988). Quest for certainty. In J. A. Boydston (Ed.), John Dewey: The later works. 1925- 
1953 (Vol. 4, 1929). Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. 
Dickerson, L. (1975). The learner’s interlanguage as a system of variable rules. TESOL Quarterly. 9, 
34-48. 
Diggs, D., & Rappaport, J. (1992). Literacy, orality, and ritual practice in Highland Columbia. InJ. 
Boyarin (Ed.), The ethnography of reading. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of 
Califonia Press. 
Dikotter, F. (1992). The discourse of race in modem China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Dikotter, F. (1997). Racial discourse in China: Continuities and permutations. In F. Dikotter (Ed.), The 
construction of racial identities in China and Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
210 
Dobson, W. A. C. H. (1974). A dictionary of the Chinese particles: With a prolegomenon in which the 
problems of the particles are considered and they are classified by their grammatical functions. 
Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press. 
Dorian, N. (1981). Language death: The life cycle of a Scottish dialect. Philadelphia-1 Iniversity nf 
Pennsylvania Press 
Draper, J. B., Hicks, J. B., & Hicks, J. H. (2000). Where we’ve been; What we’ve learned. In J. B. 
Webb, & B. L Miller (Eds.), Teaching heritage language learners: Voices from the classroom. 
Yonkers, NY: The American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages. 
Duranti, A. (1997). Linguistic anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Eagleton, T. (1996). The illusions of postmodernism. Oxford, UK and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers. 
Ebrey, P. (1995). Surnames and Han Chinese Identity. In M. J. Brown (Ed.). Negotiating ethnicities in 
China and Taiwan. Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies. 
Edwards, J. (1985). Language, society and identity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Edwards, J. (1995). Multilingualism. London: Penguin Books. 
Edwards, J. (1997). Language minorities and language maintenance. Annual Review of Applied 
Linguistics. 17. 30-42. 
Ellis, R. (1994). The study of second language acquisition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Elvin, M. (1985). Between the earth and heaven: Conceptions of the self in China. In Carrithers, M., 
Collins, S. and Lukes, S. The category of the person: Anthropology, philosophy, history. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 
Emerson, R. M., Fretz, R. I., & Shaw, L. L. (1995). Writing ethnographic fieldnotes. Chicago & 
London: University of Chicago Press. 
Espiritu, Y. L. (1992). Asia American panethnicity: Building institutions and identities. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press. 
Fairbank, J. K., & Reischauer, E. O. (1973). China: Tradition and transformation. Boston: Houghton & 
Mifflin. 
Field, F. E. (2002). Linguistic borrowings in bilingual contexts. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins Publishing Co. 
Fischer, M. M. J. (1986). Ethnicity and the post-modern arts of memory. In J. Clifford & G. E. Marcus 
(Eds.), Writing culture: The poetics and politics of ethnography. Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
London: University of California Press. 
Fishman, J. (1966). Language loyalty in the United States. The Hague: Mouton & Co. 
Fishman, J. (1980). Minority language maintenance and the ethnic mother tongue school. Modem 
Language Journal, 64, 167-172. 
Fishman, J. A. (1980). Ethnic community mother tongue schools in the U.S.A.: Dynamics and 
distributions. International Migration Review, 14, 235-247. 
Friedman, K. (2000). Negotiating Taiwan’s language hierarchy: Taiwan’s new language education, 
curriculum and the role of the state in shaping linguistic markets. Paper presented at the Sixth 
211 
Annual Conference of the North American Taiwan Studies Association. Harvard University, 
Massachusetts. 
Gallagher, M. W. (1996). Optimizing unique opportunities for learning. In X. Wang (Ed.), A view 
from within;_A case study of Chinese Heritage Language Schools in the United States. 
Washington, DC: National Foreign Language Center. 
Gardner, R. C. (1985). Social psychology and second language learning: The role of motivation and 
attitudes. London: Edward Arnold. 
Gee, J. (1996). Social linguistics and literacies: Ideology in discourses. Second edition. London and 
Philadelphia: Routledge/Falmer. 
Gee, J. (1999). An introduction to discourse analysis: Theory and method. London & New York: 
Routledge. 
Gee, J. G. & Green, J . L. (1998). Discourse analysis, learning, and social practice: A methodological 
study. In P.D. Pearson & A. Iran-Nejad (Eds.) Review of Research in Education 23 (pp. 119- 
169). Washington, DC: American Educational Research Association 
Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures. New York: Basic Books. 
Geertz, C. (1976). “From the natives’ point of view”: On the nature of anthropological understanding. In 
K. Basso & H Selby (Eds.), Meaning in anthropology (pp. 221-237). Albuquerque: University 
of New Mexico Press. 
Global Chinese Language and Culture Center Online. (2000). Retrieved June 18, 2002, from 
http://www.ocac.gov.tw 
Goffrnan, E. (1959). Presentation of self in everyday life. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. 
Graham, A. C. (1995). Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical argument in ancient China. La Salle, IL: 
Open Court. 
Gudykunst, W. B., & Schmidt, X. (1988). Language and ethnic identity: An overview and prologue. In 
W. B. Gudykunst (Ed.), Language and ethnic identity. Clevedon, Avon (UK) and Bristol, PA: 
Multilingual Matters. 
Gudykunst, W. B., & Ting-Toomey, S. (1988). Culture and interpersonal communication. Newbury 
Park, Beverly Hills, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Gumperz, J.J. (1982a). Discourse strategies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gumperz, J.J. (1982b). Introduction: Language and the communication of social identity. In J. Gumperz 
(Ed.), Language and Social Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Guthrie, G. P. (1985). A school divided: An ethnography of bilingual education in a Chinese 
community. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Associates. 
Guthrie, G. P., & Hall, W. S. (1981). Introduction. In H. T. Treuba, G. P. Guthrie, & K. H-P. Au 
(Eds.). Culture and the bilingual classroom: Studies in classroom ethnography (pp. 1-13). 
Rowley, MA: Newbury House Publishers. 
Hall, B., & Valade, K. (1995). “Brown-nosing” as a cultural category in American organizational life. 
Research on Language and Social Interaction, 28, 391-419. 
Hall, D. L., & Ames, R. (1995). Anticipating China: Thinking through the narratives of Chinese and 
Western culture. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
212 
Hammersley, M., & Atkinson, P. (1983). Ethnography: Principles in practice London: Tavistock. 
Harre, R., & Secord, P. F. (1979). The explanation of social behavior. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield Adams & 
Co. 
Hastings, S. O. (1995). Cultural discourses on identity and morality by Asian Indians in the United 
States: An ethnographic analysis. Unpublished Dissertation. University of Massachusetts 
Amherst. 
Haworth, A. (1999). Bakhtin in the classroom: What constitutes dialogic text: Some lessons from small 
group interaction. Language and Education. 13(2T 99-117. 
Henderson, D. (2002). Negotiating coauthority: The power of identity. In J. A. Kotarba, & J. M. Johnson 
(Eds.), Post modem existential sociology (pp. 235-258). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. 
Heritage, J. (1997). Conversational analysis and institutional talk. In D. Silverman (Ed.), Qualitative 
research: Theory, method and practice (pp. 160-182). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Hester, S., & Elgin, P. (1997). Membership categorization analysis: An introduction. In S. Hester & P. 
Elgin (Eds.), Culture in action: Studies in membership categorization analysis. Washington, 
DC: International Institute for Ethnomethodolgy and Conversation Analysis & University Press 
of America. 
Hill, J. (1998). “Today there is no Respect”: Nostalgia, “respect,” and oppositional discourse in Mexicano 
(Nahuatl) language ideology. In B. B. Schieffelin, K. A. Woolard, & P. Kroskrity (Eds.), 
Language ideologies: Practice and theory. New York & Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
Ho, D. Y. F. (1992). Cognitive socialization in Confucian heritage cultures. In P. M. Greenfield & R. R. 
Cocking (Eds.). Cross-cultural roots of minority child development, (pp. 285-313). Hillsdale, 
NJ & Hove, UK: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Hoffman, D. M. (1996). Culture and self in multicultural education: Reflections on discourse, text, and 
practice. American Educational Research Journal. 33(3). 545-569. 
Hofstede, G. (1980). Cultures consequences: International differences in work-related values. Beverly 
Hills, CA: Sage. 
Holstein, J. A., & Gubrium, F. F. (1997). Active interviewing. In D. Silverman (Ed.). Qualitative 
research: Theory, method and practice (pp. 113-143). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Hsu, F. K. L. (1981). Americans and Chinese: Passage to differences (3rd edition). Honolulu, HI: 
University of Hawaii Press. 
Hu, G. (2002). Potential cultural resistance to pedagogical imports: The case of communicative 
language teaching in China. Language, culture and curriculum. 15(2), 93-105. 
Hua Yu. (Revised Edition). (1990). Hong Kong: Chi Sheng Book Co. Ltd. 
Hymes, D. (1972). Models off the interaction of language and social life. In J. Gumperz & D. Hymes 
(Eds.), Directions in sociolinguistics: The ethnography of communication (pp. 35-71). New 
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. 
Hymes, D. (1974). Foundations in sociolinguistics: An ethnographic approach. Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press. 
Ingram, D. (1984). Hermeneutics and truth. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 15(1). 
213 
James, W 0967). What pragmatism means. In J. McDermott (Ed.), The writings of William James (pp. 
376-390). New York, Random House. 
Jin, L., & Cortazzi, M. (1998). The culture the learner brings: A bridge or a barrier? In M. Byram & M. 
Fleming (Eds.), Language learning in intercultural perspective: Approaches through drama and 
ethnography (pp. 98-118). Cambridge, UK and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 
Jo, H-Y. (2001). Heritage language learning and ethnic identity: Korean Americans struggle with 
language authorities. Language, Culture and Curriculum. 14. 26-41 
Johnson, B. (2003). Values in English language teaching. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Kahane, J. (1996). Politics of self-esteem. American Educational Research Journal. 33UY 
Katriel, T. (1990). ‘Griping’as a verbal ritual in some Israeli discourse. In D. Carbaugh (Ed.), Cultural 
communication and intercultural contact (pp. 99 - 113). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Katriel, T., & Philipsen, G. (1990). Reflections on “communication” as a cultural category in some 
American speech. In D. Carbaugh (Ed.), Cultural communication and intercultural contact (pp. 
95-97). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
King, K. A. (2000). Language ideologies and heritage language education. International Journal of 
Bilingual Education and Bilingualism. 3, 167-184. 
King, K. K. (1932). Problems of second generation Chinese. Sociology and Social Research. 16 63^ 
250-258. 
Kramsch, C. (1994). Context and culture in language teaching. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Krashen, S., & Shin, F. (1998). Do people appreciate the benefits of advanced first language 
development? Attitudes towards continuing first language development after “transition.” In S. 
Krashen, L. Tse, & J. McQuillan (Eds.), Heritage language development, (pp. 3-13). Culver 
City, CA: Language Education Associates. 
Kuo, E. C. Y. (1974). Bilingual pattern of a Chinese immigrant group in the United States. 
Anthropological Linguistics, 16. 128-140. 
Kvale, S. (1996). Interviews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing. Thousnd Oaks: Sage 
Publications. 
Lakoff, R., & Johnson, M. (1980). Conceptual metaphor in everyday life. The Journal of Philosophy, 
TL 453-486. 
Langlier, K. M. (1989). Personal narratives: Perspectives on theory and research. Text and Performance 
Quarterly, 9, 243-276. 
Lee, M. (1998). Non-Chinese heritage learners: Practices and implications. In X. Wang (Ed.), A view 
from within: A case study of Chinese Heritage Community Language Schools in The United 
States. Washington, DC: National Foreign Language Center. 
Legge, J. (1983). The Chinese classics. Volume 1. Taipei: Southern Materials Center. 
Leung, E. K. (1975). A sociological study of the Chinese language schools in the San Francisco Bay 
Area. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Missouri. 
Li, W. L. (1982). The language shift of Chinese-Americans. International Journal of the Sociology of 
Language, 38, 109-124. 
214 
Lieberson, S. (1981). Language diversity and language contact. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Lin, C-J. (2000). The other women in our home: Social discourses on foreign maids in Taiwan. Paper 
presented at the Sixth Annual Conference of the North American Taiwan Studies Association, 
Harvard University, Massachusetts. 
Lin, Y-M. (1986). The past, present and future of the Chinese language schools in the United States. 
Department of Instructional Design/Development/Evaluation. Unpublished manuscript. 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
Liu, S-L. (1994). Parental attitudes and expectations toward childrearing and filial piety Harmony and 
conflict between two generations among Taiwanese families. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
University of Massachusetts Amherst. 
Lofland, J., & Lofland, L. (1995). Analyzing social settings. A guide to qualitative observation and 
analysis (3rd edition). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co. 
Chaudron, C. (1988). Second language classroom research on teaching and learning. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Louis, K. K. (1932). Problems of second generation Chinese. Sociology and Social Research. 15(3L 
Low, V. (1982). The unimpressible race: A century of educational struggle by the Chinese in San 
Francisco. San Francisco: East/West Publishing. 
Lu, X. (2001). Bicultural identity development and Chinese community formation: An ethnographic 
study of Chinese schools in Chicago. Howard Journal of Communications. 12(4). 203-219. 
Luke, C., & Luke, A. (1999). Theorizing interracial families and hybrid identity: An Australian 
perspective. Educational Theory, 49, 223-249. 
Lyman, S. M. (2002). Restoring the self as subject: Addressing the question of race. In J. A. Kotarba, & 
J. M. Johnson (Eds.), Post modem existential sociology (pp. 15-38). Walnut Creek, CA: 
AltaMira Press. 
Lynch, J. (1989). Multicultural education in a global society. New York: Fairman Press. 
Macbeth, D. (2000). Classrooms as installations: Direct instruction in the early grades. In S. Hester and 
D. Francis (Eds.) Local educational order: Ethnomethodological studies of knowledge in action. 
Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Jon Benjamins Publishing Company 
Malmkjaer, K. (1991). The linguistics encyclopedia. London and New York: Routledge. 
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion and 
motivation. Psychological Review. 98. 224-253. 
Martin-Jones, M., & Heller, M. (1996). Introduction to the special issues on education in multilingual 
settings: Discourse, identities and power. Part II: Contesting legitimacy. Linguistics and 
Education. 8. 127-137. 
McKay, S., & Wong, S. C. (Eds.). (2000). New Immigrants in the United States: Readings for second 
language educators. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Mercer, N. (1995). The guided construction of knowledge: Talk amongst teachers and learners. 
Clevedon: Multilingual Matters 
215 
Mertz, E. (1989). Sociolinguistic creativity: Cape Breton Gaelics linguistic “tip.” In N. C. Dorian (Ed.), 
Investigating obsolescence: Studies in language contraction and death tpp 103-116). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Milbum, T. A. (1998). Conversation and culture in the Puerto Rican Cultural Center: An ethnographic 
exploration of communicating personhood. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of 
Massachusetts, Williamston. 
Milbum, T. A. (2000). Enacting “Puerto Rican Time” in the United States. In M. J. Collier (Ed.), 
Constituting cultural difference through discourse. Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage 
Publications. 
Moerman, M. (1975). Accomplishing ethnicity. In R. Turner (Ed.), Ethnomethodoloev. (pp. 54-68). 
Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books. 
Moerman, M. (1987). Talking culture: Ethnography and conversation analysis. Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Morimoto, T. (1997). Japanese Americans and cultural continuity: Maintaining language and heritage. 
New York & London: Garland Publishing Co. 
Nadamitsu, Y., Chen, L., & Friedrich, G. (2000). Similar or different?: The Chinese experience of 
Japanese culture. In M. Collier (Ed.), Constituting cultural difference through discourse (pp 
158-188). Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Nafisy, H. (1993). The making of exile cultures: Iranian television in Los Angeles. Minneapolis and 
London. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Nakayama, T. (1994). Dis/orienting identities: Asian Americans, history, and intercultural 
communication. In A. Gonzalez, M. Houston, & V. Chen (Eds.), Our voices: Essays in culture, 
ethnicity and communication. An intercultural anthology. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury 
Publishing Co. 
Neville, R. C. (2000). Boston Confucianism: Portable tradition in the late-modern world. Albany, NY: 
State University of New York. 
Nieto, S. (1997). Ethnicity and education forum: What difference does difference make? Harvard 
Educational Review, 67(2), 169-187. 
Ong, W. J. (1982). Oralitv and literacy: Technologizing the world. London and New York: Routledge. 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, Taiwan, ROC. (2001, December). An introduction to the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, Taiwan, R.O.C. 
Padilla, A. M. (1980). The role of cultural awareness and ethnic loyalty in acculturation. In A. M. 
Padilla (Ed.), Acculturation: Theory, models and some new findings (pp. 47-84). Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press for the American Association for the Advancement of Science. 
Pan, L. (1990). Sons of the yellow emperor: A history of the Chinese Diaspora. Boston, Toronto, 
London: Little, Brown and Company. 
Pan, Z., Chaffee, S. H., Chu, G. C., & Ju, Y. (1994). To see ourselves: Comparing traditional Chinese 
and American cultural values. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Paulston, C. B. (1994). Linguistic minorities in multilingual settings: Implications for language policies. 
Amsterdam and Philadephia: John Benjamins Publishing Co. 
216 
Philipsen, G. (1987). The prospect of cultural communication. In L. Kincaid (Ed.), Communication 
theories: Eastern and Western perspectives (pp. 245-254). New York: Academic Press. 
Philipsen, G. (1992). Speaking culturally. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Philipsen, G., & Katriel, T. (1990). “What we need is communication”: “Communication” as a cultural 
category in some American speech. In D. Carbaugh (Ed.), Cultural communication and 
intercultural contact (pp. 77-93). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. 
Phinney, J. S., & Rosenthal, D. A. (1992). Ethnic identity in adolescence: Process, context and outcome. 
In G. R. Adams, T. P. Gullotta, & R. Motemayor (Eds.), Adolescent identity formation. 
Newbury Park, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Polanyi, L. (1985). Telling the American story: A structural and cultural analysis of conversational 
storytelling. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishers Corporation. 
Potter, J. (1997). Discourse analysis as a way of analyzing naturally occurring talk. In D. Silverman 
(Ed.), Qualitative research: Theory, method and practice (pp. 144-160). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
Powers, M. (2000). Vision and identity in Qi Wu Lun. In P. Yu, P. Bol, S. Owen, & W. Peterson (Eds.), 
Ways with words: Wring about reading texts from early China. Berkeley, Los Angeles, & 
London: University of California Press. 
Prus, R. (1996). Symbolic interaction and ethnographic research: Intersubiectivitv and the study of 
human lived experience. Albany NY: State University of New York Press. 
Psathas, G. (1995). Conversation analysis: The study of talk-in-interaction. Thousand Oaks, London, 
New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Pye, L. (1992). The spirit of Chinese politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Quirk, R., Greenbaum, S., Leech, G., & Svartvik, X. (1972). A grammar of contemporary English. 
Essex, UK: Longman Group Ltd. 
Rampton, B. (1987). Stylistic variation and not speaking ‘normal’ English: Some post-Labovian 
approaches and their implications for the study of interlanguage. In R. Ellis (Ed.), Second 
language acquisition in context (pp. 47-71). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall International. 
Rigney, E. G., & Smith, R. (1991). A behavioral examination of Mead’s view of role-taking. Symbolic 
Interaction. 14(1). 71-81. 
Romaine, S. (1989). Bilingualism. New York: Basil Blackwell 
Royce, A. P. (1982). Ethnic identity: Strategies and diversity. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Sacks, H. (1972). On the analyzability of stories by children. In J .J. Gumperz & D. Hymes (Eds.), 
Directions in sociolinguistics: The ethnography of communication (pp. 325-345). New York: 
Basil Blackwell. 
Saffan, W. (1999). Nationalism. In J. Fishman (Ed.), Handbook of language and ethnic identity (pp. 77- 
93). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Schumann, J. (1978). Social and psychological factors in second language acquisition. In J. Richards 
(Ed.), Understanding second and foreign language learning: Issues and approaches. Rowley, 
MA: Newbury House. 
217 
Scollon, R., & Scollon, S. W. (1981). Narrative, literacy and face in interethnic communication. 
Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation. 
Scollon, R., & Scollon, S. W. (1996). Intercultural communication: A discourse approach. Oxford, UK 
& Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. 
Seidman, I. (1998). Interviewing as qualitative research: A guide for researchers in education and the 
social sciences. New York and London: Teacher’s College Press. 
Sherzer, J. (1987). A discourse-centered approach to language and culture. American Anthropologist, 
89,295-309. 
Sherzer, J. (1992). Ethnography of speaking. In R. Bauman (Ed.), Folklore, cultural performances and 
popular entertainments: A communication-centered handbook (pp. 76-80). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Silverman, D. (2001). Interpreting qualitative data: Methods for analyzing talk, text, and interaction (2nd 
edition). London, Thousand Oaks, CA, New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Silverstein, M. (1979). Language structure and linguistic ideology. In P. R. Clyne, W. Hanks, C. L. 
Hofbauer (Eds.), The elements: A parasession on linguistic units and levels. Chicago, IL: 
Chicago Linguistic Society. 
Siu, X., & Paul, C. P. (1987). The Chinese laundrvman: A story of social isolation. New York and 
London: New York University Press. 
Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (1999). Education of minorities. In J. A. Fishman (Ed.). Handbook of language 
and ethnic identity. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Soloman, R. C. (1994). Recapturing personal identity. In R. T. Ames (Ed.), Self as person in Asian 
theory and practice. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Spradley, J. P. (1980). Participant observation. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Stafford, C. (1995). The roads of Chinese childhood. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Street, B. (1994). Cross-cultural perspectives on literacy. In J. Mavbin (Ed.). Language and literacy in 
social practice: A reader. Clevedon, Avon (UK) & Bristol, PA: Multilingual Matters. 
Tan, A. (1989) Jov Luck Club. New York: Putnam’s Press 
Tom, K. P. (1941). Function of the Chinese language school. Sociology and Social Research, 25(6), 
557-560. 
Tse, L. (1998). Ethnic identity formation and its implications for heritage language development. In S. 
D. Krashen, L. Tse, & J. McQuillan (Eds.), Heritage language development (pp. 15-29). Culver 
City, CA: Language Education Associates. 
Tu, W-M. (1985). Confucian thought: Selfhood as creative transformation. Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press. 
Tu, W-M. (1994). Embodying the universe: A note on Confucian self-realization. In R. Ames (Ed.), 
Self as person in Asian theory and practice (pp. 177-212). Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press. 
Tu, W-M. (1997). Chinese philosophy: A synoptic view. In E. Deutsch & R. Bontekoe (Eds.), A 
companion to world philosophies (pp. 3-23). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
218 
Tyler, S.A. (1986). Post-Modern ethnography: From document of the occult to occult document. In J. 
Clifford & G.E. Marcus (Eds.), Writing culture: The poetics and politics of ethnography (pp. 
122-140). Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. 
Urciuoli, B. (1995). Language and borders. Annual Review of Anthropology. 525-546 
Valdes, G. (2000). Heritage language research priorities conference report. Los Angeles: UCLA. 
Van Lier, L. (1988). The classroom and the language learner: Ethnography and second language 
research. London and New York: Longman 
Van Maanen, J. (1995). An end of innocence: The ethnography of ethnography. In J. Van Maanen (Ed.), 
Representation in ethnography (pp. 1-35). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 
Van Maanen, J., Dabbs, J. M., & Falkner, R. R. (1982). Varieties of qualitative research. Beverly Hills, 
CA: Sage Publications. 
Varenne, H. (1998). Diversity as American cultural category. In C. J. Greenhouse & R. Kheshti (Eds.), 
Democracy and ethnography: Constructing identities in multicultural liberal states. Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press. 
Wang, G. (2000). The Chinese overseas: From earthbound China to the quest for autonomy. 
Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press. 
Wang, P-F. S. (1996). Academic curriculum. In X. Wang (Ed.), A view from within: A case study of 
Chinese Heritage Language Schools in the United States, (pp. 21-25L Washington, DC: 
National Foreign Language Center. 
Wang, S. C. (1996). Improving Chinese language schools: Issues and recommendations. In X. Wang 
(Ed.), A view from within: A case study of Chinese Heritage Language Schools in the United 
States, (pp. 63-67). Washington, DC: National Foreign Language Center. 
Wei, L. (1994). Three generations, two languages, one family: Language choice and language shift in a 
Chinese community in Britain. Clevedon, Avon (UK), and Bristol, PA: Multilingual Matters, 
Ltd. 
Wei, L. (1997). Who maintains/relinquishes which language how and why? A response to Michael 
Clyne. Current Issues in Language & Society. 4. 148-152. 
Weider, D. L., & Prat, S. (1990). On becoming a recognizable Indian among other Indians. In D. 
Carbaugh (Ed.), Cultural communication and intercultural contact (pp. 45-64). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Weinstein, E. A., & Deutschberger, P. (1963). Some dimensions of altercasting. Sociometry, 26, 454- 
466. 
Wick, N. (1998). Linguistic Agons: The self and society opposition and American Quakers. 
International and Intercultural Communication Annual, 22. 
Wilder, G. D., & Ingram, J. H. (1974). Analysis of Chinese characters. New York: Dover Publications. 
Wiley, T.G. (2001). Defining heritage languages and their speakers. In J.K. Peyton, D.A. Ranard and S. 
McGinnis (Eds.), Heritage languages in America: Preserving a national resource (pp. 29-36). 
McHenry IL: Center for Applied Linguistics and Delta Systems. 
Willett, J. (1995). Becoming first graders in an L2: An ethnographic study of L2 socialization. TESOL 
Quarterly, 29, 473-503. 
219 
Wong, L. Y. (1992). Education of Chinese children in Britain and the USA. Clevedon, Avon (UK) and 
Bristol, PA: Multilingual Matters, Ltd. 
Wong, S. C., Lopez, M. G. (2000). English language learners of Chinese background. In S. L. McKay 
& S. C. Wong (Eds.), New Immigrants in the United States: Readings for second language 
educators. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Wong, S. C. (1988). The language learning situation of Asian immigrant students in the U.S.: A socio- 
and psycholinguistic perspective. NABE Journal 11, 203-234. 
Woolard, K. A. (1998). Introduction: Language ideology as a field of inquiry. In B. B. Schieffelin, K. 
A. Woolard, & P. Kroskrity (Eds.), Language ideologies: Practice and theory. New York & 
Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
Woolard, K. A., and Schieffelin, B. (1994). Language ideology. Annual Review of Anthropology, 23, 
55-82. 
Wu, D. Y-h. (1991). The construction of Chinese and non-Chinese identities. Daedalus, (Spring), 159- 
179. 
Wu, D. Y-h. (1994). Self and collectivity: Socialization in Chinese preschools. In R. T. Ames (Ed.), 
Self as person in Asian theory and practice (pp. 235-249). Albany: State University of New 
York Press. 
Yao, X. (2000). An introduction to Confucianism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Yep, L. (1977). Child of the owl. New York, Hagerstown, San Francisco, London: Harper & Row 
Publishers. 
220 


